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This surveyl is a continuation of previous articles on the topic of Florida criminal law 
and procedure. 
I. CONFESSIONS 
A. Right to Counsel and Right to be Silent 
The principles of Miranda v. Arizona2 and Escobedo v. Illinois3 were 
applied by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Statewright 
v. State.4 Defendant was taken to the police station and advised that he 
did not have to say anything; that anything he said could be used against 
him; that he had a right to an attorney, and if he did not have one, the 
state would furnish him one at no cost to him. The defendant then 
waived his rights and gave a statement. In reversing defendant's con-
viction, the court held that a suspect must be clearly informed that he 
has the right to have a lawyer with him during interrogation and that 
the warnings given were insufficient to clearly inform the defendant of 
this right. 
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that charges 
of careless driving resulting in an accident and of operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage are petty 
offenses for which the Miranda warnings need not be given.5 
1. This survey covers cases reported in 248 So. 2d through 278 So. 2d and laws enacted 
by the 1972 and 1973 Regular and Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature. Professor Wills 
who usually writes this survey was on a leave of absence and will continue to write future 
surveys. 
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which held that the right to counsel applies at the police station 
when an investigation ceases to be general in nature and begins to "focus in" on the de-
fendant. Although it is still a viable case, Escobedo has largely been superseded by and in-
corporated into Miranda. 
4. 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
5. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The court relied on 
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The court in Weinstein v. State,6 held that the dictates of Miranda 
are not confined to hardened criminals, but apply to all citizens regard-
less of age. However, a juvenile may both assert and intelligently waive 
rights to remain silent and to have counsel.7 
Cases frequently arise where a defendant has made two confessions, 
one having been coerced and the other free from coercion, after the 
proper Miranda warnings had been given. The Supreme Court of Florida 
has stated that in cases such as these, 
questions arise as to ( 1) whether coercive influences actually exist 
in the first instance, (2) whether those influences have abated, 
or persist, up to the time of the statement being given and ( 3) 
whether such influences as have persisted did, in fact, render 
the statement involuntary. These questions are mixed questions 
of fact and law to be determined initially by the trial court in 
ruling on admissibility of the statement and ultimately by the 
jury.a 
A statement should be excluded if the attending circumstances are 
calculated to delude the accused as to his true position or to exert im-
proper or undue influences over him. However, where an agent of the 
Bureau of Narcotics advised defendant of his rights at the time of his 
arrest, then. told him there was nothing to fear and that he would be 
protected, was not a deluding of the defendant since he was again advised 
of his rights at a later time by o~her officials.9 A similar result was reached 
in Grimsley v. State,10 where defendant was given the proper Miranda 
warnings but indicated that she did not know if she should waive an 
attorney and asked the officer for his opinion. He said "I don't know." 
She then asked, "Well, do you think I should tell the truth?" The officer 
said, "Yes, by all means."11 Defendant then signed a waiver of rights. 
The court held that the waiver was valid and the testimony of her ad-
missions to the police officer was properly admitted. 
In Myers v. State,12 the police twice attempted to give the Miranda 
warnings but were stopped by the defendant who stated that he knew 
and understood his rights and then freely gave a statement. The court in 
holding that the statement was admissible, stated that "where the state 
makes every reasonable effort to inform a defendant of his rights and the 
Wright v. Worth, 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87 (1922), which held that offenses against municipal 
ordinances were not criminal in nature as contemplated by the state constitutional provisions 
relating to the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution. 
6. 269 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Defendant, a 17-year-old was not told of his right 
to counsel or that anything he said could be used against him. 
7. Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
8. State v. Oyarzo, 274 So. 2d 519, 521 (Fla. 1973). 
9. Id. 
10. 251 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
11. Id. at 672. 
12. 256 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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defendant refuses to listen ... it is not necessary to hold him down and 
read them to him."13 
Where defendant claimed that he didn't completely understand 
when the police informed him of his rights and yet told the officers that 
he did understand, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held 
that the confession was admissible.14 
In Colocado v. State/rs a police officer entered the premises in ques-
tion with a search warrant and asked who was in charge. Defendant 
answered that he was. This statement was held admissible even though 
no prior Miranda warnings were given. The court reasoned that the 
officer was merely discharging his statutory obligation of determining the 
identity of the person in charge so that a copy of the warrant and inven-
tory could be read and delivered to him. The court also noted that the 
inquiry did not in any sense constitute an in-custody interrogation of 
one suspected of a crime. 
B. Illegal Detention and Interrogation 
In In re AJ.A.,16 a confession was obtained from a 16 year-old after 
several hours of interrogation at the police station. The court held that 
.the confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of 
Florida Statutes section 3 9 .03 ( 3) ( 1971)17 which requires notification, 
without delay of the child's parents. A different result was reached under 
similar circumstances by the District Court of Appeal, First District, in 
State v. Roberts.18 That court held that the McNabb:Mallory i:ule did 
not require the exclusion of a confession despite a violation of Florida 
Statutes sections 39.03 (3), 901.06 or 901.23. The confession is admissible 
if the Miranda warnings were administered prior to the statement or con-
fession. The District Court of Appeal, First District, has also held that 
Florida Statutes section 39 .03 ( 6), which requires that a juvenile be 
fingerprinted and photographed, should be read in conjunction with 
section 39 .03 ( 3) so that a confession obtained during this process before 
the juvenile is taken to a magistrate is admissible.19 
Where the defendant was arrested in the early morning and his 
confession was obtained before noon on that day, it was held that there 
13. Id. at 402. 
14. Hall v. State, 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
15. 251 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
16. 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
17. FLA. STAT. § 39.03(3} (1971), provided that: 
The person taking and retaining a child in custody shall notify the parents or legal 
custodians of the child and the principal of the school in which said child is enrolled 
at the earliest practicable time, and shall, without delay for the purpose of investiga-
tion or any other purpose, deliver the child, by the most direct practicable route, to 
the court of the county or district where the child is taken into custody . . •. 
This section is revised significantly in Florida Statutes section 39.03(3} (1973). 
18. 274 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
19. Cooper v. State, 257 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
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was no unnecessary delay in presenting him before the committing magis-
trate and thus his confession was admissible.20 
In Jetmore v. State,21 the defendant was illegally arrested, taken to 
the police station and read the Miranda warnings. He confessed within 
45 minutes. Defendant argued that because the arrest was illegal the 
ensuing confession was inadmissible.22 The District Court of Appeal, 
Fourth District, held that the confession was freely and voluntarily given 
after the Miranda warnings, and that it was independent of the illegal 
arrest.28 
The District Courts of Appeal, Third and Fourth districts, have 
held that a defendant's initial request for an attorney during interrogation 
by a police officer does not preclude taking statements from the def en-
dant at any future time before an attorney is furnished.24 
C. Voluntary Confessions 
If a defendant is informed of all of his contitutional rights, and then 
knowingly and intelligently waives them, his statement is not inadmis-
sible on the ground that at the time of his arrest the defendant told the 
arresting officer ·that he wanted to talk to an attorney.25 If the statement 
was voluntarily made by the defendant after a full warning of bis con-
stitutional rights, the confession was valid despite the fact that it was 
made orally.26 
When the state attempts to introduce a confession given during in-
custody interrogation, the question of voluntariness need only be deter-
mined by a preponderance of the evidence.27 A statement by the accused 
that he fully understands and waives his rights is not an essential link 
in the chain of proof; waiver may be shown by attendant circumstances.28 
It is also not necessary that the defendant waive each separate item of 
the Miranda warnings as they are given as long as there is evidence of 
a clear manifestation of a knowing intent to waive.29 
Where a defendant has employed his own counsel, or one has been 
appointed for him, the presence of his counsel is not essential to the 
20. Hughes v. State, 272 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
21. 275 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
22. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
23. It is submitted that the Miranda warnings themselves are not sufficient to show at-
tenuation for the illegal arrest. It is only one piece of evidence to consider. The facts of this 
case do not seem sufficient to constitute the attenuation required by Wong Sun. 
24. Barker v. State, 271 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) ; see McDougald v. State, 275 
So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), holding that a statement made by defendant after requesting 
counsel but before request is honored, is not per se inadmissible. 
25. James v. State, 263 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
26. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972). 
27. State v. Harris, 276 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
28. Fowler v. State, 263 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1972), citing United States v. Hayes, 385 F.2d 
375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1968). 
29. Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
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validity or effectiveness of defendant's waiver of the right to have coun-
sel present at an interrogation.80 
In Anglin v. State,81 a 15-year-old defendant made a confession 
after his mother told him to tell "the truth" or "she would clobber him." 
The court held that the mother's statement did not amount to a threat 
or coercion although it recognized that other jurisdictions might agree 
that such an admonition by a parent might deprive a teenager of his 
constitutional rights. 
In Foster v. State,32 defendant on a boat radioed the Coast Guard 
that he had killed two people and had thrown their bodies overboard. 
He was then taken into custody and inadequate Miranda warnings were 
given. Defendant again admitted the murders and also re-enacted them. 
The court found that the initial statements made by the defendant were 
not made as a result of any custodial situation. Under these circumstances, 
compliance with the Miranda requirements was not necessary because de-
fendant voluntarily admitted his crime before he was taken into custody. 
D. Use of Confession at Trial 
The introduction into evidence of a co-defendant's confession im-
plicating the defendant does not constitute reversible error, even though 
the co-defendant elected not to testify and was unavailable for cross-
examination, if there was ample corroborative evidence as to defendant's 
guilt, particularly if it was given by the victim.33 It is upon this latter 
point that this situation can be distinguished from Bruton v. United 
States.84 In Brown v. State,35 the court held that Bruton does not apply 
in a non-jury case but, if it did apply, the state could nevertheless urge 
that the conviction is valid, notwithstanding error in considering in-
criminating statements made by the co-defendant, on the ground that 
the case against the defendant is so overwhelming that the error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The fact that a confession was oral and not written or recorded, 
would go only to the weight to be given it by the trial judge in deter-
mining its voluntariness and by the jury in its findings of fact.36 
In Williams v. State,37 defendant's written confession was not ad-
mitted because the state was unable to produce the stenographer who 
took the confession. Yet statements made to a police officer which re-
30. Johnson v. State, 268 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
31. 259 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
32. 266 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
33. Blackwell v. State, 269 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
34. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
35. 252 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). See also Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 
3d Dist. 1972). 
36. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972). 
37. 261 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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lated to facts contained in the written confession were admitted into 
evidence. The court held that since there was no evidence of duress or 
inducement, and the oral statements were made at another place and 
time, it was not error to admit them even if the written confession was 
inadmissible. 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, stated in Hernandez 
v. State38 that: 
[T]he admissibility of a confession shall be determined by the 
trial court from a preliminary consideration of evidence offered 
by either party bearing on the circumstances, conditions and 
surroundings under which the confession was made, which may 
include evidence as to age, sex, disposition, experience, char-
acter, education, training, intelligence and the mental condition 
of the defendant.39 
This determination should be made in the absence of the jury, so as to 
prevent it from being prejudiced against a defendant if the confession 
was not voluntarily made.40 
The rule that it is error to show that the defendant remained silent 
during interrogation has been held to be subject to the harmless error 
rule. In Wright v. State,41 the court upheld as harmless error, the ad-
mission of a police officer's testimony that defendant had no explanation 
for stolen items in an automobile after he had been advised of his rights 
to counsel and to remain silent. 
When the defendant and the police officers give different versions 
of the same event, the defendant's version is not binding on the court. 
The police officer's version may satisfy the state's burden to prove that 
the confession was voluntary.42 
In Richardson v. State,43 a psychiatrist testified that during the 
course of a mental examination defendant said that he had been picked 
up for various things but had not been convicted and that he had beaten 
a robbery charge. The court held that, although it is not proper for a 
psychiatrist to repeat at trial the statements of the accused taken during 
his mental examination, it was harmless error since the evidence of guilt 
was overwhelming and the prejudicial effect could have been removed 
by a request to strike the statement and an instruction that the jury 
disregard it. 
In State v. Retherford,44 the Supreme Court of Florida, adopting the 
holding in Harris v. New York,45 ruled that once a defendant has volun-
38. 273 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
39. Id. at 133, citing Brown v. State, 135 Fla. 30, 184 So. 518 (1938). 
40. Hernandez v. State, 237 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
41. 251 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
42. Barker v. State, 271 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
43. 248 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
44. 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972). 
45. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
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tarily taken the stand, his credibility may be impeached by the introduc-
tion of prior conflicting statements made before he was given the Miranda 
warnings. 
It is incumbent upon the state to prove the corpus delecti in every 
case. In so doing it must rely on proof other than the confession of the 
defendant. Thus, where only hearsay evidence could establish the corpus 
delecti, the conviction had to be set aside even though the defendant had 
confessed.46 
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
A search warrant is invalid if it fails to require the person executing 
the warrant to bring the property found and ,the person in possession 
thereof before either the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other 
court having jurisdiction of the off ense.47 An officer conducting a search 
under a valid search warrant may lawfully seize property not specifically 
described in the warrant if he has probable cause to believe it is stolen 
property.48 Accordingly, where a search warrant sufficiently described 
certain of the items seized, but did not describe a sufficient amount, the 
property was properly seized since the thieves accompanied the police 
officers during the search and identified the property received by the 
defendant as stolen.49 
It was held that a search warrant which failed to show the specific 
time or times when an informant allegedly obtained narcotics from the 
defendant's premises was fatally defective.60 In State 'V. Henderson,51 
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that if the original 
search warrant was signed by the proper officer and was read to the de-
fendant in toto before the search was commenced, the ministerial act 
of leaving an unsigned and undated duplicate of the original search war-
rant, would not be prejudicial error. The state in such a situation has 
the burden of producing the original warrant and showing that it had 
been read to the defendant. If a search warrant leaves out the date of 
execution, but that date can be indisputably deduced from other dates 
in the documents, the evidence obtained will not be suppressed if the 
error is not prejudicial.52 
The issue in search warrant proceedings is not guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but probable cause for believing that a crime has been 
committed and that evidence has been secreted in a specific place.113 Thus, 
hearsay evidence may provide the probable cause necessary for the issu-
46. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
47. State v. Dawson, 276 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
48. Partin v. State, 277 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
49. State v. Hutchins, 269 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
50. State v. Mills, 267 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
51. 253 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
52. State v. Cain, 272 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
53. Anderson v. State, 265 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
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ance of a search warrant.'14 In Ingram v. State,55 the District Court of 
Appeal, Fourth District, held that where an officer approached the de-
fendant for the purpose of obtaining information and recognized him 
as the person who, according to hearsay reports, was armed with a re-
volver, the officer properly conducted a search of the defendant for a 
weapon. 
Probable cause cannot be based on mere suspicion; it must be based 
on facts known to exist. However, the test for probable cause is not 
whether the evidence would be admissible for the purpose of proving 
guilt at trial, but whether the information would lead a man of prudence 
and caution to believe that the offense has been committed.66 The District 
Court of Appeal, Second District, has stated that justification for seizure 
need not be established by proof beyond and to the exclusion of reason-
able doubt but may be proven by clear and convincing evidence.57 
A warrantless search must be founded on probable cause.58 Under 
the "open view" doctrine it is not an unreasonable search for an officer 
to move to a position where he has a legal right to be, and look for things 
he may have reason to believe will be seen.59 Accordingly, in Moore v. 
Wainwright,60 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that a 
warrantless seizure of stolen television sets and other items of property 
from an abandoned farmhouse was not illegal since the television set 
was placed near an open door of the house, was clearly visible, and was 
found by the officers without the necessity of searching the premises. 
Also, once the privacy of a dwelling has been lawfuly invaded, the police 
are not required to obtain an additional warrant to seize items that they 
discover in a lawful search.61 
In Chavis v. State,62 the defendant was stabbed. While in the emer-
gency room of the hospital, a police officer made an inventory search of 
his clothing without a warrant and found a package of heroin. The court 
held that the actions of the police officer were justified because the 
search was made with the preservation of evidence in mind, a valid pro-
cedure in investigating a crime. Compare the facts in Johnson v. State: 68 
A police officer had helped to carry defendant's wife up the stairs to 
their apartment. While placing the wife upon the bed, the officer pulled 
out a small automatic weapon from defendant's coat pocket. The court 
held that the officer had no probable cause to justify the search and 
seizure of the gun since defendant was in his own home, had committed 
54. Id. 
SS. 264 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
56. Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
S7. State v. Ansley, 2Sl So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
58. State v. Miller, 267 So. 2d 3S2 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
S9. Id. 
60. 248 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
61. Partin v. State, 277 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
62. 274 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
63. 253 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
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no act involving a violation of the law, and had not threatened anyone 
and was at the time of the search cooperating with the police officer. 
In State v. Olson,64 the court held Florida Statutes, section 465.131 
(1971),65 valid as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. A 
warrantless administrative search is constitutional and neither probable 
cause nor suspicion that illegal activity is or has been going on is re-
quired. In addition, the court held that the instant search was not made 
on pretext merely because another law enforcement agency had a concur-
rent or common interest in the search and had either encouraged the 
search by authorized agents or accompanied the agent in a search limited 
to areas incident to the licensed activity.66 
Abandoned property is not subject to the constitutional safeguards 
against unreasonable search and seizures. Thus, where a police officer 
had stopped the defendant and inquired about a bulge in defendant's 
trousers and the defendant produced a vial from his pocket and threw 
it into an adjacent waterway, there was an abandonment of possession. 
The vial, which was found to contain marijuana, was admissible, not-
withstanding the fact that the officer had no valid basis to stop and in-
terrogate the def endant.67 
The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures applies in cases involving governmental action only and does 
not apply to searches and seizures made by private individuals.68 Thus, 
where a police officer was told by the operator of a service station that 
he had observed defendant with narcotics paraphernalia through an 
opening in the restroom wall, the officer had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant, notwithstanding the alleged violation of defendant's privacy 
by the service station operator.69 
An automobile may be searched without a warrant where the officers 
have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles 
which they are entitled to seize. In State v. Sanders,70 police officers 
arrested the defendant in his car on a charge of rape. The police then 
searched the car for the gun thought to have been used in the rape al-
though he was already in custody. The court reasoned that it would have 
64. 267 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
6S. The Florida Pharmacy Act authorizes agents of the Board of Pharmacy to inspect, 
in a lawful manner at all reasonable hours, any retail drug establishment or manufacturer 
for the purpose of determining a violation of any regulation promulgated pursuant to the Act. 
66. The court would probably not condone searches so frequently undertaken as to con-
stitute undue harrassment. 
67. Riley v. State, 266 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The court disregarded the "fruits 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine on the basis that the evidence was not produced through 
means of a search. The court did not consider the fact that the officer had no authority to 
stop the defendant initially. 
68. Bernovich v. State, 272 So. 2d SOS (Fla. 1973). 
69. Werley v. State, 271 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); see also note S4 supra and ac-
companying text, relating to searches based on hearsay. 
70. 266 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
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taken too long to obtain a search warrant and the gun might have been 
lost, or perhaps taken by the employees of the car-towing company. 
When police officers are lawfully in possession of a vehicle after 
its owner has been placed under arrest and are responsible for protecting 
it, it is reasonable to conduct a search for the purpose of making an 
inventory of the contents of the vehicle.71 Although a minor traffic viola-
tion cannot be used as a pretext to search a vehicle for evidence of other 
crimes, a defendant, who was stopped by policemen because he had 
exceeded the speed limit by about 15 miles per hour, was properly ar-
rested for drinking and careless driving after the policemen detected 
alcohol on his breath.72 Before impounding the automobile, an inventory 
search was made which uncovered evidence leading to defendant's con-
viction for breaking and entering. The court held that the evidence 
should not be suppressed since this was a routine inventory of a car 
which had been taken into custody. 
In Gustafson v. Florida,78 defendant was arrested for driving his 
automobile without having the proper operator's license in his possession. 
During the course of a pat-down search of defendant the officer found 
a box containing marijuana cigarettes. The United States Supreme. Court 
held that the officer was entitled to make a full search of defendant's 
person incident to the lawful arrest. It made no difference that there was 
no evidentiary purpose for the search and that the officer did not indicate 
anv sub.iective fear of the defendant. The Court relied heavily on United 
States v. Robinson,74 which was decided on the same day. In Robinson; 
the Conrt also held that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full 
search of the defendant's person is not only an exception to the warrant 
req1 1irement of the fourth amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search. 
'Pefore Gustafson was decided by the United States Supreme Court, 
the Florida courts began to apply the holding of the Supreme Court of 
Fforida in State v. Gustafson. 711 In State v. Foust,76 defendant was stopped 
bv a police officer without probable cause. The officer then discovered 
that a bench warrant had been issued against the defendant. The officer· 
then arrested the defendant and conducted a search which disclosed 
marijuana. The court held the search valid under State v. Gustafson.71 
71. State v. Cash, 275 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
72. Urquhart v. State, 261 So. 2d S3S (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
73. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973). 
74. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973). This case is noted at 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 974 (1974). 
75. 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). The court held that a search which reasonably ensues after 
a legal arrest is proper, without regard to whether there is a nexus between the offense in 
question and the object sought. 
76. 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
77. 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). There was no discussion of the reasonableness of the search. 
The court also felt that it was immaterial that the officers had no probable cause for stopping 
the defendant originally. This is another case in which a Florida court has disregarded the 
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See also State v. Hatten, 264 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
1972). 
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Advising one of his right not to consent to a search is not required 
either to validate a consent or to establish (prima fade) that the search 
was voluntary.78 Instead, all surrounding circumstances must be con-
sidered in deciding the question of voluntariness.79 In Earman v. State,80 
the Supreme Court of Florida held that a search conducted by officers 
following their illegal entry into a house for the purpose of arresting the 
defendant did not lose its unconstitutional taint even though the defen-
dant had consented to the search. Consent to the search had taken place 
after one of the officers drew a gun, made a preliminary search of the 
house, illegally arrested and searched the defendant and took him to an 
upstairs bedroom where he signed the consent while sitting on a bed 
beside an open box of marijuana. 
Conversely, one who voluntarily turns his car keys over to the police 
cannot later complain about the legality of the search.81 The District 
Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that where the police searched 
defendant's briefcase at the jail prior to delivering it to him in his cell, 
the search was reasonable and had to be considered as having been made 
with defendant's implied consent. The court noted that defendant could 
not expect the police to give him his suitcase without first examining it.82 
In Powers v. State,83 a female undercover agent and a friend entered the 
defendant's house as guests. The agent observed the smoking of marijuana 
and asked that a cigarette be rolled for her which she kept as evidence. 
The court held that the evidence should not be suppressed since the 
agent's entry was legal, creating an implied consent to the seizure of the 
evidence. The fact that the entry into the house was accomplished by 
fraud did not negate the consent where, as here, the entry was not 
fordble. 
In executing a search warrant an officer must attempt to call his 
presence to the attention of those within the residence by knocking or 
other reasonable means before entering the residence. He must also an-
nounce his authority and the purpose of his visit at the residence.84 If 
the officer fails to do this, the items seized are not admissible into evi-
dence.85 However, an officer's entry without first announcing his presence 
and purpose is justified if the officer's safety would otherwise be im-
periled.86 In State v. Kelly,87 the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
78. State v. Spanierman, 267 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
79. Id. 
80. 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972). 
81. State v. Custer, 251 So. 2d 287 (F1a. 2d Dist. 1971). 
82. State v. Kircheis, 269 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
83. 271 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
84. State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), construing FIA. STAT. § 933.09 
(1973). 
85. Id. 
86. State v. Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also Benefield v. State, 160 
So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964). 
87. 260 So. 2d 903 (F1a. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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trict, held that the statutory "knock and announce" requirements were 
violated when police officers, with a search warrant, stepped into the 
defendant's house without first announcing their presence even though 
the drugs seized could have been easily destroyed by the defendants 
had they known that police officers were present. 
Rule 3.190(h) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
that the trial court hold a hearing on a motion to suppress and rule on 
the motion before the trial begins, upon the basis of the evidence adduced 
at the hearing on the motion.ss It is error to fail to suppress in-court 
testimony concerning an article of evidence when an in-court motion to 
suppress the evidence was not ruled on, notwithstanding the fact that 
the articles were not received in evidence.s9 Where defendant's motion to 
suppress is denied and for this reason he pleads nolo contendere, he has 
preserved for appeal the issue on his motion to suppress even though 
the plea of nolo contendere was not expressly made on condition that 
the error be preserved.90 In Paulson v. State,91 the court, affirming de-
fendant's conviction, distinguished the case of Davis v. Mississippi,92 
which had recognized that the prohibitions of the fourth amendment apply 
to the taking of fingerprints. In the present case, the initial arrest for 
drunkenness was not for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints, or inves-
tigating other crimes. 
The statute93 providing that the state attorney may authorize an 
application for a court order permitting the interception of wire or oral 
communications permits the delegation of such authority to any assistant 
state attomey.94 The justices of the Supreme Court of Florida have 
jurisdiction to issue an interception order.911 A witness who has been 
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury during an investiga-
tion concerning matters related to intercepted communications has no 
standing to challenge the legality of court authorized wiretaps by a pre-
indictment and preinterrogation motion to suppress the communications.96 
If a wire tap is made without first securing the permission of a magistrate 
and is based on the consent of one of the parties to the conversation, the 
state must produce that party in order that the defendant have the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine him.91 
A defendant who complains of an unlawful search must claim and 
prove that he was, at the time of the search, the owner, tenant, or lawful 
88. Foster v. State, 255 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
89. Id. 
90. Ackles v. State, 270 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
91. 257 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
92. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
93. FLA. STAT. § 934.07 (1973). 
94. State v. Angel, 261 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
95. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973). 
96. In re Grand Jury Investigation Concerning Evidence Obtained by Court Authorized 
Wiretaps, 276 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
97. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973). 
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occupant of the premises searched.98 It is doubtful whether one who is 
not the owner of a vehicle could object to the search of the vehicle after 
being stopped for speeding.99 
Ill. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
In Furman v. Georgia,100 the United States Supreme Court held that 
capital punishment as a discretionary sentence was unconstitutional. Re-
sponding to this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida,1°1 in a very 
comprehensive opinion, examined the effect that Furman would have 
upon the various aspects of Florida law. Subsequent to this decision, 
the Florida Legislature revised sections 175.082 and 921.141 and rein-
stated the death penalty. Following conviction for a capital offense, a 
separate sentencing proceeding must now be held during which any evi-
dence may be presented which the court deems relevant, including matters 
relating to certain enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
An advisory sentence is rendered by the jury to the court which may 
enter a sentence of either death or life imprisonment. A written opinion 
must be given in support of a death sentence. These revisions were held 
constitutional by the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Dixon.102 The 
rationale of the court was that the Furman decision did not totally prcr 
hibit the use of discretion in the sentencing procedure. The court rea-
soned that if the discretion necessary in the statute is "reasonable and 
controlled" and not "capricious and discriminatory," the test of Furman 
is f ulfilled.103 
It was held that despite elimination of authorization from the 1968 
Florida Constitution, a grand jury is still proper as it is founded in com-
mon law, and since the constitution104 continues to imply its propriety.105 
Florida Statutes section 867.01 (1973), prohibiting the exhibition 
for pay or compensation of any crippled or physically-distorted, mal-
formed or disfigured person in any circus, sideshow, etc., was found un-
constitutional in that it failed to set forth reasonable standards to be 
followed in its application.106 
In contrast, the statutory provision that " [ w] hoever commits such 
acts as are of the nature to corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense 
of public decency . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .11101 is suffi-
98. Russell v. State, 270 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
99. State v. Patterson, 252 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
100. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Because there were a number of varying opinions in Furman, 
the door still appears open for states to promulgate statutes providing capital punishment in 
certain cases. See Fr.A. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1973). 
101. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972). 
102. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
103. This case is noted at 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 723 (1974). 
104. FLA. CONST. art. I,§ lS(a). 
105. Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972). 
106. World Fair Freaks & Attractions, Inc. v. Hodges, 267 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1972). 
107. FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1973). 
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ciently clear in that all the terms are of general understanding and, 
therefore, the statute is valid.108 
In Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell,1°9 the Su-
preme Court of Florida found that any person who maintains a place 
where the law is violated shall be guilty of maintaining a nuisance, that 
a place in which drugs are continually being used is a nuisance and that 
such a nuisance may properly be enjoined. Those statutes which provide 
for declaration of nuisance and subsequent injunction were found to be 
constitutionally acceptable.11° 
The validity of Florida Statutes chapter 790, covering weapons and 
firearms, 111 was upheld in a number of cases during the survey period. 
It is unlawful for felons to possess firearms under this chapter.112 How-
ever, a number of felonies were exempted (e.g., antitrust violations, un-
fair labor practices, nonsupport) as well as "other similar offenses" 
until the exceptions were eliminated in 1971.118 In Driver v. Van Cott,114 
it was held that the "other similar offenses" clause was unconstitutionally 
vague and should be deleted from the statute, but such a finding did not 
render the rest of the statute invalid. Defendants Van Cott and Smith,1111 
who had previously been convicted of forgery and lottery violations re-
spectively, did not come within the excepted felonies and were subject to 
prosecution under the statute. 
In Rinzler v. Carson,116 it was held that the prohibition of possession 
of short-barreled rifles, shotguns, or machine guns117 does not violate the 
Florida Constitution, which gives a person the right to keep and bear 
arms.118 Although the legislature may not totally prohibit the right to 
keep and bear arms, the court held that it was within the police power 
to prohibit possession of certain weapons which are ordinarily used for 
criminal and improper purposes. Semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic 
shotguns and rifles are commonly used by citizens for hunting and pro-
tection and are not banned by the statute.119 The Rinzler decision went 
on to state that where possession of a weapon was authorized by filing 
under the National Firearms Act,120 it was an exception to the Florida 
108. State v. Magee, 259 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1972). 
109. 262 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1972). 
110. See FLA. STAT.§§ 60.05, 828.05, 823.10 (1973). 
111. FLA. STAT. ch. 790 (1973). 
112. FLA. STAT.§ 790.23 (1973). 
113. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(2) (1969). The exceptions were eliminated in FLA. STAT. 
§ 790.23(2) (1971). 
114. 257 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1971). See also State ex rel., Jones v. Morphonios, 258 So. 2d 
42 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
115. This case was a consolidation of two prosecutions. 
116. 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972). 
117. FLA. STAT,§ 790.221 (1973). 
118. FLA. CoNsT. Deel. of Rights § 8. 
119. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972). See also State v. Astore, 258 So. 2d 
33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), holding FLA. STAT. §§ 790.001(14), .221, .221(3) (1973) (dealing 
with short-barreled rifles), not to be an infringement on the right to bear arms. 
120. 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1970). 
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statute. Where a municipal ordinance121 in that case failed to provide for 
such an exception, it was contrary and inferior to the state statute and 
could not be used to confiscate those weapons. 
Those sections which make carrying a concealed weapon a third 
degree felony122 and the shooting or throwing of deadly missiles into 
vehicles, for example,123 were held valid.124 
The Sex Off ender Act125 which provides a hearing to determine 
whether a defendant is a mentally disordered person after conviction126 
is not invalid as the statute meets the usual test of reasonable classifica-
tion.127 
The statute which prohibits armed trespass upon a ranch with intent 
to commit larceny, depredation or other offenses128 was held valid129 
as was the statute prohibiting lotteries.180 
Florida Statutes section 836.05 ( 1973), dealing with extortion, does 
not contain more than one subject and is thus constitutional.131 The 
bribery statute,132 which prohibits the offering to a public officer of a 
reward or compensation, is sufficient to withstand constitutional chal-
lenge.133 
The robbery statute,134 which provides for a penalty ranging from 
imprisonment for life to any lesser term of years given at the discretion 
of the court, is not an improper delegation to the court by the legisla-
ture.135 
In a federal district court decision,136 the term "lewdness" defined 
in the prostitution statute, Florida Statutes section 796.07 ( 1973), as 
any indecent or obscene act, was found to be unconstitutionally vague. 
In Roe v. Wade,131 the United States Supreme Court declared the 
Texas criminal abortion statute to be unconstitutional and set forth a 
"trimester" test for examining the validity of any similar statute. During 
121. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-69 (1973). 
122. FLA. STAT.§ 790.01. (1973). 
123. FLA. STAT. § 790.19 {1973). 
124. Bruno v. State, 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972), and Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 
(Fla. 1972), respectively. 
125 .. FLA. STAT. ch. 917 {1973). 
126. FLA. STAT.§ 917.14 {1973). 
127. Dean v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972), reaffirmed, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973). 
128. FLA. STAT. § 822.23 (1973). 
129. Holmes v. State, 272 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1973). But see the dissent of Ervin, J. 
130. Barron v. State, 271 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1972), construing FLA. STAT. § 849.09 (1971). 
131. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971). 
132. FLA. STAT. § 838.071 {1973). 
133. DuCoff v. State, 273 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1973). The case continued to say that despite 
the statute's validity, the defendant's acceptance of money was not in violation of the law 
where he conformed to a municipal ordinance providing for distribution to charity where 
it is inappropriate to refuse a gift. 
134. FLA. STAT. § 813.011 {1973). 
135. Byrd v. State, 253 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
136. Miami Health Studios, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 353 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla. 
1972). 
137. 410 U.S. 175 (1973). 
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the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to 
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's physician. For the second 
trimester period, regulations which are reasonably related to the health 
of the mother may be promulgated by the state. Finally, in the last tri-
mester (or period subsequent to the fetus' viability), the state may regu-
late and even proscribe abortions in order to promote the state's interest 
in human life, unless appropriate medical judgment deems abortion 
necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. It is 
interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Florida had previously 
found Florida's abortion statute138 to be unconstitutional.139 
The United States Supreme Court140 upheld Florida's loyalty oath 
statute141 but found the statute's summary dismissal provision a denial 
of due process. 
Florida Statutes chapter 800, which sets forth offenses for "crimes 
against nature" and "indecent exposure" was the subject of a number of 
decisions. In Franklin v. State,142 the Supreme Court of Florida struck 
down section 800.01, which had made "a crime against nature" a felony. 
The court urged the legislature to delineate clearly those acts that it 
wishes prohibited and found that their failure to do so made the present 
statute unconstitutionally vague. The court went on to hold valid section 
800.02, making unnatural and lascivious acts punishable as a misde-
meanor .143 Those defendants prosecuted under the invalid section 800.01 
would have their cases remanded for prosecution and sentence for the 
lesser offense set forth in section 800.02 .144 The statutory provisions re-
lating to indecent exposure145 were held to be constitutional.146 
The Franklin decision was held not to have retroactive effect. The 
United States Supreme Court147 found this prospective interpretation to 
be a valid exercise of the Florida court's power. 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,148 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance149 was un-
138. Comp. Gen. Laws §§ 7144, 7579, [1927] (repealed 1972) (now FLA. STAT. § 458.22 
(1973)). 
139. State v. Barguet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972); see also Medlin v. State, 267 So. 2d 
823 (Fla. 1972); Gironda v. State, 263 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972). 
140. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). 
141. FLA. STAT.§§ 876.05-.10 (1973). 
142. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971). 
143. See also Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973); Parisi v. State, 265 So. 
2d 699 (Fla. 1972). 
144. See Parisi v. State, 265 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1972); Robitaille v. State, 266 So. 2d 675 
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). See also Christian v. State, 272 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Morris 
v. State, 261 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
145. FLA. STAT.§ 800.03 (1973) (prohibiting exposure of sexual organs in public places), 
and FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1973) (prohibiting lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a 
child). 
146. State v. Petillo, 250 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1971), upholding FLA. STAT. § 800.03 (1971); 
Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971), upholding FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1971). 
147. Wainwright v. Stone, 94 S. Ct. 190, rev'g 478 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1973). 
148. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
149. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1973). 
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constitutionally vague in that it "failed to give a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by 
statute.11150 Justice Douglas found that the statute "encourages arbitrary 
and erratic arrests.11151 Florida's vagrancy statute,152 very similar to the 
Jacksonville statute, failed to meet constitutional muster as well in an 
accompanying decision.153 
The disorderly conduct and unlawful assembly ordinances of the 
City of Daytona Beach154 were found to be sufficiently dear and not 
overly broad.155 In examining the language of the statute, the District 
Court of Appeal, First District, found that the words "riot," "riotous," 
"tumultuous," etc., could be defined so as to inform persons of the con-
duct which is prohibited and not to infringe upon their freedom of 
speech.156 This case was so decided despite a holding by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the disorderly conduct ordi-
nance157 of the Miami Code was void for vagueness.158 
In reversing a district court opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida 
found a city ordinance159 proscribing "verbal abuse" of a police officer 
while he is performing his duties to be valid because it was sufficiently 
precise in describing the offense and gave fair warning to the citizen.160 
In Miller v. California,161 the United States Supreme Court once 
again attempted to formulate a test for obscene literature. It was held 
that material is subject to state prohibition if, when taken as a whole: 
1.) it appeals to the prurient interest; 2.) it is patently offensive in de-
picting sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and, 
3.) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value.162 The court attempted to provide a more concrete, 
workable standard for use by the states and, in fact, permitted the states 
to define "obscenity" according to local standards. Whether this will 
truly provide a better test or result in an incomprehensible variety of 
standards within the state itself, is yet to be determined.163 
150. 405 U.S. at 162. 
151. Id. citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 
242 (1937). 
152. Comp. Gen. Laws § 1655, [1927] (repealed 1972). 
153. Smith v. Florida, 405 U.S. 172 (1972), rev'g 239 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1970); see Russo 
v. State, 270 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), relying on Smith and Papachristou to hold 
Plantation's vagrancy statute unconstitutional. 
154. DAYTONA BEACH, FLA. MUN. ORDINANCE § 28-15(1) (b) (1973) (disorderly con-
duct), and § 28-58 (unlawful assembly). 
155. City of Daytona Beach v. Brown, 273 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
156. Id. at 126. 
157. MIAMI, FLA., CITY CODE § 38-lO(a) (1967) (breach of peace) and § 38-lO(f) 
(obscene or profane language in another's presence). 
158. Livingston v. Garmire, 437 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1971). 
159. ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CITY ORDINANCE § 25.43.1 (1969). 
160. City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
989 (1973), rev'g 245 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
161. 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973). 
162. Id. at 2615. 
163. See 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 238 (1973). 
832 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII 
Prior to Miller, the Florida courts had consistently upheld various 
obscenity statutes in a number of decisions.164 
IV. RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that the ad-
mission into evidence of a transcript of testimony given by a state's 
witness at the preliminary hearing is proper should the witness die 
prior to trial. The defendant was present with counsel at the preliminary 
hearing and the witness was fully cross-examined, although the transcript 
furnished the only evidence implicating the defendant.165 
The trial court must exercise its discretion in determining the non-
availability of a witness or the degree of diligence the state exercised in 
attempting to locate that witness before admitting at trial, a transcript 
of the missing witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing.166 The 
failure of the state to have a witness subpoena issued and delivered to 
the sheriff's department does not necessarily preclude admission of such 
a transcript.167 Where the defense procured an affidavit from a witness, 
absent at the retrial in order to impeach his testimony for the state at a 
prior mistrial and which the state sought to reintroduce, such affidavit 
was properly excluded because it was taken without the state's knowl-
edge and defendants could have taken steps to preserve the witness's 
testimony before he left the country.168 
Judicial notice of a statute, taken at the defendant's request, will not 
be construed as introduction of evidence on behalf of the accused for 
the purpose of depriving him of his right to the concluding argument 
before the jury.169 Denial of the right to opening and closing arguments 
164. Mitchem v. State, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971); May v. Harper, 250 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 
1971); Paris Follies, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Little Beaver The-
atres, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); United Theatres of Fla., Inc. v. 
State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); State ex rel. Little Beaver The-
atres, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) (Miami obscenity ordinance not 
vague); Mitchum v. State, 251 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); all holding FLA. STAT. 
§ 847.011 (1971) valid; Davidson v. State, 251 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 1971) (holding FLA. STAT. 
§ 847.013 (1971) valid and using community standards test). But see the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Jenkins v. Georgia, 94 S. Ct. 2750 (1974), reversing 
a conviction under the Georgia obscenity statute and holding that states do not have un-
bridled discretion to determine what is obscene because only the depiction of "hard core" 
sexual conduct is excluded from constitutional protection. 
165. James v. State, 254 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
166. Outlaw v. State, 269 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The dissent strongly em-
phasized the abrogation of the defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses in the 
presence of the jury where the state has failed to sustain its burden regarding the unavail-
ability of the witness and has failed to employ the power and experience of the sheriff's de-
partment which was characterized as the "very machinery available to the court for this 
express purpose." Id. at 405. 
167. Outlaw v. State, 269 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
168. Newton v. State, 272 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
169. Wyatt v. State, 270 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). Such a right accrued pursuant 
to Florida Statutes section 918.09 (1971), which is no longer in force altliough rule 3.250, 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides for the same rights. 
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on the ground that testimony of a witness called by a co-defendant ac-
crued to the benefit of all the defendants was reversible error.170 
V. APPEAL 
In Earnest v. State,171 defendant sought by certiorari to review the 
trial court's refusal to suppress evidence in a criminal prosecution. The 
court held that "the discretionary writ of certiorari will be granted to 
review an interlocutory order ... only in those cases in which it clearly 
appears that there is no full, adequate and complete remedy available 
... after final judgment."172 When appeals to the circuit court from a 
judgment of a municipal court have been exhausted, appeal to the district 
courts of appeal by writ of certiorari is not authorized unless the actions 
of the circuit court resulted in a clear miscarriage of justice.173 
If a petition for a writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy, the 
appellate court will consider the petition and determine whether another 
remedy is available. Thus, in Thompson v. Dilley174 the Supreme Court 
of Florida held that under the new provision in the Florida Constitution,1711 
it was required to "consider the petition-no matter its label or the 
remedy sought-if it has merit and if we have jurisdiction upbn any 
proper basis."176 The court thereupon issued the writ of habeas corpus. 
Although a defendant has an absolute right to appeal, an appeal is 
not automatic.177 A court will grant delayed appellate review only where 
it is shown by defendant that his right to appeal has been frustrated by 
state action.178 Thus, where a court-appointed counsel fails to prosecute 
a requested appeal, defendant cannot be denied his constitutional right of 
appeal.179 It is not permissible for a defendant to file successive appeals, 
stating a different ground in each one.180 
In City of Miami 'V. Brown181 no stenographic report was made of 
the proceedings in the municipal court. The defendant and the City 
would not agree on the contents of a record on appeal and the trial judge 
could not remember the case. The district court held that the defendant 
"should not be deprived of the benefit thereof by refusal of the appellee 
170. Davis v. State, 256 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
171. 253 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
172. Id. at 459, citing Simpson v. Broward County, 241 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
1970). 
173. Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
174. 275 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1973). 
175. "[N]o cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought." 
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a}. 
176. 275 So. 2d at 234. 
177. Harrell v. Wainwright, 268 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
178. Id. 
179. Thompson v. Dilley, 275 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1973). The court relied on its decision 
in Baggett v. Wainwright, 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1970). 
180. Palmer v. State, 273 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
181. 256 So. 2d 78 (Fla, 3d Dist. 1971). 
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or its counsel to co-operatem82 and that the circuit court was entitled to 
consider the appeal on the record as it then stood.183 
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held, .that where 
the transcript of instructions given to the jury was not available due to 
the death of the court reporter and the disappearance of his notes, judg-
ment against the defendant must be reversed.184 
In Hooks v. State,185 the Supreme Court of Florida held that though 
an indigent defendant has an absolute right to counsel on his first appeal 
no such right exists in subsequent proceedings. The court stated that: 
The question in each proceeding of this nature before this Court 
should be whether, under the circumstances, the assistance of 
counsel is essential to accomplish a fair and thorough presenta-
tion of petitioner's claims. Of course, doubts should be resolved 
in favor of the indigent petitioner when a question of the need 
for counsel is presented.186 
The filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, but a dismissal of 
an appeal for lack of jurisdiction does not prohibit a defendant from 
filing a petition for habeas corpus in the same court.187 If notice of appeal 
was filed prior to the entry of the judgment and sentence, the notice does 
not confer jurisdiction upon the district court of appeal and, absent 
proper filing, the appeal must be dismissed.188 
The Florida Appellate Rules provide that a decision, judgment, order 
or decree shall not be deemed rendered until any proper and timely post-
trial motion is disposed of.189 Thus, in White v. State,19° where a proper 
post-trial motion for discharge in the nature of a petition for rehearing 
was made, the case was reviewable since the judgment was not more than 
30 days old when the appeal was taken. Since the time for filing a notice 
of appeal is measured from the rendition of the order appealed, appellate 
jurisdiction will not be conferred unless it is clear to the appellate court 
at what date the order was rendered.191 
VI. BAIL 
In Gustafson v. State,192 it was held that in the absence of statutory 
authorization, a defendant's bail money may not be withheld to satisfy 
182. Id. at 79. 
183. Id. 
184. Yancey v. State, 267 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
185. 253 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1971). 
186. Id. at 426. 
187. Evans v. State, 255 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
188. Holmes v. State, 267 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
189. FLA. APP. R. 1.3. 
190. 267 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
191. Sparks v. State, 262 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). The judge endorsed on the 
motion an order denying it, dated the motion and signed it, but the appellate court held that 
there was no basis for determining the date on which the order was rendered. 
192. 251 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
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any fines or costs of the court as long as defendant has appeared at the 
time specified. Although the court cited no Florida cases, it held void a 
sheriff's "cash appearance bond" form that had been signed by the de-
fendant which authorized such a deduction. 
Florida courts continued to follow the principles set forth in Young-
hans v. State193 as to the handling of bail applications. In Wells 'V. 
W ainwright,194 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the granting of 
supersedeas bond following conviction was within the court's discretion 
but that such discretion could not be exercised arbitrarily. In Wells, it 
was clear that the court had not followed the standards enunciated in 
Younghans in denying bail to the defendant. 
A rehearing of a defendant's bail application was ordered following 
a denial without explanation when a rubber stamp which stated "Motion 
Heard, Considered and ... " had been affixed to the application, to which 
someone had added "Denied." The application was then signed by the 
judge.195 
The granting of post-conviction bail is not subject to article I, 
section 14 of the Florida Constitution, which concerns itself with bail 
prior to adjudication.196 Thus, in Hedden v. State,191 the court found 
that it was within the trial court's discretion to grant bail after conviction 
despite the fact that defendant had been given a mandatory life sentence. 
Bail as a matter of right is only available prior to conviction, except 
in cases involving capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprison-
ment where proof of guilt is evident or its presumption is great.198 The 
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the prohibition of capital punish-
ment by the United States Supreme Court199 does not affect the consti-
tutional bail provision in Florida, even though there are no longer any 
"capital off enses."200 
A habeas corpus petition challenging bail as excessive was held to 
be best brought in the circuit court which could more ably deal with such 
matters. The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district 
courts of appeal even though it has no true supervisory or appellate juris-
diction over a circuit court which set bail.201 It had been previously stated 
that, as a general rule, circuit courts are not empowered to deal by habeas 
corpus with the propriety of an order of court over which the court has 
193. 90 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956). 
194. 260 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1972). 
195. Miller v. State, 272 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing Younghans v. State, 90 
So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1956). 
196. Wells v. Wainwright, 260 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1972), cited with approval, Hedden v. 
State, 275 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
197. 275 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
198. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; FLA. STAT. ch. 903 (1973); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.130, 
3.130(c}-(f}. 
199. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
200. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972). 
201. State ex rel. Renaldi v. Sandstrom, 276 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
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no appellate jurisdiction; nevertheless, it is proper to do so when ques-
tioning the legality of a detention or the granting of bail.202 
VII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
During the survey period, the law concerning the need for jury 
instructions on lesser included offenses, as set down in Brown v. State,203 
was the subject of several clarifying decisions. The Supreme Court of 
Florida in Brown classified the situations where instructions on lesser 
included offenses need be given: 
( 1) Crimes divisible into degrees. 
(2) Attempts to commit offenses. 
( 3) Offenses necessarily included in the offense charged. 
( 4) Offenses which may or may not be included in the offense 
charged, depending on the accusatory pleading and the 
evidence.204 
In State v. Anderson,205 the Supreme Court of Florida further elab-
orated on the discretion of the trial court with respect to the above-stated 
fourth category: 
[I]t means that he may be convicted of any lesser offense, 
which, although not an essential ingredient of the major crime, 
is spelled out in the accusatory pleading in that it alleges all 
of the elements of the lesser offense and the proof at trial sup-
ports the charge. 206 
The key consideration as to the propriety of any given instruction con-
cerning lesser included offenses is whether the defendant was apprised 
of all of which he might be convicted.207 Thus, where the record did not 
support the lesser included offenses of selling or offering for sale an inter-
est in a lottery, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct 
thereon. 208 
The refusal of the trial court to charge the jury upon the offense of 
aggravated assault as a lesser included offense in a homicide prosecution 
was error where the accusatory pleading charged the use of a deadly 
weapon and, therefore, encompassed aggravated assault.209 Similarly, it 
was error to refuse a request for an instruction on simple assault where 
202. Janes v. Heidtman, 272 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
203. 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968). 
204. Id. at 381 (emphasis in original). 
205. 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1972), rev'g 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The District 
Court of Appeal, Second District, applied different criteria testing the necessity of giving a 
requested lesser included offense charge, depending on whether the defendant or the state 
requested the instruction. See Rodriguez v. State, 257 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) which 
adheres to the rationale as set forth by the Second District in Anderson. 
206. 270 So. 2d at 356. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. Accord, State v. Fernandez, 270 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1972). 
209. Appell v. State, 250 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
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the information alleged that the defendant did, by force, violence and 
assault, put the robbery victim in fear and where such allegation was 
supported by the evidence.210 Where the display of a deadly weapon 
was adduced by the evidence and the pleadings, a charge on aggravated 
assault as a lesser included offense of robbery was justified.211 A charge 
on the offense of wilfully or wantonly unnecessarily or excessively chastis-
ing a child or ward was warranted in a prosecution for torturing or un-
lawfully punishing children.212 A simple assault and battery cannot be 
viewed as a lesser included offense within an aggravated assault accusa-
tion where the state's position rested entirely upon the shooting.213 Where 
the information is silent as to allegations of assault with a deadly weapon 
and as to allegations of battery, neither a charge of aggravated assault 
nor of assault and battery would have been appropriate in a prosecution 
for robbery.214 The offense of carrying a concealed weapon is not a 
lesser one included in the greater offense of assault with intent to commit 
murder.215 
In Wilson v. State,216 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
held that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on bare assault 
which was a lesser included offense of robbery but not a necessarily in-
cluded offense was reversible error. In doing so, the court refused to 
declare the error harmless because it was too difficult to determine 
"whether the failure of the trial judge to give the requested instruction 
resulted in injury to the substantial rights of the defendant."217 However, 
the Supreme Court of Florida218 reversed, holding that the error was 
harmless. The court rejected the rationale of the District Court of Appeal, 
Fourth District, that it is difficult for an appellate court to determine 
whether the failure to give the requested instructions resulted in injury 
to the substantial rights of the defendant by noting that such a determina-
tion is precisely what is required under Florida Statutes section 924.33 
(1973). 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Rayner v. State,219 interpreted 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.150 as requiring a trial judge to 
instruct on necessarily included offenses. Such an instruction is manda-
tory notwithstanding the defendant's affirmative attempt to waive the 
giving of the instruction or defendant's objection thereto. Thus, the fail-
210. Stephens v. State, 279 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). Accord, Bryan v. State, 279 
So. 2d 332 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
211. Morrison v. State, 259 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
212. Robinson v. State, 254 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
213. Richardson v. State, 251 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
214. State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973). 
215. Glaze v. State, 249 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
216. 265 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
217. Id. at 414. 
218. State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973). 
219. 273 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 264 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), where it was 
held, in effect, that it was permissible for a defendant to affirmatively waive the giving of 
such instructions. Accord, Henry v. State, 277 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
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ure of the trial court to instruct the jury on a necessarily included offense 
constituted reversible error, although it was omitted pursuant to the de-
fendant's request. Similarly, in State v. Washington,220 the supreme court 
held that the trial court had properly given instructions on necessarily 
included offenses over the objections of the defendant, and affirmed the 
conviction. However, the refusal of the trial court to give a requested 
charge of larceny in a robbery prosecution warranted reversal.221 It has 
also been held that in a robbery prosecution, where no charge on a neces-
sarily included offense of larceny was requested, and none was given, it 
was not reversible error.222 
Absent a request for a lesser included offense instruction, the trial 
court is not required to give it. 223 Neither is a trial judge precluded by an 
objection of the defendant from charging the jury on a lesser offense, 
which although not necessarily included, is embodied in the accusatory 
pleading and supported by the evidence.224 Where the evidence would not 
support a charge of first-degree murder, the giving of instructions on 
lesser included offenses was not error, notwithstanding defense counsel's 
objections.225 Instructions to the jury on lesser included offenses must 
be given even though it is the opinion of the trial judge that the proofs 
clearly established the major crime charged.226 However, a defendant 
may waive his right to have the jury charged as to lesser included offenses, 
where such charge is not mandatory.227 
The Supreme Court of Florida held in DeLaine v. State228 that the 
only lesser included offenses in the crime of rape are assault with intent 
to commit rape, assault and battery and bare assault, and that the failure 
to so charge the jury constituted error. Accordingly, the court expressly 
decided that fornication is an offense separate and distinct from rape and 
is not necessarily an included offense. 
It has been held that it is reversible error to deny a requested instruc-
220. 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1972). The trial court had instructed the jury in a rape 
prosecution on the necessarily included offenses of assault with intent to commit rape, assault 
and battery, and simple assault. The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Washington 
v. State, 247 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971) had reversed and its decision was quashed by 
the Supreme Court. 
221. Miles v. State, 2S8 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Hand v. State, 199 So. 
2d 100 (Fla. 1967). 
222. Branam v. State, 26S So. 2d SSS (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). Accord, Henry v. State, 277 
So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). See note 223 infra and accompanying text. 
223. Burney v. State, 276 So. 2d S20 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
224. Morrison v. State, 2S9 So. 2d S02 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
22S. Smith v. State, 2S9 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Accord, Morrison v. State, 259 
So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The charge was held to be mandatory where the crime 
charged was not necessarily included, but where the evidence supported the lesser crime in 
a particular case. 
226. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
227. Black v. State, 279 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
228. 262 So. 2d 6SS (Fla. 1972). It was held to be a harmless error where the trial court 
gave .a charge on assault with intent to commit rape only but the jury convicted the de-
fendant of rape. Contra, Miles v. State, 2S8 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). See also Logan 
v. State, 264 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
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tion on conspiracy to commit petit larceny, a misdemeanor, where the 
defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, a felony.229 
Where the defendant was charged merely with illegal possession of a 
firebomb, the court erred in instructing the jury on conspiracy to possess 
the firebomb as a lesser included offense.230 Possession of an hallucino-
genic drug is not an offense which is necessarily included in the offense 
of illegally selling an hallucinogenic drug.281 
An attempt to commit a crime must be classified as a lesser included 
offense if the crime charged is an offense prohibited by law.232 Thus, an 
attempt to receive stolen property is a lesser included offense of a charge 
for receipt of stolen property.288 The provision of the rule stating that 
the trial judge shall charge the jury as to attempts to commit the offenses 
charged is mandatory, not merely permissive.234 
A request for an instruction which has been denied, or an objection 
to a failure to give an instruction is a prequisite to raising error on ap-
peal. 235 Despite the fact that the defendant's counsel did not submit a 
written request for instructions on the law of lesser included offenses 
at any time during the trial, this objection to the court's failure to so 
charge the jury was held to be adequate notice to the trial court, and the 
refusal to give the requested charges at that time constituted reversible 
error.236 Where the defendant did not request a cautionary instruction 
before the reception of evidence of prior convictions until most of the 
evidence had been admitted, there was no error.237 Where the defense 
fails to submit a request for a charge that the uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice in a capital case should be received with great caution, 
and does not object if it is not given, a new trial based on a finding of 
fundamental error is not warranted.238 
A defendant is entitled to the standard jury instruction upon the 
229. Edwards v. State, 275 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
230. Swindle v. State, 254 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). The District Court of Appeal, 
Second District, relied on Kinchen v. State, 235 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), where it 
was held that conspiracy to commit a robbery is not an offense included under the charge 
of robbery, and that the trial judge could not property adjudge the defendant guilty of con-
spiracy unless it was so alleged in the information. 
231. McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Parker v. State, 237 
So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). See note 263 infra and accompanying text. Each is a sepa-
rate and independent offense and proof of one does not necessarily include the charge and 
proof of the other. 
232. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Brown v. State, 206 
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968). 
233. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
234. Henry v. State, 277 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
235. Id. Accord, Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972); Williams v. State, 247 So. 
2d 425 (Fla. 1971); McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
236. Baker v. State, 254 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
237. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972). 
238. Boykin v. State, 257 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1971). The court held that error harmless due 
to the cumulative effect of the general witness charge, the revealing cross-examination of 
the accomplice, and the inclusion of the content of the charge by counsel In their presentation 
to the jury. 
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defense of alibi in every case where there is sufficient evidence to take 
the issue to the jury, and it is not the function of the trial judge to weigh 
the evidence and decide on the basis when or whether the charge should 
be given.230 
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Kilgore v. State 
held that "if any evidence of a substantial character is adduced, either 
upon cross-examinaion . . . or [directly] . . . the element of self-defense 
becomes an issue, and the jury, as the trier of the facts, should be duly 
charged as to the law thereon ..•. "240 Regardless of the quantum or the 
quality of the proof of self-defense, the existence of self-defense as an 
issue requires the charge to be given and the failure to do so constitutes 
error.241 
If there is any evidence to support a defense of entrapment, 242 or 
where there is conflicting evidence,243 the trial court must instruct the jury 
on the issue of entrapment. Where the instructions given by the trial 
court on the defense of entrapment were consistent with the law, the court 
did not err when it refused to give the defendant's requested change.244 
In Willcox v. State,245 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
found fault with instruction 2.13, Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal 
Cases, as promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida, but held that 
the error was harmless. The challenge to the circumstantial evidence 
instruction was based upon objections to the phrase "if the circumstances 
are susceptible of two equally reasonable constructions, one indicating 
guilt and the other innocence, you must accept the construction indicating 
innocence."246 The court found the instruction erroneous in that once 
having heard it, the jury might exclude a hypothesis of innocence if it 
was equally as probative as the hypothesis of guilt, even though it might 
otherwise be reasonable; instead, the court noted that, it is the exclusion 
of all reasonable hypotheses of innocence which lends a reasonable 
hypothesis of guilt the force of proof. Where the state relies solely on 
circumstantial evidence, or when circumstantial evidence constitutes the 
substantial thrust of the state's case, a proper jury charge thereon should 
be given.247 
239. Davis v. State, 254 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The defendant had presented 
four alibi witnesses. 
240. 271 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). In Jackson v. State, 251 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 
2d Dist. 1971), the district court held that the defendant's claim that he acted in self-defense 
was insufficient to warrant an instruction on self-defense. Accord, Brosi v. State, 263 So. 2d 
849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), where the evidence did not warrant an instruction on the law of 
entrapment. 
241. Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
242. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Stinson v. State, 245 So. 
2d 688 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
243. Avilla v. State, 278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
244. Evenson v. State, 277 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
245. 258 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
246. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION IN CRIMINAL CASES 2.13. 
247. Anderson v. State, 255 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
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The admission into evidence of impeachment statements with in-
structions that the statements were admitted solely for impeachment and 
not as substantive testimony is proper248 and the failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error.249 
Where a case is submitted to the jury on a two-fold theory of pre-
meditated murder and felony-murder, and the trial court fails to charge 
the jury on the various elements of the substantive felony, the failure to 
so charge is reversible error.250 In Anderson v. State,251 the supreme court 
held that the failure of the trial court to define or explain to the jury 
the meaning of "premeditation" as used in an instruction for murder in 
the first degree was reversible error, even absent an objection by the 
defendant. 
Despite the fact that the trial court tracked the applicable statute 
in defining murder in the second degree and manslaughter to the jury, 
the use of an instruction in which the technical phrases "evincing a 
depraved mind" and "culpable negligence" were given without further 
definition or explanation was considered grounds for reversal, even 
though the defendant had not requested additional explanatory in-
structions. 252 
Following a request by the jury that the court reread the instructions 
on first and second degree murder, the defendant asked the court to also 
give the instruction as to self-defense when the trial court repeated the 
requested instructions, and objected when the court failed to do so.253 
The District Court of Appeal, First District,254 reversed the judgment of 
conviction, holding that the failure to repeat the self-defense instruction 
erroneously left the jury with an incomplete and potentially misleading 
instruction. 
In Walsingham v. State,255 the Supreme Court of Florida held that 
an instruction defining the offense of abortion was prejudicial and mis-
leading where it failed to include a statement to the effect that abortion 
is not unlawful if it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother. The 
court further held that where a trial court attempts to define the crime 
under which the accused is charged, it must define each and every element, 
and if it fails to do so, the charge is misleading and necessarily prejudicial 
to the accused. 
248. Walter v. State, 272 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
249. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
250. Wright v. State, 250 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
251. 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973). 
252. Bryan v. State, 271 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court, commenting on the 
standard jury instructions noted that "any substantial deviation from use of these instruc-
tions will almost always end in error on the part of the trial court." Id. at 199. 
253. Stills v. State, 272 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing Hedges v. State, 172 
So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965). 
254. Id. 
255. 250 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971). The failure of the court to furnish the jury with a 
standard upon which to determine the lawfulness of the acts was reversible error. 
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Where the evidence established that the defendant, who was present 
prior to the crime, was apprehended in another city two weeks after the 
crime, the court properly submitted the issue to the jury of whether the 
defendant fled after the crime.256 Similarly, an instruction on flight was 
proper where the evidence showed that the defendant left his home after 
shooting his wife and was found by police crouched behind a dresser in 
the bedroom of a friend's apartment.257 
In a perjury prosecution, a requested instruction on the question of 
inadvertence or mistake is not warranted when the defense presented is 
contrary to and inconsistent with the content of such instruction.258 
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held in Joseph v. 
State259 that the trial court's instruction on burglary: "in this case ... 
the pushing open of a door entirely closed . . . is a sufficient breaking to 
sustain a conviction," was harmless error in light of the fact that the evi-
dence sustaining a breaking was uncontroverted and that a corrected 
version of the instructions was given subsequently by the trial court. 
An instruction is not erroneously refused where it is an improper 
statement of the law.260 Nor is it improper to refuse to give a requested 
instruction which is a correct statement of the applicable law if the sub-
ject was fully covered in the general charges given by the court.261 A re-
viewing court will generally look to the entire charge rather than to one 
statement out of context in determining whether a charge is erroneous.262 
Where the defendant, through his representations that under Florida 
law possession of an illegal drug was a lesser offense necessarily included 
in the greater offense of the sale of such drug misleads the state and the 
trial judge, he is estopped to assert error where the judge incorrectly in-
cluded possession of a hallucinogenic drug as a lesser offense of selling 
the drug and he failed to object thereto.268 
VIII. SENTENCE 
During the period surveyed, numerous cases have dealt with the 
question of whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time served prior 
to sentencing. Under Florida Statutes section 921.161(1) (1973), the 
allowance of credit for time served prior to sentencing is a matter within 
the discretion of the trial court and a defendant is not entitled to credit 
256. Hargrett v. State, 255 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
257. Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
258. Hirsch v. State, 268 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Had the court given the re-
quested instruction, it would have been error. 
259. 252 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
260. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Gordon v. State, 119 
So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960). 
261. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Mackiewicz v. State, 114 
So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1959). 
262. Yanks v. State, 261 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
263. McPhee v. State, 254 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See note 231 supra and ac-
companying text. 
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for presentence jail time as a matter of right.264 The question of whether. 
credit for time served was appropriate for a defendant awaiting court 
action in an escape trial was addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida 
in Law v. Wainwright.265 The supreme court determined that the fact 
that the trial court withheld adjudication on the escape charge could have 
been dispositive of the issue. If there had been an order which either 
allowed credit for time served, expressly denied it, or was silent on the 
issue and, thus, tantamount to a denial, the sentence order would be bind-
ing; however, given the fact that nothing in the record indicated whether 
the trial judge had reached the question, the court held as a matter of law 
that the defendant was entitled to credit for the time served while awaiting 
the trial court's decision. 
The court subsequently modified its holding in Law to permit a 
court to substitute its judgment where a sentence order had been issued, 
but the order was silent on the question of credit for time served.266 In 
Adams v. Wainwright,267 the supreme court held that time spent in a 
county jail prior to the completion of a trial for escape from state prison 
counts toward the original prison sentence. The court reasoned that the 
existing, uncompleted prison term travelled with the escaped prisoner 
and that the moment he was detained, the sentence resumed by operation 
of law. Additionally, the court decided that the defendant was entitled 
to credit toward his original prison sentence for time served in the county 
jail following his conviction for escape and prior to his return to the 
custody of the Division of Corrections. 
In Blackmon v. State,268 the District Court of Appeal, Second Dis-
trict, held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant a defendant credit 
for time served on a sentence imposed by another court which was sub-
sequently vacated. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Tate v. Short,269 held that a 
statute which required defendants who were unable to pay a fine to re-
main in prison for a period sufficient to satisfy the fine denied equal pro-
tection of the law. The Florida courts have adopted Tate and invalidated 
sentences of imprisonment imposed on indigent defendants who were 
unable to pay the fines assessed against them.270 Where the defendants 
received the maximum sentences permissible and, in addition, were 
264. Miller v. State, 270 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Richardson v. State, 243 
So. 2d 598 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). Under Florida Statutes section 921.161 (1973), a sentence 
shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence may 
allow a defendant credit for all or a part of the time spent in the county jail before sentence. 
265. 264 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972). 
266. Adams v. Wainwright, 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973). See also Falagan v. Wainwright, 
195 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1967). 
267. 275 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1973). 
268. 253 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
269. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 
270. Colocado v. State, 251 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Johnson v. State, 250 So. 
2d 347 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); Martin v. State, 248 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1971); Gary v. State, 
239 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). 
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assessed costs, the portions of the sentences imposing additional imprison-
ment in the event of non-payment of costs have been held constitutionally 
invalid by Florida courts271 under the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Williams v. Illinois.272 In City of Orlando v. Cameron,273 
the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the United States Supreme 
Court's prohibition against giving defendants the option to pay a fine or 
serve a term of imprisonment,274 to apply only to those who are unable 
to pay due to indigency. Thus, there is no constitutional infirmity in the 
imprisonment of a defendant with the financial ability to pay a fine who 
refuses or neglects to do so. However, in order to invoke the constitu-
tional protection, a defendant who wishes to avoid imprisonment but 
is unable to pay a fine, must assume the burden of proving his indigency 
pursuant to Florida Statutes section 27.52 (1973).275 
In Phillips v. Allen,216 the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court 
of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus following the imposition of alter-
native sentences requiring the defendant ·to either pay a fine or serve 
time in jail. After granting the writ, the court relinquished jurisdiction 
temporarily to the Municipal Court of Orlando which proceeded to vacate 
the sentences and reduce the period of confinement. The supreme court 
reassumed jurisdiction and held that the subsequent modifications of 
the municipal court vitiated the violations of Tate and Williams and dis-
charged the writ.277 
A number of cases have held that that portion of a sentence requiring 
probation after a prison term is illegal.278 However, when the defendant 
was convicted on four charges, he could properly be sentenced on two 
and placed on probation on the remaining charges to commence at the 
conclusion of the imprisonment.279 
It appears to be well settled in Florida that where convictions are 
entered on two offenses, each of which constitutes a facet of the same 
transaction, it is improper to impose sentence on each.280 Thus, where the 
first count of the information charges possession of heroin and the second 
271. Dancer v. State, 259 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); accord, Bell v. State, 249 So. 
2d 706 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
272. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Williams held that an indigent criminal defendant may not be 
imprisoned for default in payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by statute 
regulating the substantive offense. 
273. 264 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1972). 
274. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 
275. City of Orlando v. Cameron, 264 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1972). 
276. 255 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1971). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ervin argued that the 
majority opinion was patently discriminatory in that it indirectly authorizes trial judges to 
impose alternative imprisonments after it is discovered that indigents cannot pay their fines. 
277. Id. 
278. Boyd v. State, 272 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Martinez v. State, 266 So. 2d 392 
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Dancy v. State, 259 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Robinson v. State, 
256 So. 2d 390 (Fla. Jd Dist. 1972). 
279. Harris v. State, 278 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
280. Hunt v. State, 264 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); accord, Moore v. State, 260 
So. 2d 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
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count charges sale on the same day, each offense constituted a facet of a 
single transaction.281 Similarly, where a defendant is convicted on sep-
arate counts of possession and sale of marijuana, and the record estab-
lishes that each of the offenses occurred the same day and that the mari-
juana sold was the same marijuana on which the possession charge was 
based, each conviction represented a facet of a single transaction and 
therefore justified only one sentence for the highest offense charged.282 
The same has been held to apply in cases of possession and sale of nar-
cotics,283 barbiturates,284 amphetamines,286 cocaine286 and LSD.287 Addi-
tionally, charges of robbery and extortion288 represented offenses arising 
out of the same transaction as did breaking and entering with intent to 
commit a misdemeanor and petit larceny.289 It has been held that aggra-
vated assault and resisting arrest with violence constituted facets of the 
same transaction and as such warranted only one conviction.290 
Separate sentences were improper for convictions of both sale of 
unregistered securities and sale by an unregistered dealer where the sep-
arate offenses were part of a single transaction.291 Where the defendant 
was charged with and convicted of obtaining credit through the unau-
thorized use of a credit card under three separate informations, the fact 
that such conduct occurred during his possession of the credit card on a 
single day indicated that the three transactions should be treated as dif-
ferent facets of the same criminal offense and sentences on more than one 
conviction were not warranted.292 While a conviction for displaying a 
firearm during the commission of a robbery was proper, only one sentence 
could be imposed if the defendant was also convicted of the robbery in 
which he used the weapon. 293 
Conversely, it has been held that robbery and carrying a concealed 
firearm are separate and distinct offenses and, therefore, a sentence im-
posed upon both under two counts of an information was valid.294 Sim-
ilarly, where the defendant shot and killed the victim in the process of 
281. Johnson v. State, 260 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Martin v. State, 251 So. 2d 
283 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). · 
282. Keenan v. State, 253 So.· 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Yost v. State, 243 So. 
2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); accord, Walker v. State, 261 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
283. Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Torres v. State, 262 So. 2d 
458 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Martin v. State, 251 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Lietch v. 
State, 248 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971). 
284. Warren v. State, 266 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
285. Weeks v. State, 253 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
286. Caivano v. State, 276 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
287. Farrell v. State, 259 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
288. Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
289. Id. 
290. Moody v. State, 279 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
291. Sparks v. State, 256 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Easton v. State, 250 
So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
292. Lore v. State, 267 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Lietch v. State, 248 So. 
2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 253 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1971). 
293. Hernandez v. State, 278 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
294. Cooper v. State, 261 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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escaping after having committed a robbery, the crimes of robbery and 
assault with intent to murder were considered two separate transactions 
for the purpose of sentencing.295 Manslaughter and driving while under 
the influence of alcohol were held to be separate offenses and separate 
sentences were thus warranted.296 Separate sentences following convic-
tions for breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and for 
possession of burglary tools were permitted to stand on the rationale that 
one could be found guilty of possessing burglary tools but not guilty of 
breaking and entering.297 
Where the offense was committed by the same person, at the same 
time, in the same place, under the same circumstances and with the same 
intent, the only offense was that of receiving stolen property, thus, there 
could only be one sentence even though the property was owned by four 
different entities.298 
The law permitting only one sentence for multiple convictions on a 
single transaction applied even though the sentences were for identical 
terms and were to run concurrently.299 However, where a sentence on one 
count was erroneous, the court could not set aside both sentences in order 
to impose a greater sentence on the remaining and still valid count, as 
the validity of each must be determined separately.800 
If a sentence is proper under the law, it is not subject to appeal on 
the grounds that it was excessive under the circumstances of the case.801 
Nor is the imposition of the maximum sentence grounds to allege cruel 
and unusual punishment.802 Thus, where the defendant rejected the 
state's off er to recommend to the court a sentence of 15 years in return 
for a plea of guilty, he could not claim that a sentence of 130 years was 
meted out as a penalty for going to trial, absent a conclusive showing 
that such was the case.808 A lawful sentence of 35 years' imprisonment to 
a defendant who sought a jury trial was not error, even though a co-
def endant who chose to plead guilty received only five years on a prop-
erly negotiated plea.804 A statement by the trial court during plea nego-
tiations in open court that it "wouldn't be thinking of less than 50 years" 
295. Tarpley v. State, 258 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Footman v. State, 203 
So. 2d 356 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). 
296. Dawson v. State, 266 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
297. Foster v. State, 276 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing Washington v. State, 
51 Fla. 137, 40 So. 765 (1906). 
298. Avilla v. State, 278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
299. Carr v. State, 264 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
300. Brown v. State, 264 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
301. Id. Accord, Godfrey v. State, 278 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
302. Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
303. Id. 
304. Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The court commented 
that "while such a diversity in results between the two paths pursued by the convicted 
actors may be quite shocking to the judicial conscience of the appellate court ••• ," it found 
that the record did not support the contention that such a sentence constituted a gross 
penalty placed on the defendant's right to choose a trial by jury. Id. at 725. 
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was not binding on the judge following the defendant's refusal to plead 
guilty. The defendant's subsequent conviction by the court was not sub-
ject to appeal absent a showing that the sentences of 101 years was vin-
dictive in nature.8011 
Where a portion of the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable, 
the excess is automatically vacated without the necessity of resentenc-
ing. 806 Although there are a number of alternatives807 available to a trial 
judge in imposing a sentence, he may not sentence a convicted criminal 
for a term less than the minimum prescribed by law.808 
Florida Statutes section 775.14 {1973) provides: 
Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for 
a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been 
altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sen-
tenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence 
was originally withheld. 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Gazda,809 held that this statute 
was tolled for the time during which the defendant was absent from the 
court's jurisdiction, and extended the five year deadline for imposing 
sentence. Where the defendant was convicted on three separate counts, 
the trial court was justified in imposing sentence on one count and with-
holding sentence on the remaining two from day to day.810 However, the 
trial court must exercise its power to sentence before the statutory time 
limit expires.811 
Before one may be sentenced as a second off ender pursuant to Florida 
Statutes section 77 5.09 ( 1973), there must be a constitutionally valid 
prior conviction.812 Thus, where the defendant's allegation that his prior 
conviction was constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright818 
was not refuted, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.SH 
It has been held that a trial court may take into consideration the 
contents of a pre-sentence investigation report prior to sentencing.8111 
Further, a sentence is not invalid merely because a pre-sentence investi-
gation was not held or because the court failed to afford a defendant an 
305. Blackman v. State, 265 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
306. Chaires v. State, 265 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
307. In State v. Dull, 249 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), the court noted that the 
fact that the trial judge might have withheld adjudication of guilt and/or placed the de-
fendant on probation, or might have imposed an indeterminate sentence, did not operate to 
legitimize a sentence imposed contrary to law. 
308. Id., citing Dean v. State, 83 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955). 
309. 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971), quashing Gracia v. State, 244 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. 1971). 
310. Smith v. State, 259 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
311. Id. 
312. Jackson v. State, 252 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Lee v. State, 217 So. 
2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). 
313. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
314. Jackson v. State, 252 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
315. Mincey v. State, 256 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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evidentiary hearing on mitigation, even though the court was informed 
of circumstances which were worthy of consideration.816 Similarly, the 
trial court was not in error in failing to inquire about mitigation where 
the defendant's counsel was permitted to state fully into the record the 
matter which he would urge on mitigation, and was not prevented from 
presenting evidence thereon.817 
The trial court is without jurisdiction to mitigate a defendant's sen-
tence by withdrawing adjudication and sentence and placing him on pro-
bation, after more than 60 days have elapsed from the imposition of 
sentence.818 
In taking a plea of nolo contendere, character evidence is material 
and properly admissible for consideration by the trial judge in deter-
mining sentence.819 While it is permissible to allow a judge who did not 
preside at the trial to pass sentence, the failure of the substitute judge 
to familiarize himself thoroughly with the case prior to sentencing consti-
tutes an insufficient basis to determine the defendant's sentence.820 
Florida Statutes section 922.051 (1973) provides: 
When a statute expressly directs that imprisonment be in a 
state prison, the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment 
in the county jail if the total of the prisoner's cumulative sen-
tences is not more than ( 1) year. 
Pursuant to the above statute, where a defendant was charged upon two 
separate informations, and convicted on both, the trial court's sentence 
of one year in the county jail on each charge, with the second sentence 
to begin at the expiration of the first, was not permissible.821 The statute 
was construed to prohibit imprisonment in the county jail if any combi-
nation of sentences would result in imprisonment in the county jail for 
a period of more than one year.822 
The United States Supreme Court, in Furman 'll. Georgia, held that 
the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments.828 The opinion was rendered per curiam and each member of the 
court contributed a separate opinion. Justices Stewart and White rejected 
316. Cole v. State, 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
317. Holland v. State, 258 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
318. Sayer v. State, 267 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), dting Ware v. State, 231 So. 
2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). 
319. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972). 
320. Caplinger v. State, 271 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). The sentencing judge 
availed herself of neither the benefit of a presentence investigation ordered by the presiding 
judge, nor the record of the trial itself, but instead, relied solely upon the statements of counsel 
to familiarize herself with the case. 
321. Dade County v. Baker, 265 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1972), adopted the dissent of Judge 
Carroll in Dade County v. Baker, 258 So. 2d 511, 512-14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), as the proper 
interpretation of the statute. 
322. Id. 
323. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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the death penalty as being capriciously applied without a meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many 
in which it is not. Justice Douglas found the discretionary statutes un-
constitutional in their operation because they were "pregnant with dis-
crimination." It remains to be seen whether a statute can be drafted 
with a degree of specificity and with sufficiently objective criteria to 
satisfy the diverse objections of the members of the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the wake of Furman, recognized 
the elimination of the death penalty and held that the only sentence 
which could be imposed upon conviction of murder in the first degree 
is life imprisonment.824 Thus, death sentences previously imposed for first 
degree murder were reduced automatically to life imprisonment while 
those imposed upon convictions for rape were remanded for resentencing 
consistent with the Court's holding in Furman.82fj In Baxter v. Stack, it 
was held that the court which sentenced the defendant to death had juris-
diction to correct its sentence and to impose a sentence of imprisonment 
for life.326 
IX. FORMER JEOPARDY 
In Waller v. Florida,821 the United States Supreme Court established 
that cities, and states, including their respective courts, are not separate 
sovereignties. Consequently, a defendant's prosecution in a state court 
for a felony arising out of the same acts for which he had been convicted 
in a municipal court, would constitute double jeopardy, providing the 
former conviction was a lesser included offense of the felony. Upon re-
mand to the Florida courts, however, the District Court of Appeal, 
Second District, held that the municipal offense was not a lesser included 
offense of the state larceny charge and, therefore, no question of former 
jeopardy was involved.328 
There was also no former jeopardy in the following instances of suc-
cessive prosecution because the charges in the second action were not 
lesser offenses included in those charged in the first action: where the 
defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon following ac-
quittal of assault with intent to commit murder; 329 where defendant was 
324. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972); accord, In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 
(Fla. 1972). 
325. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972). See Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 
(Fla. 1972), where the Supreme Court of Florida, in an attempt to provide guidance during 
the interim period following Furman and prior to the enactment of new legislation, held 
that inasmuch as Furman eliminated capital punishment, it would eliminate capital offenses 
as well. See section III supra for a further discussion of the Furman case and its effect in 
Florida. 
326. 270 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
327. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). 
328. Waller v. State, 270 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
329. State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971); Glaze v. State, 249 So. 2d 
742 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
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prosecuted for possession of marijuana after a municipal court convicted 
him of driving while under the influence of drugs; 330 where the conviction 
in a city court for profanity was followed by prosecution for resisting ar-
rest; 881 where a conviction following a guilty plea of possession of less than 
one gallon of whiskey for which no tax had been paid was followed by a 
charge of concealment of 3 1/2 quarts of such whiskey and possession of 
a container intended for bottling the illegal whiskey; 832 where a municipal 
court convicted a defendant of performing an obscene play and defendant 
was later prosecuted under a state statute for performing the same play 
on another date; 333 where the defendant had been acquitted of careless 
driving in a metropolitan court and was then prosecuted by the state for 
leaving the scene of an accident.834 
Although there were similar elements involved in the two offenses 
for which the defendant was prosecuted, a defendant could properly be 
prosecuted for manslaughter resulting from operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated after he had been convicted of driving while under the 
influence of alcoholic beverages.835 The District Court of Appeal, Second 
District, then held that in order for the defense of former jeopardy to 
apply, it is necessary that the second prosecution arise out of the same 
facts and that it be for the same offense.836 Proof of additional facts in 
one charge is the determining factor in deciding whether each charge 
may be prosecuted separately. 
In Bernard v. State,837 it was held that jeopardy attached in a non-
jury case only when evidence is heard by the judge prior to the time 
that the state has entered a nolle prosequi. In affirming the District Court 
of Appeal, Third District's decision,838 the court required actual presenta-
tion of proof by the state for commencement of jeopardy. Jeopardy does 
not attach if a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute within the 
statutory period after it had been transferred from municipal to state 
court. Therefore, the state is allowed to file a subsequent information in 
state court.889 Where the court required the state to proceed on two 
counts (III and IV) of a four-count information, and the state used evi-
dence of other crimes, i.e., the other two counts to show intent and motive, 
330. State v. Lampley, 250 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
331. State v. Lamons, 251 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
332. State v. Hart, 253 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
333. State v. Ell-Gee, Inc., 255 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3.d Dist. 1971), citing Ashe v. Swenson, 
397 U.S. 436 (1970). See also State ex rel. McCausland v. Rowe, 272 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d 
1973). 
334. State v. Jackson, 248 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
335. State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
336. Id. at 583, citing State v. Shaw, 219 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). 
337. 261 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1972). 
338. State v. Bernard, 254 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Judge Pearson dissented, saying 
that jeopardy attaches when the nonjury trial begins and that the majority confused the 
taking of testimony with the taking of evidence since evidence had already been offered and 
rejected at trial. Id. at 40. 
339. State v. Ressler, 257 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
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that evidence did not place the defendant in jeopardy for a new prosecu-
tion of counts I and II since the evidence was first used simply to 
strengthen the state's case under counts III and IV.840 
A defendant's failure to raise the defense of former jeopardy at 
trial constituted a waiver of that defense.841 
It has been held that a plea of guilty raises the bar of former jeopardy 
against another prosecution for an offense based upon the same transac-
tion and the state can not nolle prosequi such a case and recharge the 
defendant for a higher offense.342 However, where defendant pleaded 
guilty and then withdrew his plea, it was as if the plea had never been 
made, and the state was free to file a new information.843 The state's 
nolle prosequi of an information which has been brought within the two-
year limitation period but which has been dismissed more than two years 
after the offense, prevented further prosecution for the same offense.344 
The fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is a limita-
tion on the states through the fourteenth amendment.845 Therefore Ashe 
v. Swenson,346 holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is imbedded 
in the fifth amendment, is also applicable to the states. The United States 
Supreme Court indicated that Ashe would be given retroactive effect.m 
Nevertheless, in Brewer v. State,348 the Supreme Court of Florida found 
Ashe to be prospective only, in a case where defendant's conviction had 
become final prior to that decision. Since the collateral estoppel rule does 
not raise serious questions concerning the actuality of guilt, according to 
the court it must be treated in this manner, unlike the retroactive status 
given to other rules.849 
In a case in which the defendant's conviction was not final, the 
criteria for collateral estoppel were given effect where the defendant was 
convicted of forcible rape following an acquittal for a felony-murder 
which had occurred while the victim was being raped.850 Since the state 
had initially failed to prove the fact that the defendant had raped the 
victim, it was estopped from proving this necessary fact for the latter 
conviction. A defendant's acquittal of robbery for lack of identity estop-
ped the state from retrying the defendant for conspiracy to commit 
robbery where identification of the defendant was again a crucial 
issue.851 The collateral estoppel rule was not applicable, however, where 
340. State v. Fisher, 264 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
341. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
342. Ray v. State, 231 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970). 
343. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
344. Ball v. Goodwin, 249 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
345. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
346. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
347. Id. at 437 n.1. 
348. 264 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1972), afj'g 253 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
349. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confessions). 
350. Eagle v. State, 249 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
351. Martin v. State, 260 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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the defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to 
commit rape following a previous acquittal of rape and assault to commit 
rape charges, in that the ultimate facts needed for conviction were not 
common to the other offenses.852 Neither collateral estoppel nor double 
jeopardy bars the state from introducing evidence at trial after that evi-
dence was suppressed in a previous proceeding in another county.853 
The District Court of Appeal, Second District,354 held that the denial 
of defense counsel's motion for a mistrial followed by a later motion for 
dismissal by the state, which was granted with a statement by the judge 
that both parties had moved for a mistrial, could not be deemed a waiver 
by the defendant of a double jeopardy claim since he was not a party 
to the state's motion. 
Juvenile proceedings are not of a criminal nature, and, therefore, 
an adjudication of a delinquent in a juvenile court is not a bar to criminal 
prosecution on the same facts.855 
Former jeopardy is not an issue where the court holds a retrial to 
determine defendants' penalty where a federal court had set aside the 
death penalty sentence which defendants had received following a con-
viction of murder.856 
In Roberson v. State,857 the Supreme Court of Florida required that 
a recommendation of mercy which had been granted at the first trial, also 
be given for the defendant who obtained a retrial, unless the record in the 
second trial was significantly different from the first. The court cited North 
Carolina v. Pearce858 for the proposition that a more harsh sentence in 
these circumstances requires that some justification be noted in the record. 
After a mistrial following defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, 
it was improper on retrial to amend the information to assault with intent 
to commit murder as an accused can only be retried for the offense for 
which he was convicted before mistrial.859 
A minor traffic offender was immune from prosecution by juvenile 
court where she had already been convicted and fined in another juris-
diction. 860 
x. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
To warrant a new trial under Florida Statutes section 920.05 ( 1 )(a) 
(1973), it must be established that the defendant's absence at a pro-
ceeding where the jury was present operated to substantially prejudice 
352. McDonald v. State, 249 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
353. Suiero v. State, 248 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
354. Fugett v. State, 271 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
355. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
356. Barlow v. Taylor, 249 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1971). 
357. 258 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971). 
358. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
359. Kilpatrick v. State, 262 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Ray v. State, 231 
So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1970 [sic]) (decided in 1969). 
360. In re S.S.Y., 273 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
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his rights.361 Thus, if there is no objection to the absence of the defendant 
it is harmless error if the jury returns to the courtroom. during delibera-
tions to make inquiries of the trial judge.862 If a defendant voluntarily 
absents himself from the courtroom once a trial proceeding has com-
menced, the trial need not be interrupted, and a denial of a continuance 
will, at most, constitute harmless error where the sentence is not capital.368 
There is no requirement under rule 3.180 of the Florida Rules of Criminal 
Procedure that the defendant be present at a hearing on a motion for a 
new trial.864 
XI. PRELIMINARY HEARING 
There is an abundance of Florida cases holding that even a com-
plete denial of a preliminary hearing does not deprive a defendant of due 
process, because it is not an essential stage in a criminal proceeding,8611 
nor is it essential to a fair trial.866 Given the fact that article one, section 
15 (a) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the state attorney, as a 
constitutional officer, to initiate criminal prosecutions for felonies by 
filing an information under oath, the Supreme Court of Florida held that, 
in so filing, the state attorney conclusively determines that the evidence 
is adequate to establish probable cause.867 A preliminary hearing is not 
required where an information charging the commission of a felony has 
been filed. Thus, the requirement in Florida Statutes section 901.06868 
that one arrested by virtue of a warrant be taken without unnecessary 
delay before a committing magistrate does not apply to those arrested 
on a capias issued upon an indictment or direct information.869 
Where approximately five hours had elapsed between the time of 
arrest and the time the defendant was taken before a committing magis-
trate, such delay was neither unreasonable nor violative of his constitu-
tional° rights.87° Further, it has been held that an inculpatory statement, 
otherwise admissible, is not rendered inadmissible solely because the 
defendant has not been taken before a committing magistrate for a 
preliminary hearing.871 
361. Stephan v. State, 251 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
362. Id. 
363. Barcia v. State, 249 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
364. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
365. See, e.g., Conner v. State, 253 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
366. Lovell v. State, 250 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), citing Baugus v. State, 141 So. 
2d 264 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962). 
367. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blounts, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972), afj'g Maxwell v. 
Blount, 250 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). See DiBona v. State, 121 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. 1960). 
368. Section 901.06 was repealed in 1973 to the extent that it conflicts with FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.125. 
369. Karz v. Overton, 249 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); accord, Bradley v. State, 
265 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
370. Stevens v. State, 251 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Pettyjohn v. United 
States, 419 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
371. Robinson v. State, 254 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing State ex rel. Carty v. 
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It is thus apparent that constitutional objections to incarceration 
based on the filing of an information, with no judicial scrutiny prior to 
arraignment, have gone largely unrecognized in the Florida courts872 
despite statutory law873 mandating an appearance before a magistrate 
without "unnecessary delay." In Pugh v. Rainwater,874 the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that an incar-
cerated suspect must be afforded a preliminary hearing within a reason-
able time following arrest and directed the def end ants to submit a plan 
for the implementation of a committing magistrate system in all cases 
where the prosecution is initiated by direct information. The district court 
later adopted a plan which required that persons arrested in Dade County 
be afforded expeditious preliminary hearings before a magistrate and 
imposed certain sanctions, including the immediate release of those arres-
tees who were not provided with a timely preliminary hearing.3711 Al-
though implementation of the plan was stayed pending appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's 
decision and held that the fourth and fourteenth amendments require 
that arrestees held for trial upon informations filed by the state attorney 
must be afforded a preliminary hearing before a judicial officer without 
unnecessary delay.876 
Additionally, the court extended the preliminary hearing protection 
to misdemeanants, except when they "are out on bond or are charged 
with violating ordinances carrying no possibility of pretrial incarcera-
tion."377 The court of appeals vacated that portion of the district court's 
decision which required that the preliminary hearing be held within four 
days of the initial appearance, as well as the portion establishing a dif-
ferent time schedule, because they discriminated against those accused of 
capital offenses in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.878 Finally, 
the court vacated those provisions of the plan adopted by the district 
court imposing sanctions to insure compliance with the requirements of 
probable cause and preliminary hearings.379 At the time of this writing, 
Purdy, 240 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1970). The court found an additional ground for refusing to 
reverse in that the defendant did not object at trial to the admission of the statement. 
372. State ex rel. Carty v. Purdy, 240 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1970); Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 
So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970); State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1968}; Palmieri v. State, 
198 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1967). 
373. FLA. STAT, §§ 901.06, .23 (1973) dictate that when an arrest occurs, with or without 
a warrant, the officer making the arrest "shall without unnecessary delay take the person 
before a magistrate." Section 901.06 was repealed in 1973 to the extent that it conflicts with 
Fr.A. R. CRJM. P. 3.125. 
374. 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971), af!'d, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973). 
375. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1972). 
376. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973). 
377. Id. at 789. 
378. Id. 
379. Id. The court of appeals, while noting that "[t]hese paragraphs were at the time 
considered necessary by the court as a means for overcoming Florida's longstanding practice 
of denying preliminary hearings to criminal defendants," vacated the sanctions on the as-
sumption that the adoption of the Amended Rules of Criminal Procedure by the Supreme 
Court of Florida would obviate the need for such "onerous" sanctions. Id. at 790. 
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Pugh has been argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and 
a rehearing has been scheduled for the fall of 1974. 
XII. F Am TRIAL 
In Smith v. State,380 the prosecutor stated in his closing argument 
that if the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity he would 
be on the street in 30, 60, or 90 days and that there was no possibility 
of keeping him off for longer than that. The court in reversing defendant's 
conviction held that the first part of the prosecutor's argument was per-
missible but that the last phrase incorrectly stated the law, was highly 
prejudicial to the defendant and denied him his right to a fair trial. Also, 
where the prosecutor appealed to the sympathies of the jury for the vic-
tim's family, and commented several times on defendant's desire to remain 
silent, it was held that the defendant was denied a fair trial.881 In deter-
mining whether a statement made by the prosecutor is prejudicial, a court 
will look to the entire charge rather than to one statement out of con-
text.882 If the prosecutor's argument was a fair comment on the evidence 
the reviewing court will not reverse.883 
In Price v. State,884 the court held that the defendant was denied his 
fundamental right to a fair trial when the prosecutor stated in his closing 
argument that the "jury must believe in the integrity of the system and 
that if defendant had been named and not identified in another confession 
defendant would not be on trial because the state had no reason to prose-
cute an innocent man."385 The Supreme Court of Florida held that it is im-
proper for the prosecutor to refer to "mug books" or "mug shots" during 
a criminal trial, but that such a statement does not deny the defendant 
a fair trial where there is other clear evidence of defendant's identifica-
tion.886 
Rule 3.250, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which entitles the 
prosecution to the concluding argument before the jury if the defendant 
calls witnesses, is not constitutionally objectionable under the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments.887 Rule 3.250888 gives the defendant the right to 
the concluding closing argument when he has not called any witnesses on 
his behalf. A denial of this right is a denial of a fair trial. The courts are 
not concerned with whether a denial of this right is prejudicial to the 
defendant. As the court in Raysor v. State389 stated: 
380. 273 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
381. Breniser v. State, 267 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
382. Yanks v. State, 261 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
383. Wade v. Wainwright, 266 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
384. 267 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
385. Id. at 40. 
386. Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973). 
387. Preston v. State, 260 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1972). 
388. "[A] defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be 
entitled to the concluding argument before the jury." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250. 
389. 272 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
856 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. :XXVIII 
[W] e are at a loss as a practical matter to know just how any 
criminal defendant could in fact make a demonstration of error 
because of the refusal of the trial court to follow the dictates of 
the Rule. It is inherent in the procedure . . . that the right to 
address the jury finally is a fundamental advantage which simply 
speaks for itself.390 
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that the 
harmless error rule is inapplicable when the rule prohibiting comment on 
the failure of the defendant to testify has been violated.391 In Jones v. 
State392 the prosecutor stated, " [ t] here is not one word from the stand 
that says they did not participate in this crime." The court held that 
this was reversible error although it was susceptible to differing con-
structions. The statement could have been regarded by the jury as having 
reference to the failure of the defendants to testify on their own behalf. 
Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant should question prospective 
jurors as to the kind of verdict they would render under any given state 
of facts or circumstances. It was held to be reversible error when the 
state asked prospective jurors whether or not they would convict on the 
testimony of a person who has been granted immunity if the state proved 
the case beyond a reasonable doubt.393 
In Cole v. State394 the defendant argued that he was denied his right 
to a fair trial when his defense counsel's final argument to the jury was 
limited to 20 minutes. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held 
that in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, a court may impose 
reasonable restrictions on defense counsel's argument. In another case, 
a ruling of the trial court cutting off the defense counsel's effort to attack 
the credibility of a detective who produced an incriminating statement 
signed by the defendant was held not to constitute reversible error.3911 
When the trial court limits the type of questions which the defense counsel 
may ask of a witness, a reviewing court will not reverse unless prejudice 
is shown.896 
Where it was clear from the record that the jury could not have de-
liberated free from outside influence and that a juror had engaged in a 
conversation with someone outside of the courtroom concerning the case, 
there was prejudice to the defendant's right to receive a fair trial, and 
a new trial was ordered.897 
Whether a defendant has received a fair trial may depend on whether 
he was able to obtain information important to his defense. In Carnivale 
390. Id. at 869. 
391. Mathis v. State, 267 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
392. 260 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
393. Smith v. State, 253 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
394. 262 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
395. Lane v. State, 264 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
396. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
397. Durano v. State, 262 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
1974] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 857 
v. State,398 the defendant had deposed all of the witnesses listed in the 
statement of particulars and discovery, but defense counsel had no oppor-
tunity to depose the co-defendant because counsel was not informed that 
the co-defendant had turned state's evidence the morning of the trial. 
In reversing defendant's conviction the court held that the purpose of 
discovery is to eliminate the likelihood of surprise at trial. The opinion 
further stated that if the trial court rules that no prejudice resulted to 
the defendant, it is essential that "the circumstances establishing non-
prejudice to the defendant affirmatively appear in the record."399 Where 
a shirt worn by the victim, which was not listed on the bill of particulars 
and discovery, was admitted into evidence, the defendant was entitled to 
a new trial.400 Allowing an unlisted witness to testify is not reversible 
error in the absence of prejudice.401 A withholding by the state of knowl-
edge of evidence known to be useful to the defendant, even though useful 
only for impeachment purposes, can be grounds for a new trial.402 If 
certain testimony is introduced and the state bas failed to comply with 
pretrial orders relating to discovery, defendant is deprived of a fair and 
impartial trial!03 
A defendant can be denied bis right to a fair trial if be is surprised 
by other than evidentiary matters. In Robinson v. State,404 the informa-
tion was amended after the jury was sworn in. In reversing the conviction, 
the court stated, " [ w] e believe this was a matter of substance which 
constituted prejudicial error because of its potential for surprise which 
would infringe upon the defendant's right of a fair trial."4011 A defendant 
is not entitled as a matter of right to a pretrial copy of a complete and 
detailed report on any and all prospective jurors or to copies of all 
written statements made by witnesses to police officers and to the state 
attorney's office.406 
A defendant could be denied a fair trial when the trial judge makes 
an unreasonably large number of statements, comments, suggestions and 
innuendos. Though each alone may not constitute reversible error, in 
their totality they could well have been the influencing factor in the 
jury's verdict.407 
In Moncur v. State,408 a co-defendant entered a guily plea which 
the trial court received in the presence of the venire from which def en-
d ants' jury was to be selected. The judge at that time spoke critically 
398. 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
399. Id. at 795. 
400. Garcia v. State, 268 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
401. Lopez v. State, 264 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
402. Matera v. State, 254 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
403. Lowell v. State, 253 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
404. 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
405. Id. at 695. 
406. Robertson v. State, 262 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
407. Rockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
408. 262 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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of a jury which had acquitted another co-defendant. Defendant's motion 
for a continuance until a new venire could be summoned was denied. 
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed and held that 
the defendant "is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial jury, excluding 
even those whose minds have been tainted by newspaper publicity long 
before they have been called, much less sworn."409 
XIII. GRAND JURY 
The Supreme Court of Florida declared in State v. Silva410 that the 
selection procedure of the Dade County Jury Commission was improper 
and illegal. Following a mandate of the United States Supreme Court,411 
the Florida court held that prospective jurors must be selected at random 
without systematic and intentional exclusion of any economic, social, 
religious, racial, political or geographical group.412 In forbidding propor-
tional racial limitations in the selection process, the court further warned 
that by designating a prospective juror as black or white, the state as-
sumes a greater burden of showing that there was no racial discrimination 
in the selection of the jury venire. Additionally, the court upheld the 
Florida Statute413 providing for the selection of grand and petit jurors 
from male and female persons over the age of 21, and held that it was 
not violative of the twenty-sixth amendment, since each state has the 
power to establish qualifications for jurors to serve in its courts.414 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Portee v. Statems rejected the con-
tention that as a result of the elimination of the authorization for a 
grand jury in the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution, the Dade 
County Grand Jury was illegally constituted. The court found that the 
grand jury was based on common law principles and was therefore not 
affected by the constitutional .revision. 
As a constitutional officer, the state attorney is authorized to initiate 
criminal prosecutions by filing an information even though the grand 
jury has failed or refused to issue an indictment.416 He has concurrent 
authority with the grand jury to file a formal accusation, by indictment 
or information, of a felony not involving capital punishment.411 A circuit 
court judge has the power pursuant to Florida Statutes section 905.21 
(1973), to transfer a grand jury investigation to another county without 
409. Id. at 688. 
410. 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972). 
411. Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). 
412. State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972). 
413. Fr.A. STAT. § 40.01(1) (1969). 
414. 259 So. 2d at 153. The qualifying age for jury service was subsequently lowered to 
18 years. FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1973). 
415. 253 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971); accord, Reed v. State, 267 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1972). 
416. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972), citing State ex rel. 
Latour v. Stone, 135 Fla. 816, 185 So. 729 (1939). 
417. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972). 
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the necessity of an adversary hearing if he determines that conditions 
in that county make it impractical to convene a grand jury.418 
If an in camera examination of the transcript of grand jury testimony 
by a trial judge fails to reveal any material discrepancies in the testimony 
of a witness, the defendant is not entitled to review that transcript for 
cross-examination purposes.419 A defendant was not prejudiced by the 
fact that two witnesses allegedly gave false testimony to the grand jury, 
notwithstanding their refusal to testify at the defendant's trial after hav-
ing been advised of their constitutional rights.420 
In Branzburg v. Hayes,421 the United States Supreme Court held that 
a grand jury is not required to show "sufficient grounds" for believing 
that a reporter has information relevant to a crime being investigated, that 
the information is unavailable from other sources, or that the need for the 
information is sufficiently compelling to override first amendment inter-
ests. The case has the effect of requiring reporters to give up confidential 
sources of information to the grand jury unless they can meet the burden 
of showing an abuse of discretion by the investigating body.422 
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in In re Brevard 
County Grand Jury Interim Report423 warned that the grand jury may 
not single out persons in civil or official positions to impugn their motives, 
or hold them to scorn or criticism by word, imputation or innuendo with-
out presenting them for indictment. 
XIV. IMMUNITY 
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a claim asserting 
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was adequately 
met by granting a witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony 
and any evidence derived from such testimony since the immunity was 
"coextensive with the privilege."424 The Court rejected the defendant's 
claim that the privilege could only be maintained by immunity from 
prosecution for offenses to which the testimony related. In another im-
munity decision,425 the Court upheld as "responsive" any answers sub-
418. McCall v. Askew, 262 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972) ; see Higginbotham v. State, 
88 Fla. 26, 101 So. 233 (1924). 
419. Williams v. State, 275 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Minton v. State, 113 
So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959). 
420. Simpson v. State, 276 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
421. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
422. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1972) ; Levinson v. Attorney 
Gen., 321 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
423. 249 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing State ex rel. Brautigam v. Interim Re-
port of Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1957). Such an official is entitled to an order ex-
punging such a report from the public records. 
424. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court adopted "use and deriva-
tive use immunity" as opposed to transactional immunity which the defendant was claiming. 
425. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Inves., 406 U.S. 472 (1972). But see United States 
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mitted by a witness under a good faith belief that they were demanded, 
and held that the witness bad the right of counsel's advice in making the 
determination. 
In Brinson v. State,426 the appellant had been given immunity from 
drug prosecution after she gave sworn testimony as to another's involve-
ment. However she was found to be in contempt because she failed to 
testify at the trial. 
XV. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION 
If an information wholly fails to charge a defendant with a crime it 
is fundamental error. Thus, a conviction founded upon such an informa-
tion is void and must be set aside although the defendant pleaded guilty 
to the charge. However, if the insufficiency of the information is such 
that it does not wholly fail to charge a crime, the failure to timely raise 
the defect by motion to dismiss constitutes a waiver of the insufficiency.427 
It is not necessary that the indictment or information state the exact date 
of the offense if it is not known; it is adequate to state that the crime was 
committed within two specifically stated points in time. Also, it is not 
essential that the date of the offense proved at trial be the same date stated 
in the indictment or information.428 In Howlett v. State,429 the informa-
tion and bill of particulars reported the date of the crime as January 11 
or thereafter. The evidence at trial proved that the crime took place on 
January 6. The court, upholding defendant's conviction, stated: 
There may be some variance between the date alleged in the 
information as being the date the offense charged was committed 
and that proven on the trial, which variance is immaterial if the 
proof shows that the crime was committed before the filing of 
the information and that prosecution therefore was begun within 
the [statute of limitations] period, except in those rare cases 
... where the exact time enters into the nature or legal existence 
of the offense.480 
It is reversible error to require the defendant to go immediately to 
trial after allowing the prosecutor to substantially amend the information 
to charge a felony after having originally charged defendants with a mis-
demeanor. Instead, the information should be re-filed with a new 
arraignment for the defendants.431 After a jury has been accepted and 
sworn, any amendment of an information which affects a matter of sub-
v. Meyers, 339 F. Supp. 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ; Davis v. Wainwright, 342 F. Supp. 39 (M.D. 
Fla. 1972). 
426. 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
427. Catanese v. State, 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.190(c), 3.610(a) (1). 
428. Sparks v. State, 273 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1973). See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(d) (3). 
429. 260 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
430. Id. at 880, quoting Horton v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 611, 15 So. 2d 327 (1943) (emphasis 
in original). 
431. Lawson v. State, 251 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
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stance constitutes prejudicial error because of its potential for surprise 
and thus infringes upon the right to a fair trial.432 
In Wilcox v. State433 the state filed an information charging the de-
fendant with having received or aided in the concealment of certain 
property. The state then obtained leave to file an amended information 
which described different property. It then withdrew the amended infor-
mation, requiring the defendant to proceed to trial on the original in-
formation. The court, in reversing the conviction, held that when the 
state abandoned the amended information it was left without a charge 
against the defendant since the amended information vitiated and re-
placed the original. 
Where the state amended the bill of particulars on the morning of 
the trial, changing the scene of the alleged crime from the Youth Hall to 
defendant's apartment, after the state attorney and the defense counsel 
had discussed the change, the court held that the defendant had not been 
prejudiced and affirmed his conviction.434 
One may be convicted of any crime which is "necessarily included" 
in the offense charged or which is included within the allegations of the 
accusatory pleading and shown by the proofs. A "necessarily included" 
offense of which a defendant may be convicted is one which is neces-
sarily proven by proof of another offense.4811 Thus, in King v. State,436 the 
court reversed a conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery based on 
an information charging robbery because conspiracy to commit robbery 
is not an offense included under a charge of robbery. 
In Kilgore v. State437 defendant was charged in two separate infor-
mations with homicide and carrying a concealed weapon. The court pro-
posed to try the charges jointly. The District Court of Appeal, Second 
District, held that this was error. At the time the case was decided, the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure438 required that only the state or the de-
. fendant could move for a consolidation. Also, a consolidation could take 
place only if the charges could have been joined in a single information.489 
XVI. .ARREST 
A warrantless arrest for violation of a municipal ordinance is valid 
only if such violation is committed in the presence of the arresting officer 
432. Robinson v. State, 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
433. 248 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
434. Hale v. State, 273 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
435. Payne v. State, 275 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
436. 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 19'12). 
437. 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 19'12). 
438. The applicable rule at the time the case was adjudicated was rule 3.190(g), (k). 
This rule was subsequently amended by FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.151(b) which provides that 
only the defendant may move for consolidation of related offenses. Related offenses are those 
triable in the same court and based on the same or connected acts or transactions. FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.151(a). 
439. 271 So. 2d at 151. Again, this requirement has been changed by FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.151(a), (b). See note 438 supra. 
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and there is sufficient evidence to show that the arrest was made immedi-
ately or on fresh pursuit as required by Florida Statutes section 901.15 ( 1) 
(1971).440 
A conviction for resisting arrest is dependent upon the state's proving 
that the officer was making a lawful arrest.441 The legality of the arrest 
and the justification for resisting arrest are determined by whether or 
not the officer had substantial reason to believe that the defendant was 
committing a misdemeanor.442 
Where an officer observed the defendant in the commission of a 
felony and filed for an arrest warrant with the state attorney, the arrest 
was valid because it was based upon the mistaken belief that the warrant 
was outstanding.443 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Shadwick v. City of Tampa,444 
upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance which authorized 
the city clerk to issue arrest warrants and, impliedly, to make a determi-
nation of probable cause. The decision that a determination of probable 
cause need not be confined to strictly judicial officers was affirmed by 
the United States Supreme Court,445 which required only that the issuer 
be neutral, detached and capable of determining probable cause.446 
XVII. EVIDENCE 
A. Other Crimes 
It is well settled in Florida that evidence of other crimes447 is admis-
sible if it casts light on the character of the act under investigation by 
showing either motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, iden-
tity or general pattern of criminality, such that it has a relevant or mate-
rial bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried.448 Evi-
dence relating to similar but separate crimes is admissible if relevant for 
any purpose except that of showing bad character or propensity towards 
criminal conduct.449 The application and interpretation of the relevancy 
limitation have been the subject of numerous cases during the survey 
period. 
In Ashley v. State,450 the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the 
principle that 
440. City of Miami v. Crouch, 249 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
441. Rosenberg v. State, 264 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
442. Id. 
443. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The court justified the arrest 
under FLA. STAT. §§ 901.15(3), (4) (1973). 
444. 250 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1971), afj'g 237 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). 
445. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). 
446. Id. 
447. For a thorough analysis of the constitutional Issues relating to this type of evidence, 
see Bray, Evidence of Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions, 
28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489 (1974). 
448. William v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959). 
449. Id. 
450. 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972), dting Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1960). 
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the state, in introducing testimony concerning other crimes 
committed by a defendant, may not make such crimes a feature 
of the trial instead of an incident, so that the effect is to devolve 
from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt 
or innocence into an attack on the character of the defendant.451 
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Thus, in Reyes v. State,462 a trial for possession and sale of drugs, ex-
tensive testimony as to the defendant's prior drug transactions was char-
acterized as a "side-show of unrelated past activities" and held inadmis-
sible. Similarly, proof of a prior robbery was termed "overkill" by the 
state and was held to be reversible error.453 Testimony concerning prior 
instances of breaking and entering were found not relevant in a prosecu-
tion for arson.454 The introduction of the testimony concerning the dis-
covery of burglary tools in the defendant's possession subsequent to the 
events on which the information was based, prompted the court to note 
that "the prosecution is not permitted to adduce every description of 
evidence which according to their own· notions may be supposed to 
elucidate the matter in dispute."455 
In a prosecution for possession and sale of a narcotic drug, the intro-
duction of evidence concerning the defendant's subsequent criminal con-
duct warranted a reversal, despite the fact that the evidence of the 
defendant's guilt was almost conclusive.456 In another case the testimony 
of two witnesses who claimed that the defendant had subsequently per-
formed similar abortions on them was not relevant and was therefore 
inadmissible to prove the prior abortion.457 
Evidence tending to place the defendant's automobile at the scene 
of another crime on the same night as the robbery with which the defen-
dant was charged was held inadmissible as not showing a pattern, motive 
or manner of operation.458 However, testimony concerning a robbery 
committed by the defendant subsequent to the subject rape was relevant 
where the automobile used in the robbery was proven to have belonged 
to the rape victim's father.459 
In a prosecution for incest, the admission of testimony concerning 
two alleged incestual acts was held not to be reversible error.460 Similarly, 
451. 265 So. 2d at 693. 
452. 253 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
453. Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
454. Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
455. Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). The court fur-
ther characterized the introduction of such evidence as "one more example of overzealous 
prosecutors submitting evidence of collateral acts • • . that are not relevant to the issue 
being tried." Id. 
456. Denson v. State, 264 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
457. Lucas v. State, 57 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). "A citizen accused of committing 
a crime, no matter how heinous ..• is entitled to be informed as to the nature of the charge 
against him and afforded an opportunity to prepare his defense .... " Id. at 263. 
458. Walker v. State, 273 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
459. Brown v. State, 250 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Gragnon v. State, 212 So. 
2d 337 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). 
460. Clark v. State, 266 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Judge Rawls, dissenting, stated 
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in a rape prosecution, evidence of four prior rapes, where the defendant 
had approached each victim in a manner identical to the subject case, 
was held relevant and thus admissible.461 Testimony concerning a prior 
assault by the defendant was deemed relevant where it tended to prove 
a similarity between the crime the defendant was tried for and conduct 
toward others at or about the same time and place.462 Evidence of four 
prior murders was held to be relevant to the issues of the motive, intent, 
identity, and modus operandi of the defendant.463 Additionally, evidence 
dealing with certain events which transpired at a rape victim's home some 
300 yards from the scene of a first-degree murder was sufficiently tied to 
the subject murder to warrant admission.464 
Where a proper predicate is laid by a showing of some overt act by 
the deceased at or about the time of the slaying that would reasonably 
suggest the need for self-defense, evidence of prior specific acts of violence 
by the deceased, known to the defendant at that time, are admissible for 
the limited purpose of proving the reasonableness of the defendant's fear 
of the deceased at the time of the slaying.465 
In Reams v. State,466 the Supreme Court of Florida, noting that evi-
dence relating to a similar crime is admissible in limited circumstances, 
imposed the additional requirement that before such evidence may be 
admitted there must be clear and convincing proof of a connection be-
tween the defendant and the collateral occurrences. 
B. Character of the Accused 
The state cannot introduce evidence attacking the character of the 
accused unless the accused first puts his good character in issue.467 Thus, 
the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the state to 
prove, over the defendants' objections, that the defendants were drug 
that the evidence admitted was not relevant under the Williams test and that, in effect, the 
defendant was tried for an incestuous relationship with his daughter which took place over 
a period of 16 years. Accord, Nathy v. State, 275 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). Again, in 
a dissenting opinion, Judge Rawls lamented that to admit a "tornado" of irrelevant and 
immaterial evidence relating to the reconstruction of a depraved family life over a 20 year 
period, "is to obliterate all concepts of due process granted by the Constitutions of the 
United States and the State of Florida." Id. at 590. 
461. Dean v. State, 277 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1973). 
462. Booth v. State, 257 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
463. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972). 
464. Williams v. State, 249 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
465. Williams v. State, 252 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). The court detailed the evolu-
tion in Florida of judicial thought as to the admissibility of evidence of prior acts of violence 
by the deceased when offered in support of a defense of self-defense citing Gamer v. State, 
28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835 (1891) (limiting such proof to evidence of the defendant's reputation 
for violence in the community); Palm v. State, 135 Fla. 258, 184 So. 881 (1938) (first case 
which permitted evidence of specific acts of violence by deceased known to the defendant at 
the time of the slaying). 
466. 279 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1973). 
467. Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (1886). 
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addicts when that fact was not raised initially by the defendants.'68 
Similarly, in a murder prosecution, the state's line of questioning con-
cerning the defendant's alleged reputation for homosexual behavior was 
improper. The defendant's failure to object, however, precluded a reversal 
on that issue. 469 
C. Photographs, Tapes, Voiceprints and Fingerprints 
During the period surveyed the Florida courts considered numerous 
cases concerning the admissibility of voiceprints, tape recordings, photo-
graphs and fingerprints. In Worley v. State,410 a case of first impression, 
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that voiceprints were 
admissible to corroborate testimony identifying the defendant as the 
person who had made false bomb threats by telephone. In holding that 
voiceprints were competent evidence the court expressly refrained from 
deciding whether voiceprint identification, standing alone, would be 
sufficient to sustain the identification and conviction of the defendant.471 
Similarly, the admission of expert testimony concerning a spectrographic 
voiceprint identification and the voiceprints upon which the opinions were 
based was held to be proper.472 Thus, the introduction of tape recordings 
of extortionary telephone conversations to a prosecution witness to cor-
roborate the witness's testimony was proper.473 
The consent of one participant in a conversation to its interception 
is a condition precedent to its admissibility, absent a duly authorized 
warrant.474 The testimony of a police officer that he was given consent 
to make the wiretap was not sufficient, where such hearsay was not cor-
roborated or authenticated by the competent in-court testimony of the 
consenting party.'75 Additionally, where the quality of a tape recording 
is so defective and distorted as to render the conversation unintelligible, 
it is reversible error to allow such a recording to be heard by the jury, 
since the individual jurors might speculate upon the various portions of 
the recording which can be understood.476 
Gruesome and inflammatory photographs are admissible into evi-
468. Machara v. State, 272 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
469. Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
470. 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 
641 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.MA. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967); 
State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1971). The court interpreted these 
cases and the available expert testimony and found that sufficiently impressive scientific data 
had been amassed to verify the voiceprint's accuracy and reliability. 
471. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
472. Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
473. Id., citing Walker v. State, 222 So. 2d 760 {Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). 
474. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973), quashing 244 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
1971). 
475. Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 {Fla. 1973). 
476. Carter v. State, 254 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
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dence if relevant to any issue which must be proved in a case.477 In State 
v. Wright,418 the supreme court held that the exceptional nature of the 
proferred evidence is not to be considered in testing the relevancy thereof 
but rather the determination of relevancy is to be made in the "normal 
manner." Thus, photographs, even though clearly inflammatory and 
prejudicial, are relevant and admissible to show decedent's position at 
the time of death; 479 to establish the cause of death and identity of the 
deceased; 480 to refute defendant's claim of self-defense; 481 to prove that 
force had been used against the victim during the attack; 482 to illustrate 
or explain the testimony of a witness; 483 to support or refute the defense 
of suicide; 484 or to reveal the nature and appearance of injuries.485 
However, in Beagles v. State,486 the court held that where the defen-
dant had admitted the victim's identity, her death and the fact that a 
bullet had entered her brain and did not come out, it was error for the 
trial court to allow into evidence more than 30 gruesome photographs of 
the victim because there remained no pertinent issues to be resolved by 
the use of such photographs. Additionally, the court noted that photo-
graphs should be received in evidence with great caution and those which 
show nothing more than a gory or gruesome portrayal should not be 
admitted. Further, gruesome photographs should not ordinarily be ad-
mitted if made after the body has been removed from the scene unless 
they have some particular relevance.487 
The admission into evidence of several police photographs from 
which the defendant was identified prior to trial was not error where the 
numbers thereon were obliterated, they were not referred to as "mug 
shots" and they were introduced without objection.488 In Loftin v. State,489 
the supreme court refused to grant an automatic reversal upon the mere 
use of the words "mug shots" and chose instead to require a consideration 
by the appellate court of the entire record and surrounding circumstances. 
Thus, without defendant's objection, the prosecutor's reference to "mug 
books" and "mug shots" in connection with the initial photo identifica-
477. State v. Wright, 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972), quashing 250 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. 1971). 
478. 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972), citing Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971). 
The court rejected the District Court of Appeal, Second District's reasoning that, to be ad-
missible, such photographs must tend to resolve a conflict in evidence relating to a disputed 
vital issue, not merely to prove a "technically relevant" issue. 
479. Baker v. State, 251 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Williams v. State, 228 
So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1969). 
480. Jones v. State, 257 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
481. Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971). 
482. Stevens v. State, 251 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
483. Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
484. Jones v. State, 257 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
485. Maness v. State, 262 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
486. 273 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
487. Id. 
488. Greenwood v. State, 270 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
489. 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973), afl'g Loftin v. State, 258 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
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tion of the defendant constituted harmless error where there was other 
clear evidence of the defendant's identification, the prosecution stated 
that the defendant's photograph was not among the "mug shots" and the 
defendant expressly testified that he had never been convicted of a 
crime.49o 
Fingerprints alone are sufficient to clearly establish that an accused 
committed a given crime if the circumstances are such that the print 
could have been made only at the time the crime was committed.491 Thus, 
fingerprints are sufficient to sustain a conviction where the crime occurred 
in a private house and no other plausible explanation existed for the 
presence of the defendant's prints at the scene of the crime.492 However, in 
Dargans v. State,493 the court declined to apply the well settled rule and 
held that fingerprints found on a carton of beer were admissible notwith-
standing the defendant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove 
that such prints could have been made only at the time of the commission 
of the subject crime. 
D. Circumstantial Evidence 
A person charged with a crime may be convicted solely on the basis 
of circumstantial evidence.494 However, the circumstances must be con-
sistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and must be of such a 
conclusive nature and tendency that there can be no reasonable hypoth-
esis other than that the defendant is guilty.495 Circumstantial evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a conviction as a matter of law if it produced 
nothing more than a suspicion of guilt.496 It is the actual exclusion of 
every other reasonable hypothesis which clothes circumstances with the 
force of proof.497 
E. Identification of the Defendant 
The propriety of the in-court identification of the defendant which 
was preceded by a pretrial lineup or photo identification, has been the 
subject of several cases during the survey period. Where the in-court 
490. Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973). 
491. Wilkerson v. State, 232 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Ivey v. State, 176 So. 2d 
611 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965); Tirko v. State, 138 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962). 
492. Roberts v. State, 268 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Anderson v. State, 
241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970). 
493. 259 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
494. Miller v. State, 270 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Navarro v. State, 262 So. 2d 
729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
495. Camporeale v. State, 270 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); accord, Weinstein v. 
State, 269 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Jacobs v. State, 268 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
1972) ; Navarro v. State, 262 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) ; Lockett v. State, 262 So. 2d 
253 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
496. Whitehead v. State, 273 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
497. Weinstein v. State, 269 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Navarro v. State, 262 So. 
2d 729 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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identification has a basis completely independent of the questioned line-up 
or other identification confrontation, its admission is proper.498 Such 
testimony will be set aside only if the identification procedure was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification.499 Thus, in Chaney v. State,500 the su-
preme court held that the identification of a def endent in a rape prose-
cution was not fatally tainted despite the fact that, prior to any arrests, 
the victim was shown a single photograph of the defendant who had 
admitted to her that he had been jailed for rape previously. The victim 
had ample opportunity to see her assailant over a protracted period of 
time and her in-court identification was clearly of independent origin. 
The court further held that an accused is entitled to counsel only at a 
post-indictment lineup.1101 
Similarly, it is not necessary that the defendant be represented by 
counsel at a pre-information, out-of-court photographic identification to 
have the evidence of identification properly admitted.1102 Paschal v. 
State, 503 dealt with a prosecution for murder in the first degree in which 
the witnesses clearly saw the faces of the gunmen at the time of the crime. 
Prior to the inquest, they identified the gunmen from photographs. The 
court held that the identification at the inquest, conducted without the 
defendants being represented by counsel, did not prejudice the defen-
dants who argued that the witnesses' observations at the inquest bolstered 
their subsequent identification at trial. The testimony of a police officer 
concerning an extra-judicial photographic'~04 or lineup505 identification 
which the victim made of the defendant was not competent original or 
substantive evidence to identify the accused, and was not properly ad-
mitted where there was no corroborative in-court identification by the 
victim.1106 
F. Hearsay 
An otherwise inadmissible hearsay declaration is not rendered ad-
missible merely because it is stated in the presence of the defendant.1101 
Such a statement is admissible under the hearsay exception of admission 
by silence only under circumstances where it was so accusatory in char-
acter that the defendant's silence may be inferred to have been' an assent 
498. Wilson v. State, 26S So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Hearns v. State, 262 So. 2d 
907 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); Daniels v. State, 262 So. 2d 72S (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
499. See cases cited at note 498 supra. 
SOO. 267 So. 2d 6S (Fla. 1972). 
501. Id. 
S02. Staten v. State, 248 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
S03. 251 So. 2d 2S7 (Fla. 1971). 
S04. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
SOS. Stevens v. State, 2Sl So. 2d S6S (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
506. Id. 
S07. Daugherty v. State, 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Johnson v. State, 
249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
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to its truth.508 Thus, the testimony of a police officer as to the identifica-
tion of an accused made by an unknown second party was clearly inad-
missible to prove the truth of the assertion, notwithstanding the fact that 
the defendant was present during the testimony.509 Further, the admission 
by silence exception has doubtful application to those situations where 
the party is accused of a crime in the presence of the arresting officer.510 
The testimony of a police officer that a third party, who was not 
allowed to testify, had told him that he saw the defendant's automobile 
at the scene of another crime on the same night as the subject robbery 
was inadmissible.511 Similarly, testimony grounded upon information from 
two unidentified sources who were not present and unavailable for cross-
examination, was highly prejudicial to the defendant in that it deprived 
him of his rights to confront those witnesses who were directly contra-
dicting his alibi defense.512 Testimony sought to be elicited from the 
arresting officer as to what time the complaining witness had told the 
officer that the alleged crime took place was held inadmissible under the 
hearsay rule.513 
In Appell v. State,514 the court held that a statement must be spon-
taneous and made with little or no opportunity for reflection to be admis-
sible under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. The four main 
factors to be evaluated in gauging the spontaneity of a res gestae state-
ment were listed by the court as: ( 1) the time gap between the statement 
and the event, (2) the voluntary nature of the declaration, (3) the self-
serving nature of the statement, and ( 4) the declarant's physical and 
mental condition at the time of the statement.515 
Under an exception to the hearsay rule, extra-judicial declarations 
of one conspirator made outside the presence of the co-conspirator may 
be admitted into evidence against the latter when the declarations were 
made in furtherance of and during the existence of a conspiracy.516 How-
ever, before the co-conspirator rule may be invoked, there must first be 
independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and of the defen-
dant's participation therein.1117 A determination as to whether or not a 
prima facie case has been established as a predicate for the admission 
of co-conspiratorial declarations is a question for the trial judge and 
normally must be established before such statements are introduced,518 
508. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
509. Id. 
510. Id. 
511. Walker v. State, 273 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
512. Webb v. State, 253 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
513. Jones v. State, 256 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
514. 250 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
515. Id. 
516. Hudson v. State, 276 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
517. Id., citing Farnell v. State, 214 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). Accord, Honchell v. 
State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971). 
518. Hudson v. State, 276 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), citing Carbo v. United States, 
314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). 
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but the trial judge in his discretion may permit the order of proofs to be 
reversed. 519 
If at the time a dying declaration implicating the defendant was 
made, the circumstances were such that a jury might infer that the de-
clarant entertained no hope of recovery and felt that death was imminent, 
such question was properly submitted to the jury.520 
In Rollins v. State,521 the court held that it was not an abuse of dis-
cretion to permit testimony by two state witnesses who had violated the 
court's order for sequestration of witnesses, where the record disclosed 
that after a voir dire examination the trial court determined that the 
violation was unintentional and did not substantially affect the ability 
of the witness to make an in-court identification. 
Although a trial court has discretion to order the separation of wit-
nesses, such discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily. In County of 
Dade v. CaUahan, a refusal to invoke "the rule," absent any inquiry into 
the identity of the witnesses or the nature of their prospective testimony, 
constituted an abuse of discretion.522 Where the defendant failed to 
object to the presence of two officers in the court room during the trial, 
the argument that the trial judge "allowed" the rule on exclusion of wit-
nesses to be violated thereby depriving the defendant of due process, was 
without merit.523 Additionally, the court reasoned that it is not error to 
permit a witness who is a police officer to remain in the courtroom during 
trial since such witnesses are "distinterested in the outcome of the 
trial."1124 
While it is a well-established rule in Florida that a member of the 
deceased victim's family may not testify for the purpose of identifying 
the victim where non-related witnesses are available to make such identi-
fication,525 the court in Scott v. State,1126 held that any error in so doing 
was harmless, where the mother who identified the deceased also formed 
an essential link in the chain of custody of additional critical evidence. 
Similarly where the defendant failed to make a timely objection to the 
testimony of the victim's father although non-related witnesses were 
519. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971). 
520. Mills v. State, 264 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Johnson v. State, 113 
Fla. 461, 152 So. 176 (1934), for the proposition that the apprehension of imminent death 
need not be established by statements of the declarant, but may be proved by facts and cir-
cumstances from which the jury might conclude that the declarant must have known and 
believed that he was on the threshold of death. In the subject case, the serious nature of 
the wound, a slashed throat, and an enormous loss of blood warranted submission of the issue 
to the jury. 
521. 256 So. 2d 541 (Fla:. 4th Dist. 1972). 
522. 259 So. 2d 504 {Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
523. Ratliff v. State, 256 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
524. Id., citing Spencer v. State, 113 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961). 
525. Abram v. State, 242 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 870 
(Fla. 1971). 
526. 256 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
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available for that purpose, the violation of the well-established rule did 
not constitute fundamental error.527 
The supreme court, in Freimuth v. State,rm held that courts may take 
judicial notice of official records of administrative agencies without re-
quiring the introduction of an authenticated copy of the rule. Thus, the 
trial court can take judicial notice of a Federal Register listing hallucino-
genic drugs.529 Further, a trial court may, in its own discretion, take judi-
cial cognizance of a municipal ordinance which the court is charged with 
enforcing.530 Judicial cognizance of a domestic statute does not constitute 
introduction of evidence by the defendant and thus doe5 not abrogate 
the defendant's procedural right to open and close.581 
During the survey period there were numerous decisions considering 
miscellaneous evidentiary issues. Competent evidence as to value is 
essential in a larceny prosecution and thus the jury cannot be permitted 
to consider only ·the nature of the articles stolen.532 While the victim is 
a competent witness as to value, the defendant is entitled to cross-
examine him regarding current value.533 Moreover, cost is not to be con-
sidered the equivalent of value.534 In Ashford v. State,535 the supreme 
court held that a cross-examination of the defendant based on an "FBI 
report," which was secondary evidence of the information contained 
therein, was not fundamental error and thus not a proper subject on 
appeal where it was not raised before the trial court.1136 It was error 
for the trial court to refuse to permit the defendant to testify as to whether 
he committed the crime for which he was charged, as it is basic to a de-
fendant's "right to be heard" to so testify.587 A pretrial order that wit-
nesses, who may be used by the state for purposes of identification, shall 
be examined for visual acuity was improper and nothing in the common 
law or the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a trial court 
to grant a motion compelling witnesses to submit to a physical examina-
tion of any sort.538 A comment on the defendant's silence contained 
within a hypothetical question going to the issue of sanity was harmless 
527. Barrett v. State, 266 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); accord, Russell v. Wain-
wright, 266 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
528. 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972), af!'g 249 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
529. Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972). 
530. Holmes v. State, 273 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1972). 
531. Wyatt v. State, 270 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Fr.A. STAT. § 918.09 
(1969). The court drew a distinction between evidence and proof, with judicial notice con-
stituting the latter. 
532. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
533. Singleton v. State, 258 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
534. Id. 
535. 274 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1973). 
536. Id. 
537. Moore v. State, 276 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
538. State v. Smith, 260 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1972), quashing 254 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
1971). 
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error where it was stricken from the record and the jury was properly 
admonished.539 Testimony concerning a conversation in which the defen-
dant spoke of having refused to plead guilty because of his confidence 
in his ability to convince the jury of his innocence was wholly immaterial 
and irrelevant where its only purpose was to discredit the defendant's 
anticipated testimony.540 The testimony of an accomplice, even though 
uncorroborated, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.1141 
XVIII. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 
The disclosure at trial of the identity of a confidential informant 
who drove a police officer to a pool hall outside which defendant was 
standing, was not required following a sale of drugs to that police officer 
by the defendant.1142 The informant's participation was deemed minimal 
and there was no evidence that he had done anything to pave the way for 
the sale to the policeman. The court also distinguished this case from 
those where the sale is made to a confidential informant rather than a 
police officer.543 There was no error in refusing to provide the name of a 
confidential informant where one defendant actually knew the name of 
the confidential informant despite an allegation by the defendant's coun-
sel that the state had told him that he would be given the name of the 
confidential informant at trial,1144 
XIX. PLEA OF GUILTY 
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Boykin 
v. Alabama,545 holding that a plea of guilty must be made knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily, the courts in Florida have interpreted and 
applied it under a broad range of circumstances. In Alexander v. Wain-
wright,1146 the court held that the defendant's right to be thoroughly in-
terrogated by the trial judge as to the voluntariness of his plea is not 
retroactive. Thus, there was no error when the trial court failed to in-
quire as to the defendant's understanding of the nature and consequence 
of his guilty ·plea since it was a pre-Boykin case.547 In Hall v. State,548 
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, interpreted Boykin to 
require only "an affirmative record showing that a guilty plea is entered 
S39. Zerega v. State, 260 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). 
S40. Owens v. State, 273 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
S41. Kellerman v. State, 261 So. 2d SSS (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
S42. Doe v. State, 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Harrington v. State, 110 
So. 2d 49S (Fla. 1st Dist. 19S9). 
S43. Monserrate v. State, 232 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). 
S44. Rabreau v. State, 269 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
S4S. 39S U.S. 238 (1969). 
S46. 262 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Odle v. State, 241 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. 1970). 
S47. Alexander v. Wainwright, 262 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
S48. 273 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). The court adopted the reasoning of People v. 
Sepulvado, 27 Mich. App. 66, 183 N.W.2d 327 (1970). 
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voluntarily, intelligently and understandingly" and rejected the necessity 
of having the record demonstrate a specific enumeration and waiver of 
federal constitutional rights in order for the plea to have been volun-
tarily made. A defendant need not be informed of his right to remain silent 
nor of his right not to testify against himself as a condition precedent 
to a voluntary guilty plea.549 A guilty plea is valid despite the finding 
that the trial court did not advise the defendant of his right to remain 
silent or his right to confrontation.550 In Davis v. State,551 the court re-
jected the contention that Boykin requires the pronouncement of the 
exact words to the defendant that he has the "opportunity to confront 
his accusers if he went to trial and that he could not be compelled to 
testify against himself."552 In Kelly v. State,553 the District Court of 
Appeal, First District, held that Boykin "does not require a step-by-step 
recitation of each and every [one] of the defendant's rights" where the 
defendant was represented by counsel and where the guilty plea was 
the product of plea-bargaining negotiations between the defendant and 
the state. Further, it is not a requirement in Florida that, prior to ac-
ceptance of a plea of guilty, the trial court must undertake an investiga-
tion as to the existence of a factual basis for the guilty plea; all that is_ 
required is that the court determine that the plea is made voluntarily 
with an understanding of the nature of the charge.554 
If a plea of guilty is to be sustained as voluntary, it must be entered 
by a defendant competent to understand the consequences and must not 
be induced by fear, misapprehension, persuasion, promises, inadvertence 
or ignorance.555 Thus the contention that the defendant was psychologi-
cally coerced by his attorney to enter a plea of guilty did not warrant 
an order to vacate where the record demonstrated that the defendant 
specifically denied that anyone had done anything by way of duress, 
pressure, influence, force or any other method to cause him to plead 
guilty, or that anyone had promised him anything.1156 However, where 
the trial court is notified immediately following pronouncement of a 10-
year sentence that the defendant had pleaded guilty after having been 
advised by his counsel that he would receive a sentence of 3 years, the 
trial judge should have set aside the finding of guilt as well as the sen-
tence and, ex mero motu, if necessary, set a hearing to determine the 
voluntariness of the plea.557 
549. Hill v. State, 256 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
550. Kelly v. State, 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
551. 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
552. Id. at 306. 
553. 254 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), citing Wilson v. Wainwright, 248 So. 2d 249 
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), and Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
554. Boyd v. State, 255 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
555. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
556. Scarborough v. State, 278 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
557. Kirlis v. State, 262 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. § .3.170 
(a), (f). 
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The fact that the defendant was represented by competent counsel 
at the time he entered his guilty plea was a factor which strongly mili-
tated against a conclusion that the plea was involuntary.1158 However, 
the bare allegation that defendant was without counsel at the time he 
pleaded guilty was insufficient to warrant vacating the judgment and 
sentence.559 Nor does the mere fact that multiple defendants were repre-
sented by a single attorney necessarily warrant a finding of reversible 
error based on a claim that defendants were denied effective assistance of 
counsel where the defendants pleaded guilty.560 Where the defendant was 
informed by the court and advised by counsel as to the effect and con-
sequences of his guilty plea, the plea was voluntarily made.1161 
In State v. Pinto,1162 the court noted that a defendant often pleads 
guilty after consultation and advice from his attorney and held that such 
decision was a tactical one which may not be whimsically revoked at a 
later time. A plea of guilty that is otherwise entered knowingly and volun-
tarily is not vitiated when entered for the expressly stated reason that 
the defendant had no witnesses and did not believe that he could "beat 
the charge."563 The court in Scarborough v. State held that "even where 
a defendant pleads guilty to avoid a death sentence and upon entering 
his plea testifies that he is innocent, such a plea is not involuntary where, 
upon the advice of counsel, he was pleading guilty to limit the penalty 
that he might receive."564 
The mere fact that a defendant had a prior history of mental illness 
did not serve to invalidate a guilty plea where the record affirmatively 
demonstrated that the trial court accepted the plea following a detailed 
inquiry sufficient to support a finding that it was entered voluntarily and 
that there was nothing which would raise a doubt as to the defendant's 
sanity.5611 The fact that the state obtained the defendant's confidential 
psychiatric report in contravention of a protective order, did not con-
stitute sufficient influence to nullify a plea, absent evidence that such 
information was used by the state in an attempt to encourage the def en-
dant to enter a plea of guilty.1166 The contention that the promises of 
psychiatric care were used as an inducement to obtain a plea was without 
merit where there was no showing that the defendant relied upon the 
promise or that it in any way influenced his decision.567 
558. Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. lst Dist. 1972). 
559. McClendon v. State, 260 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
560. Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
561. Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
562. 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Belsky v. State, 231 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. 1970). 
563. Carter v. State, 253 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
564. 278 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 
25 (1970). 
565. Betts v. State, 255 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
566. Surrette v. State, 251 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
567. Id. at 152-53. 
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Where the files and records did not conclusively establish that a 
plea was voluntarily made free from any threat, intimidation, coercion, 
promise or inducement of any kind, and that the defendant was advised 
that he was waiving certain constitutional rights, the defendant was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to vacate sentence.1168 
Absent any indication in the record that a plea was entered voluntarily, 
an evidentiary hearing is required notwithstanding the fact that the 
defendant was represented by a public defender.569 The mere fact that 
a defendant who entered a plea of guilty was represented by counsel of 
his own choosing does not negate the need for an evidentiary hearing 
on a motion to vacate and set aside judgment and sentence where the 
defendant alleged that he was coerced into confessing by the arresting 
officers, that no one explained to him the penalty for five counts of rob-
bery, that he did not know that he was entitled to a trial and that he 
was both questioned by the police for hours and identified in a lineup 
without the aid of an attorney.570 Where the record is devoid of any 
inquiry by the trial judge into the voluntary nature of the defendant's 
plea, the judgment will be vacated and the trial judge must either in-
quire into the voluntariness of the plea or allow the defendant to with-
draw it.571 
During the survey period several cases dealt with the problem of 
unfulfilled promises, pursuant to which pleas of guilt were entered. In 
Santobello v. New York,572 the United States Supreme Court held that 
when a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agree-
ment of the prosecutor, such promise must be fulfilled to the extent that 
it constitutes part of the inducement. Thus, where the prosecutor inad-
vertently breached an agreement that he would refrain from making a 
sentence recommendation, the Supreme Court remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration and left the ultimate disposition thereof to the discre-
tion of the state court. Such discretion was to be exercised in accordance 
with the options outlined by the Supreme Court to either grant specific 
performance of the agreement on the plea or afford the defendant the 
opportunity to withdraw the plea.573 
In Dade County v. Baker,574 the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that where cumulative sentences of imprisonment in the county jail were 
bargained for so that the defendant could benefit from a drug rehabilita-
tion program offered by the county, the defendant would be given the 
opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea as a result of the court's finding 
568. Clark v. State, 256 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
569. Williamson v. State, 273 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
570. Gayle v. State, 265 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
571. Cheever v. State, 272 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
572. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Court concluded that the interests of justice and appro-
priate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotia-
tions of pleas of guilty could be best served by remanding the case. 
573. Id. 
574. 265 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1972). 
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that felonies could not cumulatively exceed one year in the county jail. 
However, the fact that during plea negotiations the trial court indicated 
that it would consider a shorter sentence does not preclude that court 
from imposing a harsher sentence following a full jury trial where the 
court becomes better informed of the circumstances of the particular 
crimes involved.11711 Nor was the trial court's informal statement in open 
court, during plea negotiations, that it would not be thinking in terms of 
less than a SO-year sentence, binding on the tourt.1176 In Taylor v. State,511 
the defendant was entitled to reversal and remand with directions that he 
be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty where the sentencing judge over-
looked a condition of his plea bargain that he be allowed to withdraw 
his plea if he should be found not to be a proper candidate for probation. 
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Barker v. State,578 
rejected the employment of specific performance579 to enforce plea bar-
gains on the ground that to do so would bind the trial judge in his final 
disposition of the case. However, the court did indicate that the status 
of a specifically enforceable contract might be recognized upon a clear 
showing of irrevocable prejudice to either the prosecution or defense.580 
Additionally, where the trial court concurs in a plea bargain or enters 
into plea negotiations which contemplate sentence or charge concessions 
if defendant enters a guilty plea, and if the judge later decides that the 
final disposition of the case shall not include such concessions, he has an 
affirmative duty to so advise the defendant before sentencing and to pro-
vide the defendant with the opportunity to either affirm or withdraw his 
plea as entered.1181 
While an agreement by the state to recommend probation does not 
bind the trial court to accept such recommendation, the state is bound 
either to make the recommendation as promised or to advise the defen-
dant prior to the withdrawal of the plea of not guilty of its intention 
not to uphold the bargain.1182 The state's failure to maintain its part of 
the bargain renders the plea involuntary and the trial court must vacate 
the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea.583 Where 
a plea of guilty is predicated on a promise by the state not to prosecute 
other pending charges arising from the same criminal transaction, and 
the state, notwithstanding the promise to the contrary, files an information 
575. Gause v. State, 270 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
576. Blackman v. State, 265 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
577. 275 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
578. 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
579. Id. at 204. 
580. Absent such extraordinary circumstances, under rule 3.170(f), and Brown v. State, 
245 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. 1971), if a trial judge decides that the final disposition of the case 
should not include the concession of leniency contemplated by the negotiated plea bargain, 
he should be most liberal in permitting a withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
581. Enos v. State, 272 So. Zd 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
582. Crossin v. State, 262 So. Zd 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Ward v. State, 156 
Fla. 185, 22 So. Zd 887 (1945). 
583. Crossin v. State, 262 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
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based on the pending charges, that information may properly be dis-
missed. 584 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Costello v. State,5811 after noting 
that guilty pleas are voided when judges or prosecutors promise def en-
dants that they will be given lesser sentences than they actually re-
ceive, 586 held that 
[ w] e do not believe the result should be different when a def en-
dant has a reasonable basis for relying upon his attorney's mis-
taken advice that the judge will be lenient. The effect upon the 
defendant is the same; in each case he exchanges his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial for a promise of leniency.587 
The court qualified its holding by noting that it is not enough for a 
defendant to argue that he was under an impression that a promise 
had been made; a reasonable basis for such an impression must be shown. 
Thus, allegations by a defendant that he had entered guilty pleas in 
reliance on his attorney's statement that the most the defendant would 
receive was five years in prison, did not warrant vacation of the plea 
where such contention was not supported by the record.588 In State v. 
Pinto,589 the defendant's motion to vacate judgment and sentence on the 
ground that he had entered a plea on the basis of promises made by 
defense counsel after plea negotiations was not sufficient in the absence 
of an allegation or showing that, at the time the guilty plea was made, 
the trial judge was aware of the bargain or had been a party thereto. 
The withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a matter properly addressed 
to the sound discretion of the trial court.590 A defendant should be allowed 
to withdraw a plea given inadvisedly when application is duly made in 
good faith and sustained by proofs and a proper off er is made to go to 
trial on a plea of not guilty.591 In Facion v. State,592 the court held that 
the exercise of discretion should be based upon considerations and facts 
bearing only upon the merits of the motion to change the plea. The 
accused's guilt or innocence, or the probable cause to believe he was 
guilty were not proper subjects for consideration by the trial judge on 
the motion to withdraw the plea. Additionally, the court held that per-
mission to withdraw "may not be refused where it is in the least evident 
that the ends of justice will be subserved by allowing a plea of not guilty 
584. State v. Drake, 276 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). Although the court avoided 
characterizing it as such, the result approaches specific performance. 
585. 260 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1972). 
586. Id. at 201. 
587. Id. 
588. Robinson v. State, 270 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
589. 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
590. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See Fu. R. CtuY. P. 3.170 
(f). 
591. Stovall v. State, 252 So. 2d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
592. 258 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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to be entered in place of a guilty plea."593 However, where the defendant 
failed to make a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court 
did not err in failing to allow him to do so.594 When a plea has been with-
drawn with the approval of the court, it is as if a plea had never been 
entered.11911 
Ao uncoerced guilty plea cures all non-jurisdictional defects preced-
ing the acceptance of such plea. 596 The effect of a guilty plea is to waive 
trial on the merits and preclude attack on the validity of any search and 
seizure of evidence or the admissibility thereof,1197 by way of post-convic-
tion motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence. Similarly, 
a defendant who entered a plea of guilty had no standing to urge that 
the speedy trial rule should operate to discharge him.598 The failure of 
the information to state the specific amount of marijuana allegedly pos-
sessed constituted a jurisdictional defect which could not be cured by 
consent or be waived in a guilty plea.1199 Similarly in Catanese v. State,600 
the court held that where the information wholly fails to charge the 
defendant with a crime, it is fundamental error and a conviction founded 
thereon is void and must be set aside even though the defendant entered 
a plea of guilty to such charge. 
Despite their acknowledgement of the general rule that voluntary 
guilty pleas cure all non-jurisdictional defects, the court in State v. 
Pitts,601 held that a guilty plea does not cure the defect of a state's sup-
pression or concealment of evidence favorable to the accused,602 and that 
matters going to the credibility of a state's witness are cognizable in a 
post-conviction proceeding notwithstanding a guilty plea. 
It is not necessary for a defendant to make a motion to withdraw 
his plea as a condition precedent to an appeal based on an allegation 
that the plea was involuntary.603 
XX. N OLO CONTENDERE 
A plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a plea of guilty 
such that one who is sentenced to imprisonment upon such a plea is 
prosecuted and convicted under the same information.604 A nolo plea 
593. Id. at 30. 
594. Schaefer v. State, 264 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
595. Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
596. Williams v. State, 259 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972) ; Morris v. State, 255 So. 2d 
704 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
597. Whitlow v. State, 256 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
598. White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
599. Pope v. State, 268 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
600. 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
601. 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
602. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
603. Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 (1969). 
604. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971). 
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may be conditioned upon the reservation of a question of law; 6011 if it is 
not so conditioned, the defendant may not question the validity of a 
judge's denial of a motion to suppress.606 However, where the record 
showed that the defendant's nolo contendere plea was entered solely 
in light of the court's denial of a motion to suppress, defendant could 
appeal the denial of his motion despite the nolo plea.607 
Where the state had promised to make a recommendation to the 
court in return for a plea of nolo contendere, failure to make that recom-
mendation following such a plea is error because the state may not gain 
an advantage in this way.608 The court recommended that if the state 
decides against making its recommendation, it should advise the defen-
dant prior to the entry or charge of the plea.609 
The Supreme Court of Florida later held that once the state attor-
ney's office has agreed to accept a plea of a lesser included offense, and 
the plea has been made by the defendant, the state is estopped from 
claiming that its representative had erred in making the off er unless the 
defendant or his counsel caused the error.610 
Whether a plea of nolo contendere was voluntary should be deter-
mined to see if withdrawal of such a plea should be allowed where a 
defendant alleged that his plea was made upon advice of counsel that 
he would get a three-year jail sentence in return.611 
A plea of nolo contendere must be made knowingly and understand-
ingly without threat, intimidation, promise or inducement of any kind.612 
Although a per curiam decision without opinion did not permit withdrawal 
of a nolo plea,613 the dissent argued that the case's facts, including the 
exchange between counsel and the court, clearly warranted permission 
to Withdraw the plea in view of earlier cases on point.6u 
XXI. SELF-INCRIMINATION 
The United States Supreme Court6111 upheld a California statute 
which required a driver who was involved in an accident to stop im-
mediately at the scene and to give the driver of the other vehicle his 
name and address as not violative of the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. Evidence of a defendant's physical condition in a 
605. State v. Ashbey, 245 So. 2d. 225 (Fla. 1971). 
606. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971). 
607. Ackles v. State, 270 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
608. Crossin v. State, 262 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
609. ld. 
610. State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973). 
611. Kirlis v. State, 262 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
612. Hall v. State, 273 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Cheever v. State, 272 
So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
613. Mccarroll v. State, 264 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
614. ld. at 428, citing Banks v. State, 136 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1st. Dist. 1962); Costello v. 
State, 260 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1972); Brown v. State, 234 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). 
615. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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drunk driving case also does not violate the constitutional provisions 
which protect a defendant against self-incrimination.616 
The reasonable seizure of a handwritten note which stated that the 
defendant had killed the victim was inadmissible since such evidence, 
which is "testimonial" or "communicative" in nature, would compel the 
defendant to become a witness against himself in violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.617 
The exercise of one's privilege against self-incrimination by remain-
ing silent during interrogation618 prohibits the prosecution from intro-
ducing that fact in evidence.619 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, restated that under 
Florida law, a defendant who raises the defense of insanity in a criminal 
case, and requests and is granted an examination, must cooperate with 
court-appointed experts to the fullest.620 However, the court went on to 
state that the psychiatrist used by the court may be questioned only as 
to his conclusion regarding the defendant's sanity, and any questions by 
the state regarding incriminating statements made by the defendant dur-
ing his examination would violate his right against self-incrimination.621 
XXII. JURY TRIAL 
A. Right to Trial by Jury 
Having already decided that a six-man jury in non-capital cases 
did not violate the sixth or fourteenth amendments,622 the United States 
Supreme Court continued to expand upon what procedures were allow-
able in meeting this constitutional right to trial by jury. In the companion 
cases of Apodaca v. Oregon628 and Johnson v. Louisiana,624 the Court held 
that state convictions for felonies by less than unanimous juries were 
violative neither of the constitutional right to trial by jury nor of due 
process under the fourteenth amendment. Although Florida has imple-
mented trial by a six-man jury, it retains the common law requirement 
of a unanimous verdict in all cases. 
A valid waiver of jury trial was found in Quartz v. State625 where the 
defendant had signed an information providing for waiver of trial by jury 
and where counsel for the defendant had made an oral waiver. Citing two 
616. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
617. State v. Kircbeis, 269 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Maryland Pen. v. 
Hagden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
618. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
619. Brenisir v. State, 267 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
620. McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Parkin v. State, 222 
So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969) and Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970). 
621. McMunn v. State, 264 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
622. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
623. 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
624. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). 
625. 258 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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federal cases, the court found that although interrogation of the defendant 
is a better practice, a waiver may meet the requirement of voluntariness 
if the defendant knowingly signs a written document.626 In a later case, 
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that even absent a 
waiver in an information signed by the defendant, a method of waiver 
prescribed by Florida Statutes section 912.01 (1971), it was enough that 
the record reflected that the defendant did in fact otherwise waive jury 
trial.621 
The Florida statutes628 providing for the transfer of cases from 
municipal to state courts in order to obtain trial by jury were the subject 
of a number of cases during the survey period. Such a transfer is not 
permitted when the municipal court provides for jury trial.629 The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, disallowed a motion for transfer 
of a "speeding" case from municipal to state court under Florida Statutes 
section 932.61 (1973), where there was no clear evidence showing that 
the municipal violation was also a violation of state law.680 
The requirement in Florida Statutes section 932.61(4) (1973), that, 
upon a judge's order that a case be transferred to a state court, all record 
materials must be sent to that court within three days, must be strictly 
adhered to. Failure to follow this provision resulted in proper dismissal 
of the case in State v. Cook.681 However, a dismissal for failure to follow 
these statutory sections does not prevent refiling of an independent infor-
mation by the proper authorities, as jeopardy has not yet attached.632 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, found no right to trial 
by jury in a contempt of court conviction, and rule 3.840(a)(4), pro-
viding that all issues of law and fact be heard and determined by the 
judge, was held valid under the state and federal constitutional provisions 
for jury trial.688 
Where it was apparent at a hearing for a new trial that the sole 
material prosecution witness swore to two conflicting stories as to the 
guilt of the defendant, one at trial and one thereafter, it was error for 
626. See Baker v. State, 269 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Quartz v. State, 258 
So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). In Baker, the court held that full concurrence with counsel 
as to waiver at arraignment amounted to a knowing waiver. 
627. Parks v. State, 263 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Ivory v. State, 184 So. 
2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966). 
628. FI.A. STAT.§§ 932.61-.66 (1973). 
629. Nesler v. Hampton, 260 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
630. Mitchell v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 254 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). This 
decision appears to be unfair in that the defendant is forced to predict the facts to be 
alleged by the prosecution. 
631. 254 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), afl'd, 264 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1972). 
632. State v. Ressler, 257 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
633. Aaron v. State, 261 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 
384 U.S. 373 (1966) (six month criminal contempt conviction is "petty" and thus no jury 
necessary), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (adhering to the rule that contempt 
is "petty" if the sentence is six months or less). See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 
(1970). 
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the trial judge to determine at which time the witness was telling the 
truth, for to do so pre-empted the function of the jury.634 
A longer sentence may never be invoked simply because a defendant 
asks for a trial by jury. However, where a defendant was sentenced to 
35 years for robbery following a jury trial, it was not subject to review 
despite the fact that defendant's cohort was only sentenced to five years 
following a plea bargain, since the sentence was within the statutory 
limits.635 
B. Jurors 
In State v. Silva,636 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the 
propriety of jury selection using a quota system, and the requirement 
that jurors be over the age of 21 and that they be of specified character, 
e.g., law abiding, of good character and sound judgment. A system in 
which the names of white persons and black persons were placed on jury 
lists in proportion to the population of their respective classes in the 
community was found violative of due process and equal protection as 
such selection limits the number of qualified jurors in each class.637 It is 
required that selection be made at random. The court suggested that the 
county use its election data process equipment for that purpose. 
Turning to the question of whether a Florida statute638 requiring 
jurors to be above the age of 21 was in derogation of the twenty-sixth 
amendment to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of 
Florida689 concluded that the twenty-sixth amendment only provided 
18-year-old's with the right to vote, but did not include a provision for 
jury service at that age. Consequently, the states have the power to set 
an age requirement for service as a juror. Also, a statutory provision of 
random selection providing for the listing of only those persons which 
the selecting officers believe to be law abiding citizens and of good char-
acter, was found constitutional and within the power of the selecting 
body. It should also be noted that an objection to the panel of jurors must 
be made prior to trial in order for the appellate court to grant relief to 
one assigning this as error.640 Relying on Silva, the Supreme Court of 
Florida held that the mere showing of a certain percentage of eligible 
black jurors is insufficient to prove that a particular panel was improperly 
selected, although it may be considered in such a determination.641 In 
Peters v. Kiff,642 the United States Supreme Court held that proof of 
634. Solis v. State, 262 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
635. Weathington v. State, 262 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
636. 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972). 
637. Id. 
638. FI.A. STAT.§ 40.01(1) (1973). 
639. State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1972). 
640. Foxworth v. State, 267 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1972) (defendant's failure to object to 
panel prior to examination of Individual jurors was found to constitute waiver). 
641. Id. 
642. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
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systematic exclusion of blacks from a grand jury or petit jury was prop-
erly challenged by a convicted white even if he could not show that he 
was himself harmed by such exclusion. 
With the apparent elimination of the death penalty by the United 
States Supreme Court,648 any questions revolving around the exclusion 
of jurors with opinions against capital punishment have presumably 
ended.644 Nevertheless, prior to that decision, it was held that several 
jurors were properly excluded when they were found incapable of render-
ing a verdict which would result in a sentence of capital punishment.6411 
In a similar case, excusal of jurors because they either could not reach 
an impartial decision on defendant's guilt or would never vote to impose 
the death penalty was also held proper.646 
It was improper for a defendant to contest the propriety of a jury 
venire through rule 3.850 when the issue was properly raised at the trial 
level, and was a proper subject for direct appeal.841 
The voir dire process cannot cure the effect a publication of a con-
fession in the news media has on the jury, and a change of venue should 
be granted in such a case.848 No change of venue is required, however, 
where a jury may have formed some impression or opinion as to the 
case's merits through factual news items,649 or where newspaper reports 
of other criminal charges against the defendant had been made, and 
prospective jurors may have heard of these charges, since such knowl-
edge alone would not disqualify a juror absent a showing of prejudice.8110 
XXIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES8111 
In State ex rel. Shelton v. Sepe,6112 the court stated that it was "ill 
advised" for a judge to make a public pronouncement concerning his 
attitude toward sentencing offenders for specific crimes; nevertheless, 
since the announcement of a policy of confinement for a conviction of 
certain offenses pertained to matters after conviction, and was permitted 
by statute, there was no reasonable basis for defendant's fear that he 
would not get a fair trial. The Court also held that the judge could not 
643. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
644. Subsequent to the survey period and in view of the Supreme Court's unwillingness 
to completely forbid capital punishment in Furman, the Florida Legislature enacted a new 
statute allowing capital punishment in certain cases. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1973). Thus, 
the problem alluded to in the text may be a reality in the future. 
645. Paramore v. State, 251 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
646. Portee v. State, 253 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971). This case presents an interesting 
examination of the case law on this subject. 
647. Yanks v. State, 273 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
648. Oliver v. State, 250 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 1971), quashing 239 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
1970), Colbert v. State, 239 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). 
649. Gavin v. State, 259 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
650. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
651. See generally FLA. R. CRIM:. P. 3.230. 
652. 254 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
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be disqualified because he was employed as an assistant state attorney 
at the time the defendant was bound over for trial, if he had no dealings 
with the prosecution of the case. 
Where the defendant failed to follow the proper procedure for ob-
taining disqualification of a judge,653 it was within the discretion of the 
judge to determine whether he should disqualify himself.654 
XX.IV. SPEEDY TRIAL 61111 
During the survey period, there was a great deal of litigation con-
cerning rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure as promul-
gated by the supreme court.6116 In Turner v. State ex rel. Pellerin,657 the 
Supreme Court of Florida outlined the two basic requirements which must 
be met by one seeking to perfect his rights under the speedy trial rule. 
The demand for a speedy trial must be made subsequent to the date of 
the filing of an indictment, information or trial affidavit against the de-
fendant, and the defendant must be prepared for trial at the time he 
makes his demand. 
In United States v. Marion,658 the United States Supreme Court held 
that, on the federal level, the sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy 
trial is applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime, in 
other words, upon initiation of a criminal prosecution. The function of 
protecting the defendant from the possibility of prejudicial pre-accusation 
delays, is performed by the applicable statutes of limitation. 
In State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman,6119 the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that the 60-day period does not begin to run until a demand for 
speedy trial has been filed pursuant to the rule, and that such a demand 
cannot become effective unless it is filed after the defendant has been 
charged with a crime by indictment,660 information661 or trial affidavit. 
653. FLA. STAT.§ 38.10 (1973) j FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.230. 
654. In re A.S. v. State, 275 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
655. The authors have dispensed with cases construing the "three terms of court" speedy 
trial rule of Florida Statutes sections 915.01 and 915.02 (Supp. 1970), which have been 
superseded by the promulgation by the supreme court of rule 3.191 of the Florida Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. However, those cases which are analogous to and which might be 
helpful in interpreting the provisions of the new rule will be discussed. 
656. In State ex rel. Maines v. Baker, 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1971), the supreme court 
upheld rule 3.191 as a proper exercise of the court's constitutional power to promulgate rules 
of practice and procedure. See In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 245 So. 2d 33, amended, 251 So. 2d 
537 (Fla. 1971). 
657. 272 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1973), citing Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). 
658. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). The court held that the amendment would not "require the 
Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of 
time." Id. at 313. 
659. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). Accord, State ex rel. Young v. Willis, 257 So. 2d 64 
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). However, Justice Rawls, dissenting, maintained that rule 3.191 as con-
strued in Hanks is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection because a person not under 
indictment or information should be entitled to as great protection as a person just arrested 
and either jailed or released on bond. 
660. See State v. Gravlee, 276 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1973), rev'g 272 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st 
Dist.). Accord, State ex rel. Dennis v. Morphonios, 252 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
661. See State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Hanks 
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A demand by the defendant on charges of contempt of court was held 
ineffective where it predated the rule to show cause.662 
The supreme court also elaborated on the second general require-
ment for activation of the 60-day demand rule in Goodman,663 and held 
that a defendant cannot control the criminal docket merely by filing 
spurious demands for a speedy trial although he is unprepared. Further, 
the court warned that before dismissing a defendant at the expiration of 
the 60-day period, the trial judge must ascertain whether or not the 
accused had a bona fide desire to obtain a speedy trial and determine 
whether or not the accused or his attorney has diligently investigated his 
case and is prepared for trial.664 If these prerequisites are not met, the 
court may strike the demand. Thus, where the defendant had filed two 
motions to advance the cause, it was not error when the trial court set 
the trial for two days after the arraignment and within four to six weeks 
after the filing of the information.6611 
Where the defendant continued discovery proceedings after filing 
his demand and defense counsel was not ready to proceed when the case 
was called on at least one occasion, denial of discharge was proper.666 
Similarly, a motion to dismiss alleging that the information under which 
the defendant was charged was so vague that he could not prepare an 
adequate defense, filed subsequent to the filing of his demand for a 
speedy trial, operated as an admission that he was not prepared for trial 
and that his demand was spurious.667 A defendant who timely filed a 
demand for a speedy trial was entitled to a trial within 60 days notwith-
standing the fact that his case was transferred to a lower court where the 
new charge, a misdemeanor, was grounded upon the same conduct as 
the charge originally pending.668 
Rule 3 .191 requires trial within 60 days of the filing of a written 
demand by an accused charged with a crime, by indictment, information 
or trial affidavit. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the filing of a 
trial affidavit is applicable only in cases involving misdemeanors because 
in such cases the trial affidavit is a sufficient basis for prosecution.669 
v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Novak v. Sepe, 253 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 
3d Dist. 1971). 
662. Brinson v. State, 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
663. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). 
664. Id. 
665. Bradley v. State, 265 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court filed the followhig 
caveat: "The defendant's counsel should not have asked for a speedy trial if he was not 
ready to go to trial." 
666. Savinon v. State, 277 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
667. State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1973). 
668. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Maginnis, 254 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
669. Pltofsky v. State, 276 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1973), aff'g 267 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 3d Dist. 
1972). The court noted that the Florida Constitution provides that no person shall be tried 
for a non-capital felony without a presentment, indictnient or information and, therefore, 
since a trial affidavit is not a sufficient document upon which to try the accused for a felony, 
the filing of a demand following the filing of a trial affidavit, but prior to the filing of an 
information, is ineffective to invoke the demand clause of the speedy trial rule. FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § lS(a). 
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The supreme court, in McCauley v. State ex rel. Fouraker,610 held 
that a demand for speedy trial which averred that the defendant was 
available and prepared for trial was insufficient compliance with the rule 
to warrant the discharge of the defendant, although the demand was 
dictated into the record, in open court and in the presence of the state 
attorney. The court held that the rule contemplates that a demand for 
speedy trial be in writing, filed with the court having jurisdiction, and 
served upon the prosecuting attorney.611 Where the defendant included 
a request for a speedy trial within a written instrument entitled "notice 
of intention to plead not guilty," such request did not constitute a proper 
demand within the meaning, spirit and intention of rule 3.191.612 
Absent a demand for speedy trial, a defendant is entitled to dis-
charge if not tried within 180 days after being taken into custody for 
the crime charged.618 Given the fact that proceedings in juvenile courts 
are not criminal but civil in nature,674 the time spent in a juvenile deten-
tion home cannot be counted in computing the 180-day period.6711 
Where the first information filed against the defendant was "nolle 
prossed" by the state, and a second, identical information was filed, the 
failure of the state to bring the defendants to trial within 180 days of 
their incarceration warranted discharge.676 Subsequently, the state filed 
a third information charging separate acts taking place within the time 
span of the dismissed conspiracy charge but differing in times from the 
specific acts alleged in the two previous informations. The court held 
that, pursuant to rule 3.191 (h)(2), which expressly prohibits avoidance 
of the rule by prosecuting new or different chaq~es based on the same 
conduct or criminal episode, the later prosecution was precluded.8" Simi-
larly, when separate informations, one charging bribery and the other 
conspiracy, are based upon the same conduct or criminal episode, they 
cannot be successfully manipulated by the state to extend the time within 
which a prosecution can be maintained. despite the fact that the infor-
mations were filed in different counties.678 Nor can the state enlarge the 
180-day period for bringing a defendant to trial by deliberatelv delaying 
formal service of the warrant when the defendant is already in custody 
6'10. 2'73 So. 2d '156 (Fla. 19'13), quashing 258 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. 19'72). 
6'71. McCauley v. State ex rel. Fouraker, 2'73 So. 2d '156 (Fla. 19'73). 
6'72. Harris v. Tyson, 26'7 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. 19'12). The court, while noting that 
the speedy trial rule specifically dellneates neither the particular form of demand required 
nor any particular wording therefore, apparently felt that when a "demand fs submerged 
within an Instrument unrelated to speedy trial," the state was not capable of noticing the 
"disguised" demand. Id. at 393. 
6'73. State v. Bryant, 2'76 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing FLA. R. Cnn.r. P. 
3.191 (a) (1). 
674. State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st Dist. 19'11). 
6'15. State v. Bryant, 2'76 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1st Dist. 19'13). 
6'76. State v. Boren, 2'73 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 3d Dist. 19'73). 
6'1'1. Id. 
6'18. Bryant v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 84'7 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cerl. denied, 26'1 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 
19'12). 
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and known by the state to be so.679 A defendant was first charged with 
a misdemeanor (driving while intoxicated) after he struck a pedestrian 
and later charged with manslaughter after the pedestrian died, but the 
180-day period was not triggered until the defendant surrendered himself 
in response to the information on the felony manslaughter count.680 
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Maines v. Baker,681 
dealt with the issue of when a person shall be deemed to have been 
"brought to trial" within the meaning of rule 3 .191. The court held that 
a jury trial is commenced when the panel is sworn for voir dire examina-
tion, prior to the time that any questions are asked on voir dire. A trial 
before a judge alone begins upon waiver of jury trial when counsel for 
the defense and the prosecution appear before the judge to present their 
cases. 
In exceptional circumstances, rule 3 .191 ( f), allows the court, on its 
own motion or the motion of either party to extend the time for trial 
beyond that established by the rule. Although the rule defines certain 
circumstances which will justify an extension,682 there has been much 
litigation concerning the propriety of such delays. The fact that the 
grand jury did not convene until shortly before the expiration of the 
180-day period following the defendant's arrest for a capital offense did 
not constitute an exceptional circumstance within the provision for an 
extension of time.688 The desire of the state to gain a strategic advantage 
by delaying the defendant's trial until after that of his co-defendant, is 
not an exceptional circumstance justifying an extension of time.684 A 
delay in the proceedings was justified, however, when a crucial witness 
for the state fled after defendant's relatives purportedly made threats on 
his life.6811 The unavailability of an essential witness who was still hos-
pitalized with the wounds received as a result of the offense charged in 
the information, was an exceptional circumstance warranting an exten-
sion. 686 A continuance based on the fact that another case was already 
679. State v. Sutton, 269 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
680. State ex rel. Lee v. Rose, 277 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
681. 254 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1971). 
682. Rule 3.191(f) lists several exceptional circumstances such as: (1) unexpected ill-
nesses; (2) a showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available, but will 
become so later; (3) a showing by the state that the accused has caused major delay or 
disruption of the preparation of proceedings; ( 4) a showing by the state of developments 
which could not have been anticipated and which will materially affect the trial; (5) a 
showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a codefendant where the cases are not 
severable; and (6) a showing by the state that the case Is so unusual or complex that it is 
unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the time periods established by this rule. 
683. Allen v. State, 275 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1973). 
684. State ex rel. Harris v. Wehle, 260 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
685. State ex rel. Fort v. Driver, 270 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). The delay was 
justified under exceptional circumstances pursuant to rule 3.191(£) (iii). 
686. State v. Wolfe, 271 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). Consistent with the rule, after 
justifiably delaying the trial pursuant to such exceptional circumstances, the trial court reset 
the trial date within a reasonable time as ls additionally required under rule 3.191(f). 
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docketed for trial on the trial date did not operate as an exceptional cir-
cumstance to toll the trial period.687 
In State ex rel. Boren v. Sepe,688 the trial court extended the trial 
date beyond the 180-day period in an effort to afford the defendants ade-
quate time to peruse voluminous discovery materials belatedly provided 
by the state, despite the fact that the state demanded a trial date within 
the speedy trial period. Although the extension was granted at the urging 
of the defendant, ostensibly for his benefit, the exceptional circumstance 
was occasioned by delay on the part of the state, such that the extension 
was not justified. Where the state moved to disqualify the trial judge and 
pursued the cause on an appellate level to the supreme court, it was in-
cumbent upon the state to secure an impartial judge, and as long as the 
pursuit was in good faith, the action tolled the effect of the speedy trial 
statute. 689 
Additionally, a showing that the defendant was not continuously 
available for trial will justify an extension of time beyond the periods 
established by the speedy trial rule.690 Thus the failure of the defendant 
to appear at his arraignment, 60 days after his arrest, and to show by 
competent proof that he had nevertheless been continuously available 
for trial operated to excuse the failure of the trial court to bring the 
defendant to trial within 180 days.691 
The fact that the sheriff's department had an incorrect address for 
the defendant, was not sufficient to show the non-availability of the ac-
cused.692 While the state had the initial burden to present evidence dem-
onstrating the non-availability of the defendant, when such burden was 
satisfied, the defendant was required to establish his continuous avail-
ability for trial. He did so by proving that he had lived continuously at 
the same address up to the time of his arrest, that he had made periodic 
reports to his probation officer and that he had been regularly employed 
in a gainful occupation.693 
Although the state may not extend the period of time in which a 
person may be tried by first entering a nolle prosequi to the charges and 
then filing different charges based on the same conduct,694 if the evidence 
bears out the state's claim of the non-availability of the defendant an 
extension of time is justified.6911 Thus, following the refiling of an informa-
687. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Willis, 255 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
688. 256 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. discharged, 271 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1972). 
689. State v. Wolfe, 249 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). Rule 3.191(o)(2) which has 
superseded FLA. STAT. § 915.01 (1971), which formed the basis of this decision, expressly 
allows extension of the time period for interlocutory appeals. 
690. Dara v. State, 278 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); State ex rel. Kennedy v. Mc-
Cauley, 265 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.19l(c). 
691. Dara v. State, 278 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
692. State ex rel. Kennedy v. McCauley, 265 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
693. Id. 
694. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing rule 
3.19l(h) (2). 
695. State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d. 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
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tion, where the defendant knew that he was being sought by the police 
who made a diligent effort to locate him and, where the defendant did 
not make himself available, the running of the 180 days was tolled for 
such period of non-availability.696 
A continuance chargeable to the defendant will also operate to toll 
the running of the speedy trial rule.607 Thus, where the defendant re-
ceived two continuances, the first by stipulation to substitute counsel, 
and the second by withdrawing his waiver of jury trial on the date set 
for the non-jury trial, the fact that he was not brought to trial within 
180 days was not grounds for discharge.698 A defense request for an addi-
tional 20 days in which to file appropriate defense motions tolled the 
operation of the discharge provisions for the amount of time required to 
dispose of the motions.699 However, a defendant was entitled to discharge, 
notwithstanding six continuances granted in a violation of probation 
proceeding brought in another county, where there was no showing that 
they delayed prosecution of the original charges or prevented prompt 
disposition thereof.700 Since a preliminary hearing is not a prerequisite 
to a criminal prosecution,701 a defense continuance of the preliminary 
hearing does not toll the 180-day period.702 In State ex rel. Butler v. 
Cullen,703 the Supreme Court of Florida held that where the defendants 
requested additional time in which to prepare their defense prior to trial, 
the time limitations of the speedy trial rule were waived by the defen-
dants once the continuance was granted. The court noted that after a 
continuance has been granted, a defendant may file a demand for speedy 
trial after completion of his preparation for trial, and must then be 
brought to trial within 60 days.704 
Rule 3 .191 ( d) ( 2) provides, in part, that the periods of time estab-
lished by the rule may be waived "upon stipulation, signed in proper 
person or by counsel, by the party against whom the stipulation is 
sought to be enforced, provided the period of time sought to be extended 
has not expired at the time of signing .... " The District Court of Appeal, 
Second District, held that although the rule contemplates that such waiver 
or stipulation be in writing, an oral stipulation, entered into in open court 
by the defendant's counsel in the presence of an official court reporter 
was sufficient to obviate the writing requirement.7011 Where the defen-
dant's counsel entered into an oral out-of-court informal understanding 
696. Id. 
697. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d) (3); White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
698. Atkins v. State, 265 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
699. Kniffin v. Hall, 262 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
700. Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
701. Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970). 
702. Edell v. Blount, 267 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
703. 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971). 
704. Id. 
705. Eastwood v. Hull, 258 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); accord, Kniffin v. Hull, 262 
So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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to defer the setting of a trial until after a controlling question of law was 
decided in a companion case, such waiver was effective to bind the de-
fendant, notwithstanding the fact that it was entered into without his 
knowledge, consent or understanding of his right to a speedy trial.706 
The court explained that a defendant's right to be tried within 180 days 
is a procedural right, as distinguished from a substantive right, and 
therefore may be waived by his attorney without his prior knowledge or 
consent. 707 In a similar case it was held that even though the assistant 
public defender who waived the speedy trial limitation had never met 
the defendant and was not familiar with the case, it was not error for 
the counsel to waive the defendant's right to trial within 180 days, with-
out consulting with or informing the accused, where in good faith the 
public defender felt that such delay would or could benefit the accused.708 
A request for a continuance by a defense counsel who had been 
rejected by the defendant operated to deprive the defendant of a dis-
charge based upon a denial of his right to a speedy trial.709 The failure 
of the defendant to object to a continuance by the court on its own 
motion is not a waiver by acquiescence of the right to a speedy trial 
provided that a proper demand for a speedy trial has been made. 710 In 
State ex rel. Allen v. Taylor,711 the court rejected the argument that the 
waiver provisions of rule 3 .191 ( d) ( 2) came into operation where the de-
fendant was released on bail and was not, therefore, continuously avail-
able for trial since "he was free to absent himself" under the terms of 
the bail bond. 
Where the defendant has not been brought to trial within 90 days 
after his arrest on a misdemeanor charge pursuant to rule 3 .191 (a)( 1), 
he was entitled to discharge upon timely motion.712 The fact that two 
misdemeanor counts were joined in an information including a felony 
count arising out of the same circumstances did not operate to extend the 
time within which the misdemeanor counts could be tried to the limita-
tions applicable to the felony count. 713 
Where the defendant who was incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction 
requested disposition of the charges pending against him in Florida, and 
where a detainer had been issued based upon an arrest warrant, the 
failure of the state to bring the defendant to trial for over a year war-
706. State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
707. Id. 
708. State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1973). As the court noted, 
the rule may be waived or extended by order of the court with good cause shown and it is 
not required that the accused be present when the waiver is made. The determination of the 
propriety of such a waiver by the public defender depends upon the facts of the individual 
case. 
709. Llano v. State, 271 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
710. Harris v. Tyson, 267 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
711. 267 So. Zd 689 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
712. State ex rel. Jacobsen v. Goodman, 254 So. Zd 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing FLA. 
R. CRIM. P. 3.19l(a)(l). 
713. Sibert v. Hare, 276 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
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ranted discharge pursuant to rule 3.191(b)(2) and (3).714 One who is 
so held has a constitutional right to demand that Florida initiate the 
available procedure to secure his return for a speedy trial.7111 Where the 
defendant, who was being held in jail on state and federal charges, filed 
a demand for speedy trial, section (b) (2) of the rule controlled and the 
state had six months after the service of the demand.716 
XXV. PROBATION 
Probation is a privilege afforded certain defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings and is discretionary with the trial court.717 While strict proce-
dural and substantive rights of a defendant need not be fully adhered to 
in a revocation hearing,718 the proceedings must meet the minimum 
criteria of due process.719 Thus, a revocation hearing held without prior 
notice to the defendant; without the presence or testimony of the victim 
and sole witness to the alleged violation; without a full hearing as re-
quested by the defendant; without adequate time to confer with counsel 
who was appointed at the hearing; and based only upon hearsay evidence 
offered by police officers and the defendant's oral admission at the time 
of arrest, denied the defendant his right to due process.720 
The discretion of the trial court in revoking probation is dependent 
upon a finding that the probationer violated the law subsequent to the 
probation order.721 Thus, conduct engaged in by the probationer prior 
to being placed on probation cannot legally form the basis for the revo-
cation. 722 It is also irrelevant that the conviction for such conduct oc-
curred during the period of probation.728 However, where the defendant 
was on probation for a previous conviction and was subsequently con-
victed for arson, the revocation of probation on the prior conviction was 
proper.124 
Although proceedings for revocation of probation are informal in 
nature, and hearsay evidence is permitted, a judgment revoking probation 
may not be entered solely on the basis of hearsay testimony.7211 Nor may 
a revocation be permitted to stand where the state is unable flatly to 
contradict the probationer's testimony which, if true, would justify his 
conduct.726 A revocation of probation following regular proceedings 
714. Shreves v. State, 269 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
715. White v. State, 273 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
716. State v. Featherston, 267 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
717. Borges v. State, 249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
718. Mato v. State, 278 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
719. Id. 
720. Id. 
721. O'Steen v. State, 261 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
722. Id 
723. Id. 
724. Hoover v. State, 252 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
725. Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
726. Larocco v. State, 276 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
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based upon an uncontroverted breach of a condition of the defendant's 
probation, has been held to be proper.727 
In Borges v. State,728 the probationer sought a continuance based 
on the grounds that criminal proceedings, were pending against him and 
if he were to take the stand at the revocation hearing, his privilege against 
self-incrimination would be jeopardized. Following denial of the con-
tinuance and revocation of his probation, the court emphasized that 
probation was a privilege and that the probationer could have been 
denied probation even if he had been acquitted on the subsequent 
charges.729 
The United States Supreme Court, in Arciniega 'V. Freeman,730 held 
that mere on-the-job contact with fellow employees with police records 
is insufficient evidence of parole violations, absent a clear Federal Parole 
Board directive to that effect. 
XXVI. EXPUNGING .ARlmsT RECORDS 
It had been held that in absence of a statute for equivalent consid-
erations, a court order was an improper method to have an arrest record 
expunged.731 During the survey period, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit,782 adhered to this rule and vacated a federal district 
court order which required the expunging of an arrest record after defen-
dant's conviction had been declared unconstitutional. The court held that 
"public policy requires here that the retention of records of the arrest 
and of the subsequent proceedings be left to the discretion of appropriate 
authorities.mas 
XXVII. SPECIFIC CRIMES AND DEFENSES 
A. Specific Crimes 
1. ATTEMPTS, AIDING AND ABETTING 
In Robinson v. State,734 the court held that "an attempt to commit 
a crime involves the idea of an incompleted act as distinguished from the 
complete act necessary for the crime.msis Gustine v. State786 was quoted 
for the proposition that 
[t]here must be intent to commit a crime coupled with an 
overt act apparently adopted to effect that intent, carried be-
727. Granger v. State, 267 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
728. 249 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
729. Id. 
730. 404 U.S. 4 (1971). 
731. Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970). 
732. Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972). 
733. Id. at 1085. 
734. 263 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
735. Id. at 596. 
736. 86 Fla. 24, 97 So. 207 (1923). 
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yond mere preparation, but falling short of execution of the 
ultimate design. 737 
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Intent alone as well as mere preparation is insufficient to amount to an 
attempt.788 The act must constitute an "appreciable fragment,, of the 
crime, reach far enough to constitute an actual beginning of the crime, 
and be of the nature that it would be consummated were it not for an 
interruption independent of the will of the attempter.739 
Where police officers arranged to buy stolen property from the 
defendant at a certain time and place, and at the meeting, the defendant 
refused to sell because he wanted to be paid first and the police had no 
money, these facts were not enough to constitute an attempt.740 Since 
receipt of stolen property is an offense prohibited by statute, an attempt 
to receive stolen property is also a punishable and lesser included offense 
of that crime, and failure to so instruct the jury is reversible error.741 
Attempted possession of marijuana is a crime recognized under Florida 
Statutes section 776.04 {1971).742 
In State v. Anderson,748 the Supreme Court of Florida held that it 
is not necessary to prove the elements of selling a lottery ticket or a 
share in it in order to prove the offense of aiding and assisting in the pro-
moting of a lottery.744 Where the defendant was charged with aiding and 
abetting7411 in a shooting death, evidence that the defendant had urged 
her boyfriend to do something about the victim's alleged spilling of 
catsup on her, followed by the boyfriend's shooting the victim, did not 
constitute the offense where the defendant was unaware that her boy-
friend was carrying a gun.746 
Although the defendant and an accomplice entered the house of the 
victim with intent to commit robbery, the fact that another crime was 
committed during the period they were in the house does not preclude 
conviction of the defendant as an aider and abetter on this latter crime.747 
When the crime charged was committed during the commission of the 
instructed crime, an accomplice will be held to answer for the crime as 
an aider and abetter even though he didn't commit the other act. 
737. Id. at 26, 97 So. at 208. 
738. Robinson v. State, 263 So. 2d 595, 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
739. Id. at 596-97. 
740. Id. 
741. Lewis v. State, 269 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
742. Nichols v. State, 248 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
743. 270 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1973). 
744. Acts such as "transporting, hiring, procuring, supplying telephones," etc., will con-
stitute aiding and assisting under FLA. STAT. § 776.011 (1973). 270 So. 2d at 355. The roost 
important issue resolved in this case, however, was that the defendant was not entitled to the 
lesser included offense instruction if the lesser offense Is one which is merely comprehended 
or within the general scope of the charge made. 
745. FLA. STAT.§ 776.011 (1973). 
746. Casey v. State, 266 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
747. Davis v. State, 275 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
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2. HOMICIDE 
Where a defendant killed the victim from his second-floor porch 
as the victim was leaving the defendant's house, it was neither in self-
defense nor justifiable,748 despite the fact that shortly before, while in 
the house, the victim had pulled a gun and threatened to kill the def en-
d ant during an argument and also had announced that he would return 
to rob and kill the defendant.749 The District Court of Appeal, Third 
District, restated that in order to claim self-defense in any homicide, it 
is necessary for the defendant to believe that he is in imminent danger 
and that there is an actual necessity for the taking of life.750 It is neces-
sary that the person actually or reasonably believe that such force is 
necessary in order to save his life or the life of a member of his family.751 
Where it was evident that the victim who had assaulted the defendant 
was both subdued and disarmed, defendant's shooting of the victim was 
not an act of self-defense.752 
In Hernandez v. State,1ri9 the element of "premeditation" we ex-
amined and the court found: 
Though premeditation involves a prior intention to do the act in 
question, it is not necessary that the intention be conceived for 
any particular period of time before the act. A moment before 
the act is sufficient. Premeditation may be inferred from evidence 
as to the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which the 
murder was committed and the nature and manner of the wound 
inflicted. 7114 
In Hernandez, premeditation was established where evidence showed that 
the defendant had stabbed the victim 14 times in the back, resulting in 
her death. 
In Christian v. State,1riri a first degree murder conviction was reversed 
when the jury was instructed that they could find the defendant guilty if 
the killing was committed with either premeditated design or while per-
petrating or attempting to perpetrate a crime against nature. If the jury 
had found the defendant guilty of first degree murder under the latter 
instruction, the verdict would have been based on the felony-murder 
concept. However, in Franklin v. State,756 Florida Statutes section 800.01 
(1973), covering crimes against nature, was found to be illegal and void. 
Therefore, the defendant in Christian could not have been convicted of 
748. FLA. STAT. § 782.02(2)(b) (1973). 
749. McKinney v. State, 260 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
750. Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
751. Id.; Raneri v. State, 255 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
752. Gil v. State, 266 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
753. 273 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
754. Id. at 133. 
755. 272 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
756. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971). ' 
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a felony-murder under the statute. Consequently, premeditation was 
necessary for a first degree murder conviction, and since the evidence 
was insufficient in the court's mind to conclude that the jury found the 
defendant guilty on that basis, reversal was necessary. 
Where the defendant had agreed with the deceased to burn certain 
campsite buildings owned by the defendant, he was not guilty of felony-
murder when the deceased was killed attempting to set fire to the buildings 
while the defendant was out of the county.757 The court held that the 
felony-murder rule has as its purpose, the protection of "innocent per-
sons" and that it is inapplicable under the above factual situation.758 
The District Court of Appeal, Third District,759 found that where the 
defendant had agreed with another party that the latter would hold the 
gun while the defendant went through the victim's pockets, the fact that 
the victim was shot by the other party during the commission of the 
crime was sufficient to establish knowledge and intent of the defendant 
and, therefore, conviction for second degree murder. Where the defen-
dant was under the influence of an hallucinogen at the time he killed 
the victim, it was found that the killing was done while the defendant 
was committing a felony760 and he was guilty of third degree murder.761 
Defendant's conviction warranted reversal where the state failed to 
prove that the defendant acted with a "depraved mind regardless of 
human life," a necessary element of second degree murder.762 The 
court found that no such state of mind existed where the defendant 
stabbed the victim in his own apartment after being hit by the victim 
and after the victim had assaulted another member of the household. 
Where the defendant threatened to shoot an officer if he did not 
help the defendant escape, the elements necessary for the conviction of 
the crime of assault with intent to commit murder were present.763 A 
defendant who, while robbing a store, began to exchange shots with an 
off-duty policeman was guilty of assault with intent to commit murder.764 
It was improper to convict a defendant of assault with intent to 
commit second degree murder and robbery since the elements of fear 
and force necessary for the assault charge, were an integral part of the 
robbery charge; consequently, the assault was essential to the robbery 
7S7. State v. Williams, 2S4 So. 2d S48 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
7S8. The decision is well reasoned and gives effect to the true purposes of the rule. It 
avoids the problems faced by the Pennsylvania courts in their varying interpretations. See 
id., at SSO-Sl. See also the dissent for a strong disapproval of the majority's thinking. 2S4 
So. 2d at SS1. 
7S9. Williams v. State, 261So.2d SSS (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
760. FLA. STAT. § 893.13 (1973) (possession of illegal drugs constitutes a felony), 
formerly FLA. STAT.§ 404.1S (1971). 
761. Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
762. Ranerl v. State, 2SS So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
763. Gavin v. State, 259 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
764. Wood v. State, 251 So. 2d 5S6 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
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and becomes part of the "same offense," thereby allowing prosecution for 
but one offense.7611 
The Supreme Court of Florida stated that in defendant's murder 
trial, the determination by one jury of both guilt and punishment was not 
unconstitutional despite the defendant's claim that such a procedure 
places the burden on the defendant of choosing between presenting 
mitigating circumstances on issues of punishment or maintaining his 
privilege against self-incrimination. 766 
3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
The crime of aggravated assault requires general intent767 and must 
be committed under circumstances in which the perpetrator has apparent 
present ability to carry out the threat, thereby creating a fear of immi-
nent peril. 768 
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a deadly 
weapon is "any instrument which when used in the ordinary manner ... 
will or is likely to cause death or great bodily harm .... [But] the fact 
that an instrument actually causes great bodily injury or death does not 
necessarily characterize it as a deadly weapon.11769 The court held that a 
shoe can be a deadly weapon although it is not inherently so, but that 
where the evidence failed to provide any information regarding the shoe, 
there could be no conviction of aggravated assault.770 
Where the defendant pistol-whipped the victim about the head 
following a robbery, such acts constituted a separate offense of aggravated 
assault. 771 The allegation that the defendant actually shot a person was 
not a necessary element of aggravated assault; consequently, the state 
needn't prove that element to maintain a conviction for that offense.772 
a. Weapons and Firearms 
The statute prohibiting the possession or use of short-barreled rifles 
and shotguns778 "does not include weapons made from individual, non-
integrated rifle parts, if such weapons are not otherwise 'rifles.' "774 It is 
not unlawful to own and possess a sub-machine gun registered under the 
765. Hernandez v. State, 278 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). See also Cone v. State, 285 
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973); Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
766. Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971). 
767. Munday v. State, 254 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing McCullers v. State, 206 
So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). 
768. Munday v. State, 254 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
769. Johnson v. State, 249 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
770. Id. 
771. Wade v. Wainwright, 266 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), writ discharged, 273 So. 
2d 377 (Fla. 1973). 
772. Grimsley v. State, 251 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
773. FLA. STAT. § 790.221 (1973); see also. definition at § 790.001 (11). For relevant 
discussion, see footnotes 860-73 and accompanying text. 
774. State v. Astore, 258 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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National Firearms Act7711 since the controlling statute776 expressly excepts 
such firearms lawfully owned and possessed under federal law.777 
The question of whether a shotgun, which had been dismantled and 
concealed beneath defendant's clothing, could be readily converted to ex-
pel a projectile778 which would cause death or serious bodily harm, was 
one of fact and, thus, for the jury to decide.779 
The throwing of a 12-ounce soft drink bottle at a police van from 
a distance of less than 15 yards with enough force to that the trajectory 
of the bottle is flat, is violative of the statute prohibiting the throwing of 
any missile which could cause great bodily harm into vehicles.780 
A pistol in possession of a previously convicted felon is "contraband" 
and possessed in violation of the law.781 It is not necessary to take finger-
prints from a gun found to be in the possession of the defendant in order 
to sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.783 
4. FORGERY783 AND WORTHLESS CHECKS 
Where there was lack of evidence to show the condition of a will 
when it was filed, as well as an inability to show who had access to the file 
from the date of filing, the state could not maintain an action against the 
defendant for knowingly uttering, forging, publishing or altering784 the 
will, where there was no proof that the will was in the same condition 
at trial as when it was filed or when the tampering occurred.7811 Intent 
is a requisite element for conviction of possession of forged bills.786 Al-
though it is not usually the subject of direct proof, it is a question of fact 
and, when controverted, may not be determined by the court.787 
In Robinson v. State,788 the defendant was charged by information 
with fictitious signature of an officer of a corporation.789 After the jury 
was accepted and sworn, the state was allowed to amend the information 
to charge the defendant with uttering a forged instrument.790 The court 
held this to be reversible error because of its potential surprise to the 
775. 26 u.s.c. §§ 5801-62 (1968). 
776. FLA. STAT.§ 790.221(3) (1973). 
777. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972). 
778. FLA. STAT.§ 790.001(6) (1973). 
779. State v. Ware, 253 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
780. Zachary v. State, 269 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1972), construing FLA. STAT. § 790.19 (1973). 
781. State v. Bryant, 250 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), relying on FLA. STAT. § 790.23 
(1973). 
782. Thomas v. State, 264 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
783. Both FLA. STAT. § 831.01-.02 (1973) (general forgery statute), and FLA. STAT. Ch. 
817 (1973) (Credit Crime Act) will be discussed. 
784. FLA. STAT.§ 831.01-.02 (1973). 
785. Pate v. State, 256 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
786. FLA. STAT. § 831.11 (1973). 
787. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
788. 266 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
789. FLA. STAT.§ 831.06 (1973). 
790. FLA. STAT,§ 831.02 (1973). 
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defendant. Forgery requires the making of a writing which falsely pur-
ports to be the writing of another, and the crime may exist when an 
assumed or fictitious name is used as long as the name was used with 
intent to defraud.791 But, the signing of a fictitious name is not forgery 
if it is not intended that the signature be taken as the genuine signature 
of another, and there is no forgery where the defendant assumed the name 
on the checking account he opened and proceeded to cash bad checks, 
so long as the check purports to be the act of the person cashing it and 
not the act of another.792 
The general forgery statute793 and the Florida Credit Card Crime 
Act794 both encompass the offense of forging a credit card, and the Act 
specifically provides that prosecutions may be had under the general 
statute.795 Thus, although the general statute is broader, there is no in-
consistency in the two statutes and the state may elect to proceed under 
either.796 However, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,797 held 
that if a defendant is in violation of both statutory provisions, he must 
be sentenced under the penalty provisions of the more recent Credit Card 
Crime Act where the penalties under the two statutes are inconsistent. 
In Lore v. State,798 the same court found that where the penalty provi-
sions under one section799 of the Act are less severe than the penalties 
under another section800 (both sections being substantially similar), the 
less severe provisions supersede the other provisions. The court also held 
that the defendant's falsification of several credit card receipts on the 
same day only constituted different facets of the same offense and should 
be treated in a single sentence. 
The offense of issuing a worthless check801 is committed despite 
the fact that the defendant does not get instantaneous value when he 
presents the check.802 Therefore, the defendant's conviction under the 
statute was upheld because he received something for value when he 
opened an account with an $850 worthless check and then wrote another 
check for $250 for which he received cash.803 
5. CONSPIRACY 
The state does not have to charge a co-conspirator in order to proceed 
against a defendant for conspiracy.804 If charges against a co-conspirator 
791. Rapp v. State, 274 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
792. Id. 
793. FLA. STAT.§ 831.01, .02 (1973). 
794. FLA. STAT. ch. 817 (1973). 
795. FLA. STAT. ch. 817.68 (1973). 
796. State v. McCurdy, 257 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
797. Strada v. State, 267 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
798. 267 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
799. FLA. STAT.§ 817.62(2) (1973). 
800. FLA. STAT.§ 817.481 (1973). 
801. FLA. STAT. § 832.05(3) (a) (1973). 
802. Shermar v. State, 255 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1971). 
803. Id. 
804. Di Stefano v. Langston, 274 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1973). 
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are dropped, this alone is insufficient to prevent defendant from being 
prosecuted for conspiracy.805 
In order to invoke the "co-conspirator rule" which holds all acts 
and declarations of each conspirator to be the acts and declarations of 
all, it is first necessary to prove by independent evidence that a conspiracy 
did exist.806 Evidence is admissible to prove a conspiracy even though 
the conspiracy is not charged in the indictment.8-07 
Conspiracy to commit robbery is not a lesser included offense within 
a charge of robbery.808 
6. PERJURY 
The elements of the crime of perjury are " ( 1) the wilful giving ( 2) 
of false testimony (3) under lawful oath (4) on a material matter (5) in 
a judicial proceeding."809 Where the defendant's false testimony under 
oath occurred during the period between the dropping of charges against 
the defendant's son and the reinstatement of those charges, no perjury 
had occurred since the defendant did not give false testimony while testi-
fying in the case against his son. 810 
In Wolfe v. State,811 the Supreme Court of Florida held that if the 
allegedly false statements were not material to the issue before the court, 
there can be no conviction for perjury. The determination of whether 
testimony assigned as perjurious is material when made in a prosecution 
is a question of law for the judge although it may be a mixed question 
of law and fact. The court also noted that statements must not be taken out 
of context and must be viewed with the rest of the testimony.812 Intent 
and purpose must be shown to support a perjury conviction; mere inac-
curacy is not enough.813 
If a false statement is capable of influencing the court on the issue 
that it is considering, it meets the element of materiality and the degree 
of materiality is irrelevant.814 The fact that the false testimony was not 
believed is also of no importance in affecting its material character.815 
Two witnesses are generally required to convict a person of perjury. 
However, where there is only one witness and other corroborating evi-
dence which is equal to the weight of a second witness, such is also deemed 
sufficient for conviction.816 
805. Id. 
806. Honchell v. State, 257 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1971). 
807. Id. at 890, citing Brown v. State, 128 Fla. 762, 175 So. 515 (1937). 
808. King v. State, 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
809. Diamond v. State, 270 So. 2d 460, 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Gordon v. State, 
104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958). 
810. Diamond v. State, 270 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
811. 271 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1972), retlg 256 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist.). 
812. Wolfe v. State, 271 So. 2d 132, 135 (Fla. 1972), quoting Van Lien v. United States, 
321 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1963). 
813. Wolfe v. State, 271 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1972). 
814. Wells v. State, 270 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
815. Id. 
816. Id., quoting McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879 (1884). 
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7. GAMBLING 
In Perlman v. State,817 the offense of gambling was thoroughly ex-
amined. The court held that Florida Statutes section 849.01 (1973), 
specifies two separate gambling offenses: ( 1) maintaining a house for 
gambling purposes, and (2) permitting gambling in a place under one's 
control. The state must show that the defendant had either ownership or 
control of the premises where gambling habitually takes place with his 
knowledge, direction and consent. The statute prohibits the maintenance 
of the facility, but does not affect the gambler himself. 
Proof of habitual play is necessary to show the purpose for which 
the house is maintained and to show the requisite intent of the person 
charged with maintaining the gambling house.818 Thus, where there was 
proof that the premises were used in the past, such evidence was admis-
sible to show "purpose and intent" on the dates stated in the informa-
tion.819 Where a lease was assigned to a corporation of which defendant 
was the sole executive officer, and where there was testimony that the 
defendant referred to himself as manager of the hall, "control" was estab-
lished, and there was ample evidence for conviction of maintaining a 
gambling house.820 
The court in Perlman, went on to state that although bingo is ex-
cepted from being a gambling offense by a specific statutory section,821 
when it is carried on by non-profit organizations within statutory limits, 
it is still within the gambling statute when carried on outside of the 
statutory restrictions. 822 
Maintaining a gambling house is not established where the state 
only showed the presence of newspaper racing results, handicap sheets, 
water-soluble paper and that one person had asked for a "line."823 
8. BURGLARY 
In Florida, the felony of burglary requires a showing that there is 
a breaking and entering of a "building" with felonious intent.824 There-
fore, it is necessary to allege and prove that a "building" is involved. 
Where a phone booth was in question in a burglary prosecution, the 
few cases which had dealt with the subject had held that where the booth 
was outdoors it was a building within the statute,825 but when the booth 
was inside another building, it was not a building. 826 During the survey 
817. 269 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
818. Id. at 387. 
819. Id. at 388. 
820. Id. at 388-89. 
821. FLA. STAT. § 849.093 (1973). 
822. Perlman v. State, 269 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
823. Gaetane v. State, 273 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
824. FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (1973). Section 810.01 is identical except that it provides for 
burglary of a dwelling house. 
825. Perry v. State, 174 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). 
826. DaWalt v. State, 156 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). 
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period1 the District Court of Appeal1 Second District1 held that where 
there was no allegation that the defendant entered a building1 and1 fur-
ther1 no facts from which it could be determined whether the phone booth 
involved was outdoors so that prior case law would apply1 the information 
failed to state a cause of action.827 Again1 in Jackson v. State1828 there 
was no testimony to show the particulars of the phone booth's location. 
The district court presumed that· it was an indoor booth and not a 
building. However, the court risked "obiter fever" and stated that a phone 
booth was not a building whether indoors or outdoors in light of the 
statute's historical background and in view of the normal definition 
of a "building." Adding another obstacle in· prosecutions for burglary 
in phone booth cases1 the court found that there is implied permission 
or consent to enter phone booths, and that consent is a valid defense 
to a breaking and entering charge.829 Relying on Jackson, the District 
Court of Appeal1 Second District,830 held that the failure to show non-
consent in a case involving an outdoor phone booth required dismis-
sal. These decisions appear to remove the need for the indoor-outdoor 
test as most cases will involve public phone booths. 
Despite the defendant's failure to assault or rape the alleged victim, 
his conviction for breaking and entering with felonious intent to commit 
rape was still proper in that the gravamen of the offense-the intent to 
so act was present.831 Absent other information, the best evidence of the 
defendant's intent in a breaking and entering charge is what he actually 
stole, and when defendant only took $24 worth of clothing, he should 
have been convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit petit 
larceny, not grand larceny.832 
Possession of burglary tools is a separate offense from breaking and 
entering with intent to commit a felony. These are not facets of the same 
crime; 833 therefore, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced sep-
arately for each offense.834 However, in Davis v. State,835 the court fol-
lowed the rule that where offenses arise out of the same transaction and 
criminal act, the defendant must only be sentenced for one offense.836 
It was again held during the survey period that breaking and enter-
ing with intent to commit a misdemeanor is a felony.837 
827. Catanese v. State, 251 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
828. 259 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
829. Id. 
830. High v. State, 260 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
831. Hall v. State, 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
832. Rumph v. State, 248 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
833. Foster v. State, 276 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
834. Id. cf. Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), adopted in Walker v. 
State, 261 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). . 
835. 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
836. Breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor and petit larceny are 
facets of the same criminal act. 
837. Copeland v. State, 275 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973); Jenkins v. State, 267 So. 
2d 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
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9. LARCENY AND RECEMNG STOLEN GOODS 
The identity and ownership of property claimed to have been stolen 
must be proven to support a conviction for larceny.888 Where a television 
theft from a common carrier was alleged and the serial number on the 
television in question differed from that on the carrier's shipping papers, 
the identity and ownership were not proven.839 
Competent evidence as to the value of stolen property is required 
in a larceny prosecution, 840 and the market value of stolen property may 
be determined by the owner's opinion, and any conflicts are determined 
by the jury.841 An owner's statement that his television set was worth 
$160, which was supported by the fact that the set was purchased for 
that price 30 days prior to the theft, is sufficient proof of value.842 But in 
a grand larceny prosecution, original value of a purse and the articles 
in it were not to be equated with the value for purposes of conviction.848 
Also, where the owner's testimony as to value is unreasonable and con-
trary to common knowledge, it should not be accepted.844 The mere fact 
that at defendant's apprehension, he had in his possession a color tele-
vision, a radio and a camera was not in itself sufficient to establish that 
the property's value was more than $100.846 
A material element of the offense of receiving stolen property is 
knowledge of its stolen character.846 
10. CONTEMPT 
Rule 3.830,847 covering direct criminal contempt, provides punish-
ment only for acts of contempt which the court "saw or heard." This 
allows the judge to govern fully the conduct and procedures that take 
place before him. Refusal to obey an order which reinstated counsel and 
his law firm as counsel of record for certain clients was not criminal but 
civil contempt according to the supreme court.848 Because of the diffi-
culty in delineating between criminal and civil contempt, and because 
of the penalties and summary nature of criminal contempt, any doubt 
in the area should be resolved in favor of the contemnor.849 However, a 
doctor's failure to appear with his records following service of subpoena 
from both parties amounted to direct criminal contempt, as the act was 
838. Brinken v. State, 263 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
839. Id. 
840. Smart v. State, 274 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
841. Wright v. State, 251 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
842. Martin v. State, 260 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
843. Singleton v. State, 258 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
844. Id. 
845. White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
846. Eagle v. State, 270 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
847. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.830. 
848. Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971). 
849. Id. 
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heard and seen within the court's presence and the doctor was without 
adequate excuse. 850 
An attorney was found guilty of criminal contempt after he refused 
to obey a judge's order to sit down and be quiet.851 The attorney had 
repeatedly persisted in trying to get the judge to hear his argument on 
a motion despite the judge's assurance that he would hear the motion 
later.852 
Violation of an injunction brought by or on behalf of the state, 
which relates to a matter offensive to the public or prohibited by statute 
constitutes criminal contempt.853 Such action, however, is indirect crim-
inal contempt, governed by rule 3.840, which requires that an order be 
is.sued to defendant "stating the essential facts constituting the criminal 
contempt charge and requiring him to appear before the court to show 
cause why he should not be held in contempt by the court."854 Failure to 
issue such an order requires reversal of a contempt order.8115 
Defendant's failure at trial to recollect the facts and circumstances 
of a sworn statement made to a state attorney for which she was granted 
immunity, amounted to contempt because obviously false or evasive 
testimony will support such an order.8G6 
11. DRUNK DRIVING 
Charges of driving while intoxicated and manslaughter resulting 
from the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated are not one offense 
for the purpose of double jeopardy although they arise out of the same 
facts.857 Thus, a defendant who was convicted of driving while intoxicated 
was not immune from prosecution for manslaughter charges under former 
jeopardy principles. Relying on Shaw v. State,sr,s the court held that if an 
additional fact must be proved in one of the charges, there exists a sep-
arate offense. Driving while intoxicated was found to be a continuing 
offense and the charge was not dependent on the accident. In fact, the 
driving while intoxicated charge could have related to a time prior to the 
accident. On the other hand, manslaughter is an "instant offense" which 
begins with an assault and ends in homicide. 
Testimony as to a defendant's physical condition, to wit: the results 
of a breathalizer test and other physical tests performed on the def en-
d ant, does not violate the constitutional protection against self-incrimina-
850. Aron v. Huttoe, 258 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
851. Kleinfeld v. State, 270 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
852. See id. at 22-23 n.l for the dialogue between the judge and attorney. 
853. United Theatres, Inc. v. State, 259 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
854. Id. at 214, quoting Fu. R. Clu:M:. P. 3.840. 
855. Id. 
856. Brinson v. State, 269 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). See also Gilliam v. State, 
267 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
857. State v. Stiefel, 256 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
858. 219 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). 
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tion.859 Relying on a number of cases from other states stating that 
Miranda warnings do not apply for driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating beverages or narcotics,sao the District Court of Appeal, 
Third District, held that charges of careless driving resulting in an acci-
dent, and operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
were petty offenses and the warnings need not be given. 
If a municipality provides a jury trial for acts in violation of certain 
ordinances, which are also violations of a state statute, the provision of 
the state statute requiring the transfer of such cases to another court is 
inapplicable. 861 
12. RAPE 
A victim's submission to sexual intercourse without physical resis-
tance after the defendant had pulled a gun on her and ordered her to 
undress, supports a conviction of forcible rape, despite a medical exam-
iner's testimony that there was no evidence of force and a psychiatrist's 
statement that the defendant would have "backed down" had the victim 
said no. so2 The testimony of a victim is ample evidence to support a con-
viction for assault with intent to commit rape even though the defendant's 
testimony was in direct conflict. 863 
Assault of a minor under 14 in a lewd and lacivious manner with 
intent to have sexual intercourse is a separate offense from rape and does 
not establish the requisite intent to commit rape.864 Fornication is a 
separate off ense865 from that of rape. The only lesser included offenses 
in a rape charge are assault with intent to commit rape, assault and bat-
tery, and bare assault.s66 
Despite a jury determination that the defendant was not guilty of 
rape or assault with intent to commit rape, a jury was not precluded from 
finding the defendant guilty of breaking and entering with intent to 
commit rape, a felony, in a subsequent prosecution, as the defendant may 
have intended to commit rape upon entering.867 However, where the de-
fendant was acquitted of a felony-murder which occurred while the victim 
was being raped, the state was collaterally estopped from prosecuting the 
defendant for the crime of rape.sos In the first prosecution, the state had 
859. County of Dade v. Callahan, 259 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
860. Id. at 506-07. 
861. Nesler v. Hampton, 260 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
862. Dean v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972). 
863. Lustin v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
864. Bass v. State, 263 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (dictum). The case held that 
failure to include the words "without intent to commit rape" in an information alleging a 
violation of section 800.04 of the Florida Statutes is harmless error when the defendant is 
apprised of the crime for which he is being prosecuted. Id. 
865. FLA. STAT.§ 798.03 (1973). 
866. DeLaine v. State, 262 So. 2d 655 (Flil. 1972). 
867. McDonald v. State, 249 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
868. Eagle v. State, 249 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
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been forced to show that the defendant was the person who had raped or 
sexually assaulted the victim, and since they failed to make this showing, 
they were precluded from trying to prove this element in the rape prose-
cution. 
13. ROBBERY 
The intent to steal must exist at the time of the taking in order for 
a conviction of robbery to be sustained.869 It was also held that the 
"gist" of the crime of robbery is assault with a deadly weapon or with 
a weapon which can cause serious bodily harm, and the fact that only a 
small amount of money was taken from the victim is of no consequence 
in determining sentence.870 The element of putting the victim in fear of 
great bodily harm was met when the victim testified that she was "assured 
that [the defendant] had a revolver or a gun . . . so [she] wasn't going 
to take any chances," in addition to other evidence showing that the 
defendant actually had a weapon when apprehended by the police.871 
The penalty for robbery is imprisonment "for life or for any lesser 
term of years, at the discretion of the court."872 The fact that the court 
rather than the legislature determines the exact sentence is of no conse-
quence.873 
When robbery and extortion arise out of the same transaction, the 
defendant may only be sentenced once for both offenses. 874 
If the state is able to prove that the defendant was guilty of aiding, 
abetting or procuring the commission of a robbery, such proof will sustain 
a conviction for robbery.875 
Aggravated assault, although not always a lesser included offense 
of attempted armed robbery, may be such where the evidence shows that 
the assault was made with a deadly weapon.876 However, even where the 
court improperly includes a lesser included offense in ilc; instruction, it 
is harmless error if the defendant is convicted of the offense (attempted 
robbery) for which he was charged.877 
Once again, the court stated that conspiracy to commit robbery was 
not a lesser included offense to the charge of robbery.878 
869. Stevens v. State, 265 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), citing Bailey v. State, 199 
So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967). 
870. Booth v. State, 257 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
871. Rolle v. State, 268 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
872. FLA. STAT. § 813.011 (1973). 
873. Byrd v. State, 253 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
874. Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
875. Rayne v. State, 264 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
876. Morrison v. State, 259 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
877. Id. See also State v. Wilson, 276 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1973), quashing 265 So. 2d 411 
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
878. King v. State, 267 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
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B. Defenses 
1. INSANITY8711 
It is initially presumed that the defendant is sane and, therefore, the 
burden rests with him to establish an insane condition.880 However, once 
there is testimony which raises a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of 
the defendant, the presumption vanishes and the defendant is entitled 
to an acquittal if the state is unable to dispel the reasonable doubt.881 
During the survey period, the courts refused to accept another test 
for insanity, and the "M'Naghten Rule" was once more adopted.882 In 
Anderson v. State,883 Justice Ervin presented a lengthy and well-reasoned 
dissent advocating the adoption of the Model Penal Code884 test for in-
sanity in preference to the less realistic M'N aghten Rule. 
Rule 3 .210 (a) which provides the procedure to be followed where 
insanity is pleaded as a defense, states in part: 
If before or during trial the court of its own motion, or upon 
motion of counsel for the defendant, has reasonable grounds 
to believe the defendant is insane, the court shall immediately 
fix a time for a hearing to determine the defendant's mental 
condition. 8811 
In Fowler v. State,886 the Supreme Court of Florida emphasized that the 
word "shall" was indicative of the fact that the framers of the rule felt 
that such a hearing is obligatory when there is reasonable ground to be-
lieve that the defendant is insane.887 Thus, after two court-appointed psy-
chiatrists had examined the defendant on defense counsel's motion and 
both felt the defendant to be insane, the trial court must grant a hearing. 
The court did, however, state that a hearing may be waived even where 
there is reasonable ground to believe insanity exists. For example, where 
the defense counsel has no other testimony to off er than that of the 
psychiatrist, the trial court may decide the issue of competency on reports 
alone.888 Although a hearing is required, a defendant is not entitled to a 
separate trial on the issue of insanity.8811 In Presley v. State,800 a non-jury 
trial, it was permissible to find the defendant sane where there was con-
879. See generally FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210. 
880. Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973); French v. State, 266 So. 2d 51 
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
881. Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973); French v. State, 266 So. 2d 51 
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
882. Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 18 (1973); Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d 
Dist. 1973); Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
883. 267 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973). 
884. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE§ 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
885. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a). 
886. 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971). 
887. Accord, Pedrerro v. State, 262 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
888. Fowler v. State, 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971), citing Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 68 
(Fla. 1971) as an example. 
889. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
890. 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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flicting testimony as to the defendant's ability to aid in the conduct of 
his defense. 
An order declaring defendant competent to stand trial must not be 
based solely on the competency determination by a state mental hospital 
just prior to trial; a hearing must be held.891 A defendant's sister was a 
proper party to give testimony as to the defendant's sanity in addition 
to two conflicting psychiatric reports.892 Where there is conflicting testi-
mony as to a defendant's insanity, it is within the province of the jury 
to decide the issue.893 Notwithstanding the testimony of a psychiatrist 
that the defendant could not determine right from wrong at the time . of 
the offense, it was up to the jury as trier of fact to determine the -defen-
dant's sanity.894 However, insanity will not be an issue of fact unless 
rule 3 .210 is complied with to properly lay the predicate for the intro-
duction of testimony relating to insanity.805 
Had the court ruled the other way in McMunn v. State,896 a plea of 
insanity could have become very risky business. Nevertheless, in what 
seems to be a very good decision, the District Court of Appeal, First 
District, stated that the state may only question a court-appointed psy-
chiatrist as to the issue of sanity or insanity, and, consequently, it is 
impermissible for a psychiatrist to testify directly as to the facts elicited 
during a compulsory psychiatric examination. Since the defendant is 
compelled897 to follow a certain procedure and to answer those questions 
posed by the court-appointed psychiatrist in order to rely on the defense 
of insanity, such rules must be restricted in order to preserve the defen-
dant's constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. Any statute 
which would allow the state to introduce the facts of the defendant's 
confidential testimony, which could well amount to a confession, would 
be constitutionally defective. 
The fact that the Sex Off ender Act provides for a sanity hearing 
subsequent to trial898 is not a denial of equal protection in that it "comes 
late."899 The court held that the statute meets the test of reasonable 
classification in dealing with off enders. 
Before sentencing a defendant to prison, if there is substantial doubt 
as to his insanity at the time of trial on a sex charge, inquiries should be 
made pursuant to statute900 in order to make such a sanity determi-
nation.901 
891. Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
892. Id., citing Byrd v. State, 178 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See also Williams v. 
State, 275 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
893. Clayton v. State, 272 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
894. Ross v. State, 254 So. 2d 40, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
895. Pedero v. State, 271 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). 
896. 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
897. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210. 
898. FLA. STAT. § 917.18 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT. § 917.12 (1971). 
899. Den v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972). 
900. Sex Offender Act, FLA. STAT.§ 917.14 (1973), formerly FLA. STAT.§ 917.01 (1971). 
901. Dorman v. State, 263 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1972). 
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Finally, it is unnecessary for psychiatrists to conduct independent 
tests, other than interviews with the defendant, in order for them to 
testify as to the defendant's sanity.902 
2. ENTRAPMENT 
Entrapment is a question of fact for the jury to decide unless the 
evidence is so clear and convincing that the judge can rule on the issue 
as a matter of law.903 Thus, it was improper for the court to dismiss the 
case against the defendant where the evidence was in conflict regarding 
the issue of entrapment.904 
Suggesting their definition as an appropriate jury instruction, the 
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held: 
The defense of entrapment ... is available to (a) one who 
is instigated, induced or lured by an officer of the law, (b) for 
the purpose of prosecution into the commission of a crime, ( c) 
which he otherwise had no intention of committing. But such 
defense is not available where the officer acts in good faith for 
the purpose of discovering or detecting the crime and merely 
furnishes the opportunity for the commission thereof by one 
who already has the requisite intent.905 
In applying this test, the court found that where there was evidence that 
the narcotics officer had to repeatedly solicit the defendant in order to 
get him to sell marijuana, and testimony that the defendant never sold 
marijuana before, that the marijuana did not belong to the defendant, 
and that the defendant got no financial benefit from the sale, the defen-
dant was entitled to a jury instruction and decision on the entrapment 
issue.900 
In Spencer v. State,907 the court chastised the use of a female agent 
who allowed herself to be picked up at a bar and taken to the defendant's 
apartment with the intent to lure the defendant into smoking marijuana. 
Such activity carries with it inherent inducement and, in this case, the 
agent's leaving the apartment to purchase papers so as to be able to 
smoke the marijuana, was also active participation in the crime. In a fac-
tual situation somewhat similar to Spencer, the District Court of Appeal, 
902. Murphy v. State, 252 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
903. State v. Robinson, 270 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Stiglitz v. State, 270 
So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). See also Earman v. State, 253 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
1971), quashed on other grounds, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972). 
904. State v. Robinson, 270 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Avilla v. State, 
278 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). 
905. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Lashley v. State, 
67 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1963), and State v. Rouse, 239 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). 
906. Stiglitz v. State, 270 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
907. 263 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). The court stated that "society has always 
condemned such conduct and that the state ought not condone it, must less have its paid 
agents out trolling for unsuspecting males whose minds are otherwise occupied than -with 
thoughts of committing heinous crimes." Id. at 284. 
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Third District,908 found, as a matter of law, that there was entrapment 
when a girl working with police officers had offered "personal considera-
tion" in addition to the price in order to purchase drugs. In reversing this 
decision, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the case presented a 
situation for the jury and that there was evidence to support a conclusion 
that the defendant was merely provided an opportunity to commit the 
crime by the girl's actions, and that the facts did not show, as a matter 
of law, that the crime was instigated by the girl's acts.909 A strong dissent 
pointed out that the majority had improperly equated the inducement 
offer with "the mere affording of an opportunity to commit crime."910 It 
would appear that the majority has, in effect, eliminated the possibility 
of the court ruling on an entrapment issue as a matter of law. In State v. 
Liptak911 there was no testimony from the girl who was working with the 
police and no other evidence to dispute the "personal consideration" off er 
alleged by the defendants which they claimed induced them to make the 
sale. 
Applying Liptak, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found 
that the "unconscionable conduct" of the police had implanted the crime 
in the defendant's mind, thereby inducing the defendant to commit the 
offense.912 
The United States Supreme Court913 held that the rule prohibiting 
the instigation of otherwise innocent persons to commit criminal acts, and 
be prosecuted for them914 did not prevent conviction if there was a show-
ing that the defendant was involved (had requisite intent) in selling drugs 
before and after his involvement with narcotics agents. The narcotics 
agents in this case had supplied ·the defendant with the chemical neede4 
for the manufacture of the drug in question, but the Court found that 
the circumstances indicated sufficient independent criminal design to 
avoid the defense of entrapment. 
A call to the defendant to set up a sale simply provides opportunity 
for the commission of the crime and does not constitute entrapment where 
the requisite intent existed.915 
Once again, it was held that the defense of entrapment presupposes 
908. Liptak v. State, 256 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
909. State v. Liptak, 277 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1973), relying on Kloptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 
628 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). 
910. 277 So. 2d at 23 (Ervin, J., dissenting). 
911. Id. at 19. 
912. Rogers v. State, 277 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
913. United States v. Russell, 94 S. Ct. 1637 (1973). 
914. Sherm.an v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435 (1932). 
915. Brasi v. State, 263 So. 2d 848 (Fla. Jd Dist. 1972); see Roundtree v. State, 271 So. 
2d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) (finding intent to have originated in the mind of the narcotics 
agent and not in the defendant as required). . 
An interesting theory of "entrapment" is presented by the noted .California jurist, Chief 
Justice Traynor, dissenting in People v. Moran, 1 Cal. Jd 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 
411 (1970). 
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commission of the offense by the defendant, and a defendant who denies 
participation in the crime is foreclosed from pleading the issue.916 
In Evenson v. State,911 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
found that a defendant had to prove the defense of entrapment for each 
offense of which he was charged because entrapment for one transaction 
is not effective for all transactions. The court acknowledged the possibil-
ity of a "spill-over" effect which might occur in an entrapment situation 
in which a second transaction may have occurred as a result of entrap-
ment into an initial transaction.918 However, in Evenson, the court found 
that there was no such "spill-over" immunity in two drug sales approx-
imately a month apart, and that despite the defendant's failure to request 
an instruction to that effect, the court had done so anyway, thereby 
giving the defendant the benefit of the instruction. 
3. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
A further interpretation of when the two-year statute of limitations 
period for criminal offenses begins was made by- the court in State v. 
King.919 In a prior case involving embezzlement,020 the supreme court 
found that the statute began to run when. demand was made upon a 
fiduciary-executor by the probate court. This case was interpreted in a 
larceny case as meaning that the statute begins to run from the date that 
the act becomes known, or through reasonable diligence should have 
become known, by the person having an interest in the fund. 921 
In King, the defendant was to receive funds from one party which 
would be transferred to the Dade County State Attorney, and then to the 
New Orleans District Attorney. In early 1969, the first party learned that 
the qefendant had not delivered all the funds he had received to the state 
attorney as had been agreed. After some time during which there were 
contacts between the parties, a demand was made upon the defendant to 
repay the money by a certain date. The defendant failed to do so and then 
forestalled prosecution. Later, he tendered payment on December 13, 
1971, which was rejected, and finally an information was filed against 
him on December 20, 1971. The court was faced with deciding whether, 
as the state contended,922 the statute began only after demand for the 
funds had been made, or whether counting began when the interested 
party knew or had reason to know the crime had been committed. Jn 
. :~. 
916. Earman v. State, 253 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th Dist.;1971): quashed qn othergrounds, 
265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972). ' - ; . 
' · 917. 277 So. 2d S87 (Fla: 4th 'Dist. 1973). ·· • · · · · · · · 
, •?18. Id . . at '592, The cou'rt quoted United S~ates v. Buie, 407 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1969), 
'lfhl$ supported this. propositibn, · · · · ' · · · 
j: <:' '919:.'275".So. 2d' i74 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). '. . ; 
, 920. State v P~erce, 201 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 19,67). . 
~:i · 92i. bowlling v. Vaine, ·228 So. 2d 622 (Fla.: 1st Dist. 1969), appeal dismissed, 237 So. 2d 
'/.67 tFJa. 1970). . ' 
922. The prosecution relied on State v. Pierce, 201 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1967). 
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choosing the latter interpretation, the court stated that the interested 
party certainly should have recognized that the defendant's intention to 
evade payment of the funds in early 1969 when the state attorney in· 
formed him that he had not received funds from the defendant as well 
as having learned that the defendant had defrauded him in another trans· 
action. Thus, this is an example of the court making the "should have 
known" determination, an issue which appears to be a question of fact 
for the jury. 
The Supreme Court of Florida passed upon the constitutionality of 
the limitation provision for state, county or municipal officials923 which 
requires that any offense committed by officials, which is within the 
scope of their duties, be prosecuted within two years after retirement. In 
State v. Dreyer,924 the statute, although different in time from that cover-
ing non-officials, was held to be a reasonable classification. However, 
where the facts of the case presented a defendant who had left his office 
as deputy constable to run for another position, only to return 66 days 
later, this termination constituted retirement. Therefore, any prosecution 
for offenses committed prior to his first leaving office, must be brought 
within two years of that time. 
Di Stefano v. Langston925 upheld as timely and sufficient an amended 
information filed after the two-year statutory period had run because it 
was properly "linked" to the first information which had been filed within 
the statutory period. The court stated that this case did not present an 
"abandonment" of the information by the state with an attempt at sub-
sequent prosecution-a procedure which would be prohibited if the 
prosecution was not within the time prescribed.926 Relying on State v. 
Emanuel,927 the court found that "the belated subsequent information is 
saved if that new information makes the necessary recital as here regard-
ing its tie·in with the original commencement of the prosecution within 
two years."928 • 
XX.VIII. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. Discovery929 
1. EXCHANGE OF WITNESS LISTS 
Rule 3.220(a) (1) (i) establishes the procedure for an exchange of 
witness lists. The rule provides that within 15 days after written demand 
923. FLA. STAT.§ 932.465(3) (1973), transferred from FLA. STAT.§ 932.06 (1971). 
924. 265 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1972). 
925. 274 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1973). 
926. See State v. O'Neil, 174 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), where the state abandoned 
the information, then sought prosecution. 
927. 153 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). 
928. Di Stefano v. Langston, 274 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1973). 
929. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended on September 30, 1971, to 
become effective December 13, 1971, to substitute a "3" for the "l" in the existing numbering 
system so that rule 1.010 becomes rule 3.010 and so on. In re Fla. R. Crim. P., 253 So. 2d 421 
(Fla. 1971). 
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by the defendant the prosecution "shall disclose to defense counsel .•. 
the names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecution to have 
information which may be relevant to the offense charged, and to any 
defense with respect thereto." Additionally, rule 3 .2 20 (b) ( 3) requires the 
defense counsel, after receiving the list of prosecution witnesses, to recip-
rocate and furnish to the state a written list of all witnesses he "expects 
to call as witnesses at the trial." The rule further authorizes several sanc-
tions, including prohibiting the use of an undisclosed witness, in order 
to insure compliance. Noncompliance with the provisions of the rule does 
not by itself constitute reversible error, but it is incumbent upon the trial 
judge to determine whether the state's noncompliance has resulted in 
harm or prejudice to the defendant.930 The court must make an adequate 
inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances, particularly into the 
effect of the state's noncompliance on the ability of the defendant to 
prepare properly for trial. If the circumstances were non-prejudicial, 
they must affirmatively appear in the record.931 Similarly, the testimony 
of defense witnesses should not be summarily excluded where the defen-
dant did not furnish a witness list pursuant to the rule.932 The court in 
Williams v. State warned that the discovery rule should not be artificially 
or technically administered but requires instead a "careful and discerning 
employment of the court's discretion," taking into consideration such 
factors as the reason for the noncompliance, the extent of prejudice to the 
state and the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by some intermediate 
procedure.933 While the power to prohibit a witness from testifying is 
available under the rule, it should be employed only under the most 
compelling circumstances, where the omission can not be remedied 
otherwise. 934 
Thus, a trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the 
state to use a rebuttal witness not previously listed where the need for 
such testimony was prompted by testimony on behalf of the defendant 
and where such need reasonably could not have been anticipated.9311 De-
spite the fact that the defendant had invoked reciprocal discovery, where 
the state failed to inform the defendant of the fact that his co-ctetenoam 
n11.1.1 turned state's witness and would testify against him, such nou-
compliance on the part of the state did not warrant reversal, absent 
inquiry into the surrounding circumstances.936 The exclusion of the testi-
mony of a doctor, offered as a witness for the defendant in a rape prosecu-
930. Camivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Richardson v. State, 
246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). Accord, Ray v. State, 262 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
931. Carnivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), citing Ramirez v. State, 
241 So. 2d 744 {Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). 
932. Williams v. State, 264 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
933. Id. at 107-08. 
934. Id., citing Sheridan v. State, 258 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). 
935. Rowan v. State, 252 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
936. Carnivale v. State, 271 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
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tion was proper for want of compliance with the rule requiring that the 
names of witnesses on the issue of insanity be furnished in advance.937 
Where a state's witness was available and not otherwise secreted by 
the prosecution, and the defendant made no attempt to take the deposi-
tion of such witness, the trial court's order refusing to vacate a prior 
order excluding the testimony of the witness was error and sanctions, if 
any, should have been imposed against the witness for non-appearance 
pursuant to rule 3.220(f).938 A trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting police officers to testify although they had not appeared for 
discovery depositions, where ·the officers' failure to respond was not de-
liberate. 939 
2. PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF STATEMENTS OF STATE WITNESSES 
Under certain circumstances, provided for in rule 3.220(a) (1) (ii), 
the defendant is entitled to written statements given to agents of the 
state by witnesses identified in the exchange of witness lists. Where the 
defendant was furnished a list of witnesses and could have deposed them, 
the denial of both a motion to produce statements made by prospective 
witnesses to the police, and a motion for a copy of investigative reports 
relating to prospective jurors, did not constitute a denial of the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.940 A defendant is not entitled as of right to a 
pretrial copy of all written statements made by witnesses to police 
officers, nor to a complete and detailed report on any and all prospective 
jurors.941 A defendant who has failed to pursue the discovery procedures 
available to him and, additionally, has failed to demonstrate that the in-
formation sought was not otherwise available to him, cannot demonstrate 
reversible error in the state's failure to furnish certain statements made 
by a co-defendant.942 
3. DISCOVERY OF TANGIBLE PAPERS, OBJECTS AND SCIENTIFIC TESTS 
Rule 3.220(a) (l)(vi) provides for the discovery of any tangible 
papers or objects which were obtained from or belonged to the accused. 
Failure to produce requested items may warrant their exclusion from evi-
dence. Thus, the failure of the state attorney to produce a pair of sun-
glasses for the defendant's examination in response to the latter's pretrial 
motion for discovery was reversible error where the existence and dis-
937. Richardson v. State, 248 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
938. State v. DeVille, 258 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
939. Lopez v. State, 264 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Richardson v. State, 246 
So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971) for the proposition that it is the defendant's burden to show prejudicial 
error. 
940. Dixon v. State, 261 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
941. Robertson v. State, 262 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
942. Kelsey v. State, 267 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing State v. Gillespie, 227 
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). 
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covery of such glasses at the scene of the crime was a critical item in 
contradicting the defendant's alibi defense.948 
In Johnson v. State,944 the defendant moved for production of the 
fatal bullet in order to afford his own expert an opportunity to examine it. 
Although the state was unable to produce the bullet, the trial court denied 
a defense motion to suppress "any testimony from a ballistics expert re-
garding this bullet." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
versed, holding that the defendant's right to examine tangible evidence is 
a part of his right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a 
full and complete cross-examination of those witnesses. Simply by claim-
ing that they have "lost" the physical evidence, the state cannot prevent 
the exercise of these rights and then use the "lost" evidence against the 
defendant.9411 The admission into evidence of a shirt prejudicial to the 
defendant, despite the fact that it was not listed on the state's bill of 
particulars furnished pursuant to the defendant's timely motion, was 
held to be reversible error.946 
Additionally, rule 3.220(a) (l)(vi) provides for discovery of re-
ports or statements of experts, including results of physical or mental 
examinations and scientific tests and experiments. The admission of 
testimony relating to blood alcohol tests is improper where the state 
did not comply with an order granting the defendant's motion for 
· production of scientific tests and where there was no showing that 
the defendant's counsel knew that the results of such tests existed.947 
Similarly, where the state failed to produce certain pills which were the 
subject of an alleged sale of LSD, as well as the report of the chemist 
who analyzed the contents thereof' it was held that the defendant was 
prejudiced in the preparation of her defense to such extent that she was 
not accorded her right to a fair and impartial trial.948 
4. DISCOVERY OF POLICE REPORTS 
In response to the defendant's request for production of the criminal 
· and F.B.I. records of the defendant, the victim and all persons whom the 
943. Cunningham v. State, 254 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). The court noted that 
the reception of so critical an item of proof into evidence could have no effect other than to 
. surprise the defendant and present a factual issue which he was unprepared to meet and 
that, as a result, the defendant's right to due process was violated. 
944. 249 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
945. Id. 
946. Garcia v. State, 268 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The trial court also failed to 
make adequate inquiry as to why the disclosure was not made as required by Cunningham v. 
State, 254 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
947. Sheridan v. State, 258 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). Such a test, administered 
while the defendant was unconscious, was crucial and material to the charge of manslaughter 
by intoxication and the testimony regarding the test proved the only incriminating evidence. 
Additionally, the court held that a trial judge, faced with the state's failure to disclose, 
should make careful inquiry as to why disclosure was not made, the extent of the prejudice 
to the defendant and all other relevant circumstances before it can properly exercise its 
discretion. 
948. Lowell v. State, 253 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). 
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state intended to call at trial, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. 
Crawjord,949 held that the state may be required to disclose to defense 
counsel any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant or of 
any prospective state witnesses, if such material and information is 
within its possession. If such information is not in the possession of the 
prosecuting attorney, there is no further duty on the part of the state to 
secure it. With respect to the conviction records indicated above, if a 
witness denies having been convicted of a crime and the prosecution 
knows that such is not the case, then the state has an obligation to pro-
vide the defense counsel with the information which would lead him to 
admissible evidence, but neither a criminal record nor an F.B.I. rap sheet 
is admissible for that purpose.950 The holding of the supreme court in 
Crawford was extended by the District Court of Appeal, First District, 
in State v. Coney,951 which held that it is the state's duty to furnish the 
defendant not only those records of criminal convictions which were in 
their possession, but those which were in the constructive possession of 
the state attorney as well. The court further held that the state must 
furnish all pertinent and material information requested by a defendant 
which is necessary to assure him of a fair trial and which is not other-
wise available to him, even if not in its actual possession, if it can be 
readily procured from the Bureau of Law Enforcement of the State of 
Florida or the F.B.1.952 Before a defendant is entitled to such information, 
the trial court must decide whether all or any part of the information is 
readily available to him by the exercise of due diligence, subpoena, de-
position or otherwise. If not, the court must make a determination as to 
whether the information sought may be admissible and useful to the 
defendant because it is material and exculpatory.953 
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Johnson v. State,9M 
held that a police report was admissible for impeachment purposes, as a 
result of certain discrepancies between the arresting officer's in-court 
testimony regarding the defendant's jacket which was inexplicably lost 
by the police, and his report submitted on the night of the commission 
of the alleged crime. The denial to a probationer of the opportunity to 
examine a report of the probation and parole commission at his proba-
tion revocation hearing did not deprive him of his right to cross-examine 
and to confront witnesses, since such a report is for the confidential use 
and consideration of the court and is not a police document.955 
949. 257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972), quashing 245 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). The 
supreme court granted certiorari based on conflict between the District Court of Appeal, First 
District's holding in Crawford and prior decisions in Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 
(Fla. 1970) and State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969). 
950. State v. Crawford, 257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972). 
951. 272 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973). 
952. Id. 
953. This provision raised the prospect of a mandatory in camera inspection following 
each request for discovery in this area. 
954. 268 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), citing Pitts v. State, 247 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1971 I 
and State v. Pitts, 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971). 
955. Blackbum v. State, 261 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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B. Motion to Dismiss 
Rule 3.190(b) provides that all defenses available to a defendant, 
other than the plea of not guilty shall be made by a motion to dismiss. 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Carroll v. State,956 held that an accused 
has a right to be charged by an information free from patent defects and 
that the sufficiency or validity thereof may be tested by a motion to dis-
miss; 
Rule 3.190(c)(4) permits the defendant to move to dismiss the in-
formation on the ground that there are no material disputed facts and 
the undisputed facts do not establish a prima fade case of guilt against 
the defendant. In State v. West, 951 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth 
District, held that in a summary judgment proceeding the trial court may 
not try or determine factual issues, nor consider either the weight of the 
conflicting evidence or the credibility of the witnesses in determining 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Thus the trial court 
erred in granting a motion to dismiss where it assumed the role of the 
trier of fact in resolving the issue of the state of mind of the defendant.958 
A trial judge in a criminal prosecution has been held to have the 
inherent power to make a finding that a criminal prosecution has been 
abandoned. 959 
C. New Trial 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.590(a) requires that a motion 
for a new trial be made within four days, or such greater time as the court 
may allow, not to exceed 15 days, after the rendition of the verdict or 
the finding of the court. It appears to be well settled in Florida that this 
time limit is jurisdictional and strictly enforced, and that the trial court 
has no discretion to grant the motion after the expiration of the time 
limit.960 Thus, without such jurisdiction, the trial judge could not act upon 
his own motion.961 The rule has been interpreted to require that the mo-
tion be made within 15 days following the factual determination of guilt as 
made by the judge when sitting without a jury; it does not run from the 
date of formal adjudication of guilt.962 
The failure to grant a hearing on the motion for new trial before 
denying the same is not error.968 Further, the defendant need not be 
present at a hearing on a motion for a new trial.964 
956. 251 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1971). Additionally, the court held that a genuine motion 
testing the validity of an information does not serve to toll the running of the speedy trial 
rule. 
957. 262 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
958. Id. 
959. State v. Alvarez, 258 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
960. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Adams v. State, 250 So. 2d 
309 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing Long v. State, 96 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1957). 
961. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
962. Martin v. State, 262 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
963. Johnson v. State, 248 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Tibbits v. State, 146 
Fla. 69, 200 So. 373 (Fla. 1941). 
964. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
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The grounds upon which the court must grant a new trial are listed 
in rule 3.600. An oral motion where the defendant did not proffer any 
grounds for a new trial may properly be denied.965 Further, a trial judge 
may not grant a new trial simply because it will do no harm.966 Sub-
section (a) (3) of rule 3.600 authorizes a new trial if new and material 
evidence is discovered, which "would probably have changed the verdict," 
and if the defendant could not with "reasonable diligence have discovered 
and produced [it] at trial." A motion for a new trial is not properly 
granted upon the ground of newly discovered evidence where the evidence 
so discovered goes merely to impeach witnesses who testified at the 
trial.967 Absent a showing that the existence of certain witnesses was not 
known to the defendant prior to trial·, a claim that there were new wit-
nesses who would be able to give testimony favorable to the defendant 
does not constitute a sufficient basis upon which to grant a new trial.968 
There was no error when a trial judge in the exercise of his discretion 
determined that due to the unavailability of a witness, justice required 
a new trial.969 
It is well settled in Florida that a timely motion for a new trial is a 
prerequisite to the preservation of appellate review based on insufficiency 
of the evidence, except in those cases where the defendant is sentenced to 
death.970 The general rule is applicable whether the trial is before a 
jury or before the court without a jury, despite the argument that by 
rendering a judgment against a defendant in a non-jury trial, the court 
necessarily will have determined that the evidence was sufficient.971 In 
Huntley v. State,912 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held 
that the defendant's filing of a notice of appeal prior to this timely filing 
of a motion for a new trial, rendered that motion a nullity, and defendant 
thereby waived his right to file the motion for new trial. Thus, the sub-
sequent filing of the motion for a new trial was useless in preserving the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence for appellate consideration.978 
D. Severance, Joinder and Consolidation 
Rule 3.lSO(a) permits the joinder of two or more offenses in the 
same information with a separate count for each offense, when the offenses 
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more connected 
965. Quartz v. State, 258 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing Silver v. State, 188 So. 
2d 300 (Fla. 1966). 
966. State v. Pinto, 273 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). 
967. Weeks v. State, 253 ~o. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
968. Luster v. State, 262 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
969. State v. Levine, 258 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
970. State v. Owens, 233 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1970); Huntley v. State, 267 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 
4th Dist. 1972); Martin v. State, 262 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); Wells v. State, 249 
So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). 
971. Wells v. State, 249 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing State v. Wright, 224 So. 
2d 300 (Fla. 1969). 
972. 267 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
973. Id. 
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acts. The trial court in Moore v. State914 denied a motion to sever offenses 
and the defendant was tried upon a two count information which charged 
separate incidents of robbery and attempted robbery. The District Court 
of Appeal, Third District, held that the two incidents occurring on the 
same night and in the same general vicinity were "connected together" 
within the meaning of the rule,975 and thus the trial court did not commit 
error, despite the defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by their trial 
together. 976 
Pursuant to rule 3.151, two or more informations charging related977 
offenses shall be consolidated for trial on a timely motion by a defendant. 
It is well recognized that consolidation for the trial of criminal cases 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.978 In Ashley v. State,979 
the trial court refused to grant the defendant's motion for consolidation 
of five homicide cases in one trial. The supreme court affirmed, holding 
that one homicide was committed at a different time and was factually 
unrelated to the other cases, thereby justifying the refusal to consolidate. 
Further, the consolidation of two or more separate criminal charges is 
not a matter of right and must be moved for by the party desiring it.980 
Thus, it was improper for a trial court to force the defendant to defend 
two separate informations charging separate and distinct felonies before 
the same jury.981 
In Rowe v. State,982 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 
upheld the trial court's denial of a motion for severance on the part of 
a defendant. The court was confronted with evidence concerning the flight 
of a co-defendant from the scene of the arrest and so ruled notwithstand-
ing the fact that such evidence had been ruled inadmissible against the 
moving def end~nt. 
E. Continuance 
Rule 3.190(g) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that the court may in its discretion grant a continuance for good cause 
shown. It appears well established in Florida that the granting or denial 
of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court 
and that its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a 
clear showing that there has been a palpable abuse of that discretion to 
974. 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
975. FI.A. R. CRIM. P. 3.150(a), formerly rule 3.140(d) (4). 
976. Moore v. State, 259 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
977. Rule 3.15l(a) defines "related" to mean "if they are triable in the same court and 
are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more connected acts or transactions." 
978. Hall v. State, 66 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1953); Baker v. Rowe, 102 Fla. 622, 136 So. 681 
(1931). 
979. 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972). 
980. Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972). 
981. Id. The defendant was forced to admit as the basis for self-defense to the homicide 
charge that he was carrying a concealed weapon, which was the gravamen of the other charge. 
982. 250 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971). Judge Mann, in his dissent, stressed the weak-
ness of limiting instructions and the fact that the inadmissible evidence was prejudicial, not 
merely cumulative. 
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the disadvantage of the accused.983 It is not an abuse of discretion to deny 
a continuance for the purpose of presenting a witness, where the case had 
been set for trial for a considerable period of time and the defendant 
failed to take the necessary steps to insure the presence of the witness.984 
Neither was it an abuse of discretion to deny an oral motion for con-
tinuance for additional psychiatric examinations, when that motion was 
made at the call of the case for trial three months after the reports of 
the court-appointed psychiatrists were filed.985 The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance despite the publica-
tion of news stories relating to the case shortly before trial was to com-
mence. 986 
The failure of the defendant to retain private counsel until the eve 
of trial, despite the fact that 11 days intervened between his arraignment 
and trial did not render the trial court's denial of a continuance an abuse 
of discretion.987 The argument that counsel had not had an opportunity 
to fully prepare a defense has met with little success in contesting the 
denial of a continuance, particularly when the defendant contributed to 
the change of counsel prior to trial.988 The denial of a continuance was 
held to be within the court's discretion where the defendant requested a 
continuance in order to obtain private counsel after the jury was swom.989 
A request for a continuance was not improperly denied where the only 
ground was dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel.990 There was no 
abuse of discretion in denying a motion for a continuance on the ground 
that retained counsel would be out of state on the trial date, where defen-
dant had been represented for two months by a public defender, had 
retained private counsel only one week before trial and where private 
counsel was absent only during jury selection, during which the defendant 
was represented by the public defender.991 
Where the court granted a continuance of the motion to suppress, 
on the condition that the defendant inform the court when he was ready 
to proceed, the court was not in error in proceeding to trial, absent objec-
tion or a request for a hearing on the motion.992 
XX:IX. LEGISLATION 
Florida Statutes section 910.035 (Supp. 1972),993 has been added to 
permit a person who is held in custody in a county other than the county 
983. Mills v. State, 280 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Angell v. State, 271 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 
3d Dist. 1972); Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
984. Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
985. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
986. Harrelson v. State, 259 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). 
987. Palladino v. State, 267 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
988. Gause v. State, 270 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
989. Fuller v. Wainwright, 268 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972). 
990. Tilly v. State, 256 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
991. Angell v. State, 271 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
992. Dickenson v. State, 261 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). 
993. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-45. 
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in which an indictment or information is pending against him, to waive 
trial on a charge pending in the other county and have his case disposed 
of in the county in which he is being held. But he must agree in writing 
to plead guilty or nolo contendere and the prosecuting attorney of the 
county in which the charge is pending must consent. The statute also 
provides that if the defendant pleads not guilty after the transfer, the 
case will be transferred for disposition to the court of the county in which 
the prosecution was commenced. 
Florida Statutes sections 404.01 (3) and 404.02 ( 1) (Supp. 1972) ,994 
have been amended to include marijuana (cannabis) within the scope of 
the Florida drug abuse law. Cannabis is now included within the defini-
tion of an "hallucinogenic drug." 
Florida Statutes subsections 775.082(2) and (3) (Supp. 1972),995 
provide that if the death penalty is held unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court of Florida or the United States Supreme Court, persons previously 
sentenced to death shall be brought before the appropriate court and re-
sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole. Florida Laws 
1972, chapter 72-724,996 creates a category of life felonies less serious 
than capital felonies but more serious than felonies of particular degrees. 
It provides that capital felonies be punished either by death or life im-
prisonment with a minimum of 2 5 years' service before parole considera-
tion. It also provides that life felonies be punished by life imprisonment 
or a term of not less than 30 years. 
Florida Statutes section 93 9 .1 7 (Supp. 19 72), 997 provides that in 
criminal prosecutions any judgment against the defendant for costs or 
a fine may be satisfied from any cash bond deposited by the defendant. 
Florida Statutes section 776.04 (Supp. 1972) ,998 reduces the penalty 
for an attempt to commit a misdemeanor from misdemeanor of the first 
degree to misdemeanor of the second degree. The crime of larceny has 
been redefined to include, specifically, the stealing of real or personal 
property and a second conviction for petit larceny is now punishable as 
a misdemeanor of the first degree.999 
Florida Statutes section 837.021 (Supp. 1972),1°00 provides that the 
wilful making of two or more contradictory material statements under 
oath in trials, depositions, affidavits and the like is punishable as a felony 
of the third degree. Other newly created felonies of the third degree are 
tampering with jurors,1°01 tampering with or fabricating physical evi-
994. Amended by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-97. 
995. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-118. 
996. Amending FLA. STAT. §§ 775.081(1), 779.07, 782.04, 790.16, 790.161, 794.01, 805.02 
(1971). 
997. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-235. 
998. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-245. 
999. FLA. STAT.§ 811.021 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-252. 
1000. Created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-314. 
1001. FLA. STAT.§ 918.12 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315. 
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dence,1°02 tampering with a witness1003 and, as to a witness, to solicit or 
accept a bribe to testify or inform falsely or to withhold information.1004 
Florida Statutes sections 27.51(1) and 27.54(2) (Supp. 1972),1°011 
now authorize public def enders to represent indigents accused of mis-
demeanors or violations of county or municipal ordinances. Counties and 
municipalities are authorized to provide funds for this service. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-27,1°06 provides that persons accused 
of misdemeanors, violations carrying civil penalties, or violations of mu-
nicipal or county ordinances may be released upon issuance of a "notice 
to appear" in lieu of being arrested. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-71,1°07 requires trial judges to provide 
credit in a defendant's sentence for all time spent in the county jail 
prior to sentencing. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-120,1008 makes unlawful the distribu-
tion of obscene materials, as well as requiring purchasers of other goods 
or services to accept obscene materials as a condition to delivery or per-
formance. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-271,1°00 allows peace officers to make 
arrests for shoplifting, either on or off the store premises, if based on 
probable cause. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-257,1010 makes it a felony of the third 
degree to attempt to break and enter with the intent to commit a mis-
demeanor. 
Florida Laws 1973, chapter 73-194,1°11 provides that a grand jury 
report or presentment not accompanied by a true bill or indictment shall 
not be made public until the individual concerned has received a copy 
and has been given 15 days to move that any improper or unlawful part 
be expunged. The motion shall stay public announcement until the circuit 
court's ruling thereon is affirmed or denied by the district court of appeal. 
1002. FLA. STAT. § 918.13 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315. 
1003. FLA. STAT.§ 918.14 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315. 
1004. FLA. STAT.§ 914.14 (Supp. 1972), created by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-315. 
1005. Amended by Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-722. 
1006. Creating FLA. STAT.§§ 901.27-.32, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 901.06, .23 (1971). 
1007. Amending FLA. STAT. § 921.161(1) (1971). 
1008. Creating FLA. STAT.§ 847.07-.09 (1973). 
1009. Amending FLA. STAT.§ 811.022(2) (1973). 
1010. Creating FLA. STAT.§ 810.05(2) (1973). 
1011. Creating FLA. STAT.§ 905.28 (1973). 
